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ABSTRACT
One current analysis of the urban scene suggests that the central city and
its suburbs are one urban system. This analysis implies that the problems found in
the central city - unemployment, poor education, substandard housing, etc. -
cannot be solved solely in or by the central city. Many of the problems can be
solved by moving the central city's low and moderate income families to the sub-
urbs where they are near the resources - good jobs, good schools, etc. However,
the effort to disperse these families by building subsidized housing in the suburbs
has met resistance.
Much of the resistance of the suburbanites is based on legitimate goals.
Since the placement of subsidized housing in the suburbs is a political question
and resistance has been encountered, it is important to examine the rationales
for pursuing a dispersal policy. The main rationales are: 1) shelter for both the
suburban and the central city ill-housed; 2) social engineering - jobs, schools,
heterogeneity; 3) diluting the growing Black power base in the cities; 4) the
quasi-moral and Constitutional rights of the poor. However, most of the rationales
have alternative means of achievement which weaken their ability to support a
dispersal strategy. The thesis then examines three examples of government handling
of the issue of building subsidized housing in the suburbs.
The example on the local level is a case study of a "liberal" suburb -
Newton, Massachusetts. Rather than being typical of suburban reaction to the
subsidized housing proposals, Newton was chosen because it showed signs of being
a suburb that would welcome subsidized housing. The political environment seemed
receptive and the argument for bui-lding the housing was simply to adequately
rehouse ill-housed Newtonites - not the Black core of Boston. The proposal
polarized the community and the government did not approve the necessary zoning
changes. Various characteristics of purposive and material interest groups as well
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as the characteristics of local politics which might be applicable to other suburbs
are suggested as explanations for the failure.
If the suburban political systems cannot handle the issue, then perhaps the
states can force them to meet their own and the central city's subsidized housing
need. Massachusetts made an effort in this direction by passing the "anti-snob
zoning" law (Chapter 774) in 1969. Massachusetts is rated as an innovative
state. If any state would have "dispersal" as an "idea in good currency" it
would be Massachusetts. If "dispersal" were an "idea in good currency" other
states would be likely to follow Massachusetts' lead. However, the analysis of
the passage of the b ill suggests that reasons other than pro-dispersal, reasons
peculiar to Massachusetts politics in 1969, were responsible for its passage. Thus
the case indicates that states are not likely to effectively handle the dispersal
issue in the near future.
Since the federal level politician is the least politically vulnerable,
perhaps he can deal with dispersal. However, the implementation tools or levers
at the federal level are difficult to use and really inadequate. A case study of
the Nixon Administration's "open communities" policy indicates that even the
federal government is too politically vulnerable. The American political system
apparently needs some type of political protection or scapegoat to implement a
dispersal policy. Court action is a possibility.
Thesis Advisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Assistant Professor
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SUBSIDIZED HOUSING: RUNNING THE SUBURBAN GAUNTLET
INTRODUCTION: DISPERSAL POLICY
The desire to engage in residential discrimination
so as to exclude others from one's own neighbor-
hood is regarded as immoral, illegitimate, and
otherwise bad by many urban planners. I disagree.
I believe that desire is fundamental to human nature,
and is rooted in many entirely legitimate purposes.
Yet at the same time, the desire of deprived
households to gain access to benefits from which
they are not geographically excluded is equally
fundamental, and equally legitimate.
-- Anthony Downs, 1970
Most Americans live in metropolitan areas. Most metropolitanites
live in suburbia - target of social critics in the early fifties, subject of
social scientists in the late fifties. Second billed under Urban Crisis in the
sixties, the suburbs now are prescribed as the panacea for all America's
urban ills. Criticism, analysis, and neglect did not rouse the suburbanite
from his lawn chair. But cure the central city's problems by dispersing some
of its low and moderate income people to suburbia? To his feet with a shout-
wrong address I
9.
Since 1950 the majority of Americans have been metropolitart dwellers.
The 1970 Census shows that metropolitan growth continued to the point where
71 percent of the population of the United States lived in the 230 Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The distribution of populati on numbers and
growth within the SMSAs is skewed to the suburban rather than the central
city side. Since 1960 about half of the central cities in the large (500,000 +)
SMSAs lost population while their suburbs gained. Seven out of the ten
Massachusetts central cities lost population. Across the United States, the
suburban population increased 25 percent while the central city population
grew only 10 percent in the last ten years. Massachusetts has been slightly
ahead of the trend making the population decidedly suburban in 1970.
Now the majority of metropolitanites are suburbanites.
As suburbia attracts people, it generates comment, controversyand
criticism. Many social critics of the 1950s and early 1960s condemned
suburbia as unfit for humane habitation. "Homogeneous" characterized
the malignancy. Demographically described, suburbia contained young,
white, nuclear families. Sociologically, it was called the togetherness
society, the land of the upward-mobile middle class, child-centered,
female-dominated and materialistic. Psychologically, the inhabitants were
"other-directed"-- that is, organization-directed. Ideologically, the
suburbs turned liberal Democrats into complacent Republicans. "The
essence of suburbia is monumentalized in its architecture: 'My GodI--
all the houses are identicalI"'
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This "mode rn-Siren" reputation of suburbia was toned down by the
scholarly works of social scientists Herbert Gans, William Dobriner,
Robert C. Wood, and others. Gans' study of Levittown, N.J., for example,
showed that the move to suburbia did not basically change the life styles
of the central-city emigrants. A 1968 Presidential task force study denied
the "homogeneous" argument and declared the suburbs were "aching with
social, physical, and economic strains..." quite unlike those described
by the earlier social critics. Scott Donaldson completed an autopsy on the
"controversy" in his 1969 book, The Suburban Myth. (For a statistical
description of suburbia based, for the most part, on 1960 U.S. Census
data, please see the Appendix-- STATISTICAL SUBURBS.)
The changing perception of the social critics and social scientists
did not appear to influence the decisions of most people. During the period
of the most vehement attacks, the suburbs attracted 80 percent of the
metropolitan growth (1950-1960). The migration pattern in the 1955-1960
period shows 5.1 million people moved from the central cities to the suburbs,
while 1.8 million reversed the direction.
In the late sixties, bored with the suburban subject matter or satisfied
with their analysis, social critics and scientists discovered THE URBAN CRISIS.
While the suburbs grew, central cities' resources diminished and respon-
sibilities increased. Along with many middle class families, retail and indus-
trial enterprises migrated out of the city's tax grasp. The city's proportion
of the poor--black and white, unskilled, rural migrant--increased. Demands
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on the city institutions increased concurrently. The city's physical plant
deteriorated.
Unable to satisfy the demands for adequate employment, education,
public services, etc., but virtually abandoned by state governments, the
cities found tea and sympathy at the Federal level. The Feds provided
sympathy in the form of programs--public housing, urban renewal, war on
poverty, model cities, etc. But the tea was indeed weak--program funding
was minimal. Lack of obvious successes, underlined by the ghetto riots,
started urban observers reconsidering the entire "gilding the ghetto" strategy.
Not only was money unobtainable to execute the strategy but, perhaps,
the strategy itself was misconceived. Instead of a central city and suburbs--
separate and distinct--perhaps there was really an URBAN SYSTEM--un-
rendably interwoven. Consequently all the causes and all the solutions to
the problems of the central city were not to be found in the central city.
Ironically, Mr. Middle America himself--Vice President Spiro T. Agnew--
was heard propounding this line of analysis in 1970:
What these programs (Model Cities and housing programs)
have in common is an underlying s trategy based on a false
assumption: the assumption that because the problems of
race and poverty are found in the ghettos of urban America,
the solutions to these problems must also be found there.
These ghetto-oriented programs largely ignore the geographic
distribution of resource throughout metropolitan regions. The
resources needed to solve the urban poverty problem--land,
money, and jobs--are presently in scarce supply in the
inner cities. They exist in substantial supply in the suburban
areas but are not being utilized to solve inner-city problems
-I
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or combat poverty or discrimination. As a result, ghetto
residents are denied the income gains and improvements
in housing quality that would result from freer access to
suburban jobs and land.
The logic of this analysis leads to a "dispersal strategy. " If the
resources to solve the central city's problems are in the suburbs, then move
the inner city poor out to suburbia to get the good job, good education,
good. public services, clean air, safe streets and open space.
Since the private market seems unable to build and rehabilitate
housing for low and moderate income families, serious consideration of a
dispersal policy has only been made possible by the recent increases in
governmental housing subsidies. Since Section 236 (multi-family units for
low and moderate income families) of the 1968 Housing Act has been in
operation, units have been constructed. This figure can be contrasted
to the 116,000 units constructed under the predecessor program 221d3
between 1961 and 1969. The federal government also provides subsidies
for homeownership for low income families (Section 235), elderly housing
and the traditional public housing for low income families. Some states have
been initiating their own housing subsidies. Massachusetts, for instance,
has an elderly program, low-income family housing program, and middle-low
income interest subsidy program. Although the amount of subsidies available
relative to the "need" is still inadequate, the basic problem with the imple-
mentation of the dispersal strategy lies elsewhere. The problem seems to
be land. When the urbanists looked at suburbia they found it ZONED UP.
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ZONED UP is actually a catch-all invective for a variety of "gate-
keeping" devices available to each suburb. Present residents can use one
or several devices to restrict "their" town to subjectively defined "desirables."
The "gates" towns can use include prohibitions against multi-family housing;
requirements on minimum floor space, living density, and minimum building
size; costly building code requirements; and last and most popularized by
the media - large lot zoning. When the new THE SOLUTION to America's
domestic ills was announced, pronounced, prescribed and described by
everyone from Presidential Commissions to Time, the barricades did not
come tumbling down. Not even the MIT-Harvard liberal intellectuals,
concentrated in Lexington, Massachusetts, seemed able to convince their
neighbors, perhaps themselves, to accept a small multi-family development
for low and moderate income families. A referendum defeated such a pro-
posal by a factor of three to one in the spring of 1971.
14.
NATURE OF THE RESISTANCE: Legitimate and Illegitimate Goals
The dispersal solution to the central city problem has not been readily
accepted but rather rancorously rejected by many suburbanites. The popular
explanation for this resistance is -- White Racism. The resistance is much more
complex. It involves the legitimate goals of middle class value dominance
and financial security as well as the illegitimate goals of social distance and
racial segregation.
The dispersal strategy involves change. The evidence presented in
the "social change" literature indicates that resistance to any change in
1
the status quo is typical of individuals and social institutions. Resistance
occurs even if the promised future benefits outweigh the immediate costs.
"Change" is mentioned as a factor in this issue because of its mag-
nitude. The dispersal strategy can mean socio-economic integration. Class
integration, which would include racial integration, is simply not common in
metropolitan America. A change in this pattern of economic segregation will
affect several critical aspects of a middle class family's life. People of similar
life styles have clumped together in homogeneous neighborhoods for reasons that
1. Goodwin Watson, "Resistance to Change," Goodwin Watson (ed.),
Concepts for Social Change, Cooperative Project for Educational Development
Series, 1 (Washington, D.C.: National Training Laboratories, 1966).
'7
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are not wholly irrational or inherently evil.
The most salient rationale for economic segregation from a middle class
view concerns childrearing. Most parents want to instill their values in their
children. Thus parents rationally seek environments - neighborhoods and
schools - which will reinforce not counteract the parents' values. Because
of the excessive costs of private education, the middle class parents must rely
on the public school system. The public school population is usually drawn
from a geographically defined area. Thus the socio-economic characteristics
of both the child's neighborhood playgroup and his school peer group are
based on the residential neighborhoods. Thus the parent, thinking that fami-
lies of similar income will share similar value orientations, seeks to keep his
neighborhood economically homogeneous.
Resistance can be reduced by guaranteeing the dominance of the
middle class in the public school. But some parents will still object from the
fear that their children might "hang arourd with the wrong bunch. " Reducing
resistance at the neighborhood level is more difficult. The impact is like
the pebble tossed in the pool. The socio-economic waves of the low-moder-
ate-income housing (LMIH) weaken the further one lives from the project. But
2. Much of the following discussion is fairly common knowledge.
However, one of the clearest explanations was given by Anthony Downs
before the Mondale Committee. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee
on Equal Educational Opportunity, Equality of Educational Opportunity,
Part 5, De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination, 91st Congress,
2nd Session, August 25, 26, 27 and September 1, 1970, pp. 2966-2980.
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the area surrounding the LMIH is inundated. Even with small developments of
twenty to fifty units, the socio-economic ecology will change drastically. The
few families in single family homes, for instance, near a multi-family develop-
ment would be in the socio-economic minority. Their children's peer group
could be dominated by children of a lower socio-economic class. If it were
economically feasible and legally possible, the resistance could be reduced by
very thin scatteration of five or fewer units per site. However, there is the
possibility this degree of scatteration could lead to the social isolation of the
low and moderate income families.
While homogeneous neighborhoods are most important to the middle
class. suburbanite for child-rearing, he has other rational objections to low-
income families in his neighborhood. It is well known to suburbanites that
the lower class has a higher rate of violent crime than the middle class.
Knowledge that lower class "elements" are in the area would tend to con-
strict the suburbanites' ease and patterns of movement. Travel relatively
free of the fear of being mugged and robbed is a major attraction of suburbia.
Then too, the lower class's noisier public deportment is distressing to middle
class suburbanites. The suburbanite also has visions of the lower class families
"misusing" their property - burning trash, selling worms (instead of Kool- Aid)
on the street, running noisy machines, etc. All in all, the suburbanite feels




The dispersal issue is redistributive. It is in the rational self-interest
of the middle class suburbanite to resist LMIH from a financial perspective.
The middle class suburbanite probably has the least difficulty with
redistribution on the federal and state level. But he occasionally does remember
that his state and federal taxes are subsidizing LMIH to some extent.
On the local level, the suburbanite can measure the cost of LMIH
in his town by the increase in his tax rate. The taxes on the LMIH develop-
ments may not cover the cost of their residents' service demands - especially
on the schools. Thus the taxes of the existing residents go up without a con-
current increase in services.
The neighbor of a LMIH project has still another financial reason to
resist. The value of his property may decrease. Since a house is often the
family's major investment, the resistance to its possible devaluation is both
rational and intense. While it is often pointed out that house values do not
always go down - sometimes they go up - there is always the fear that the
value might go down.
Resistance based on the redistributive argument might be reduced by
giving bonuses to school districts which LMIH (or some other means of
changing- the school financing method) and by guaranteeing the value of
nearby houses. However, objectors will point out that the middle class
suburbanite is merely bribing himself with his own taxes.
Residential exclusion is also the result of motivations which are not
necessary to the family's cultural and financial maintenance. A family's
address locates it on the socio-economic strata as well as geographically
within the metropolitan area. Tony Downs notes that the desire to maintain
"social distance" between the family and families of lower socio-economic
1
status is "a nearly universal practice in human societies." This rather
strong motive is not easily dealt with by bribes. A change in attitude is
necessary.
White racism is the remaining factor in the resistance to LMIH.
This factor is an unknown percentage of the total resistance. Even looking
at racism alone it is difficult to determine what part of white racism is
actually class based. Most undesirable characteristics associated with
Blacks in the middle class suburbanite mind are inherent in the lower class
not the Negro race or culture. If most racism is class based, then there is
a much better chance of reducing resistance through appeals to reason,
bribes and guaranteed maintenance of middle class dominance.
Considering all the components, the resistance to a dispersal strategy
will not soon be crushed under the weight of the purple prose in Newsweek
et al. Nor can the conflict be relegated to the private market. If low
and moderate income families are to be adequately housed, state and federal
governments must provide subsidies. If low and moderate income families
are to be adequately housed in suburbia, some level (s) of government must
1. Ibid., p. 29- .
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must free some suburban land from the restrictions against LMIH imposed
through local governments. Between the suburban resistance and the normal
inertia of government this action will not come easily. Therefore, it is
important to examine the rationales for a dispersal policy. Are the objectives
the policy seeks to obtain valid and necessary? Is dispersal the sole means
of reaching the objective or are there alternatives? If alternatives exist,
the objective is weakened intellectually and politically as a rationale or
pi liar for the dispersal policy. What degree of scatteration is necessary
to reach the objective? This will determine to some extent the degree of
resistance which can be expected. Who are the supporters of the rationales
and at what level of government do they have strength?
PILLARS OF POLICY: Shelter, Social Engineering, Black Power, and
Constitutional Rights
There are four major categories of rationales or pillars which are
used to support the effort to construct LMIH in the suburbs. One is pure
"shelter" argument. The "shelter" rationale has two components. First
there is the "need" to build LMIH in the suburbs to adequately house the
ill-housed suburban poor. Secondly, there is a "need" to build LMIH in
the suburbs for the ill-housed low and moderate-income families living in
the central city. A seond set of arguments can be grouped under "social
engineering. " Somehow society will function better if the low- and
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moderate-income families concentrated in the central city can be dispersed
into the suburbs. Having access to good jobs and good education, the poor
will better themselves and become productive members of society. The
suburbanifes will benefit from the heterogenity this will bring into their
monotonous daily lives. Dispersed among the suburbs, poor families will
have successful family models to imitate. The problems of poverty which are
compounded by concentration can better be solved when families are
dispersed. A third argument for dispersing the poor and especially the Black
among the suburbs concerns political control of the central city. The fourth
pillar of policy is a quasi-moral or Constitutional argument concerning the
right of the present residents of a suburb to restrict future residents on the
basis of income. We.will.examin.e these four arguments in more depth.
Shelter - Suburban Need and Central City Ill Housed
The simplest and least controversial argument for building LMIH in
the suburbs is to provide adequate housing for the approximately two and one
half million suburban families living in substandard quarters. Logic supports
the validity of the argument - if an adequate supply of LMIH existed, these
families would not be living in substandard housing.
Alternatives to replacing the substandard housing in the suburb in
which it is found might occur to the suburbanite. The ill-housed could simply
move to areas which have standard housing. This argument may be valid
for individual housing markets but not for the national aggregate - there
is simply an inadequate supply of standard LMIH . Another alternative is to
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build the housing needed in another locality. The argument that a suburb
should take care of its own need may seem to be a moral rather than a physical
or economic imperative to many suburbanites.
The degree of scatteration necessary to simply provide adequate housing
is nil. The housing could be rehabilitated or replaced in the same location.
This will leave the poor somewhat concentrated within the suburbs and concen-
trated in the "inner" suburbs. For example, 90% of the Boston SMSA's
suburban poor live in less than half the suburbs.
This simple suburban "need" argument is often expanded to cover
populations besides the ill-housed. These include the suburban low and
moderate income families paying "too much" for shelter, elderly suburbanites
living on fixed incomes driven from their hbmes by rising taxes, the grown
children of residents too poor to find housing in their "home" towns, and
town employees who allegedly will do a better job if they also lived in the
town they "served." To provide for all these populations would certainly
increase the LMIH in the suburb. Unless the units were all put in one massive
clump, opposition is likely to arise in the established neighborhoods. There are
alternatives besides either building or doing nothing for these people. Varia-
tions of housing allowances could be used to keep the elderly in their own
homes, to subsidize "children" until they could pay their own way, to
pay the city employees enough to live in the suburb, and to supplement the
income of the low and moderate income families paying over 25% of their
income for shelter. Housing allowances can eliminate the objections to
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the "Lack of quality" of subsidized housing.
The main thrust for suburbs fulfilling their "need" comes from the
builders who will profit as limited dividend sponsors. There is some "white
hat" effort but there does not appear to be any concentrated effort by the
populations who would benefit from the housing.
The second half of the shelter argument concerns the 20% (in 1960)
of central city families who live in substandard housing. The rationale is
essentially a "full up" argument. There are statements such as "Indeed, in
the nation's twenty largest urban areas, 99 percent of the vacant land lies
outside of core cities," and "It's an economic fact of life that the sites are
not available in the cities, so the subsidized housing has to go to the suburbs.'' 2
The argument is: central cities have little vacant land; this vacant land or
cleared land is too expensive for LMIH; the lack of relocation housing due
to the tight housing market (low vacancies) severely hinders the clearing and
rebuilding of substandard units.
The argument may be true but the evidence to support it is spotty.
No agency of any level of government keeps records of metropolitan vacant
land - much less the vacant land's suitability for LMIH, availability, and
1. Paul Davidoff and Neil Gold, "Suburban Action: Advocate
Planning for an Open Society," Journal of the American Institute of Planners,
36:1 (January 1970): 13.
2. William Dockser, Assistant Commissioner for Subsidized Housing,
HUD, quoted in William Lilley Ill, "Housing Report/Romney faces political
perils with plan to integrate suburbs, " National Journal , 2:42 (October 17,
1970): 2260.
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cost. The best available information is the simplistic land use inventories
periodically made by most cities' planning departments or commissions. In
1962, Rand analysts surveyed the information available from 48 of the largest
cities' planning commissions. They.concluded, "...vacant land in the larger
American cities is rapidly disappearing. " But in 1968, the National Commission
on Urban Problems made a similar survey of 106 of the 130 largest American
cities. They found, "A considerable part of the area of many major cities
is still undeveloped. Unimproved land typically makes up about one-third
of all private holdings, or more than one-fifth of the total area of cities
of 100,000-plus. Even most cities of over 250,000 have a considerable amount
2
of undeveloped land." While the great proportion of metropolitan vacant land
may indeed be found in the suburbs, this does not mean that the central cities
cannot absorb much of the subsidized housing necessary to re-house their
ill-housed low and moderate income families. Certain large cities may conform
to the stereotype but it is doubtful that the "no vacant land" suggestion is
applicable nationally.
Land costs also suffer from data scarcity. The President's Task Force
on Suburban Problems surveyed FHA (Section 203) transactions for a four-week
1. John H. Niedercorn and Edward F. R. Hearle, Recent Land-Use
Trends in Forty Eight Large American Cities (Santa Monica, California: The
Rand Corporation, 1963). p. v.
2. Allen D. Manvel, Three Land Research Studies (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 19.
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period in 1968 in five metropolitan areas (Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Oakland, Philadelphia and San Francisco). In each case they found the median
per square foot land costs. for either proposed or existing construction to be
higher in the central cities. The range was from 4% higher to triple the sub-
1
urban price. While the land may be higher in the central cities, this does
not prove that the land is "too" high. The price may exceed FHA cost limits
but those limits are administratively determined and subject to change by poli-
tical action. One can argue that it is 'economically. more efficient to build on
cheaper land but economic efficiency is not always a politically convincing
argument.
The "relocation problem" is based on the "lack of vacant land" theory.
But assuming there is a need to tear down and rebuild housing in which families
are presently living, the "relocation"argument is not as strong as it was in the
early 1960's. The vacancy rate in central cities in 1960 was a slim 1.1%
(cf. 1.3% in the suburbs). While the 1970 data is not available for all
central cities, the Boston central city figure of 6.4 % indicates that the
market is not as tight and relocation housing does exist to some extent. Also,
the recent phenomena of acres of abandoned sound building in many central
1. William Sorrentino, "Housing and Land: Some Contrasts Between the
City and the Suburbs, " in The President's Task Force on Suburban Problems,
Final Report: Statistical Papers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 164.
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cities from Houston to Boston may puzzle suburbanites who are given central
city shelter arguments as reasons for building LMIH in their neighborhoods.
As indicated above, there are alternatives to building in the suburbs
based on this rationale. Clearing and new construction as well as rehabilita-
tion mey be economically inefficient but they are physical possibilities.
The scatteration needed is similar to the suburban need. There does
not appear to be a necessity from a purely shelter aspect to put the LMIH
in established neighborhoods or in every suburb.
The main political support appears to be the National Association of
Home Builders. With the tight money market, builders find the subsidized
housing programs attractive. Naturally they want a maximum number of
site possibilities. Their major strength is at the federal level with HUD.
However, Black builders have recently become a countervailing influence.
Some have expressed their dislike of HUD efforts to move the subsidized housing
into the suburbs, feeling that their market is in the central city.
Social Engineering - Jobs, Education, Heterogeneity, Concentration
The components of the social engineering rationale are very familiar-
"The good jobs are in the suburbs.".. .. "The good schools are in the suburbs."..
... "Balanced communities are good for the individual and society. ".. .. "The
concentration of poverty breeds its own problems. " Therefore, dispersal to the
suburbs will improve the individual, the family, the society, and the economy.
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(Because the "jobs and schools" arguments are most frequently used, an exten-
sive discussion of their assumptions and the available supporting data can be
found in Appendix B. They are briefly summarized here.)
"The jobs are in the suburbs." This is the most frequently cited ra-
tionale for pursuing a dispersal strategy. Presumably, poverty, welfare, crime
will be reduced and perhaps eliminated if only the unemployed central city
poor could live near the good "growth" jobs which have moved from the central
city to the suburbs.
Available data does indicate that jobs are growing faster in the suburbs.
Some central cities have sustained absolute losses in the number of jobs.
However, the actual suburban job vacancies in the skill or non-skill level of
the central city unemployed are not available to absolutely demonstrate a sub-
urban supply-demand imbalance. There are indications that the suburban job
movement is connected with the age of the city - city life cycle theory-
some cities have acute symptoms, some none at all.
The scatteration or degree of economic integration necessary to simply
meet the "job" goal is not extensive. Low and moderate income families could
logically be concentrated within suburbs. Nor do all suburbs need to have
subsidized housing to meet this job-link goal.
Job-link can be accomplished in ways other than actually moving
families near the jobs. Industry can be moved to the central city -- "guilding
the ghetto." Or employees can be transported daily to their jobs -- "reverse
commuting." While both of these appear to be economically inefficient, they
2?.
are nevertheless alternatives for the opponents of dispersal to cite.
If American business were really losing large profits due to the lack of lower
skilled labor in the suburbs, the business community could be a significant politi-
cal force. Large firms of "desirable ratables" do have some leverage with suburbs
before they actually locate. However, there does not appear to be any great
willingness to use this clout to open restrictive suburbs for their lower or even
middle income employees -- Western Electric votes to locate in 5-acre zoned
Bedminister, N.J. RCA moves to New Canaan, Conn. The author is unaware of
any concerted or organized effort by the business community to promote subsidized
housing for their employees.
If the suburban jobs are to "save" the central city adult, the suburban schools
are to "save" their children. Supposedly, by freeing the individual from the effects
of a deprived background, education will also free American society from poverty,
crime and social rigidity. But the central city educational institutions are not
functioning properly. One causal theory suggests that the problem is the under-
funding of central city schools -- equal education is measured by equality of
expenditure. Another theory measures equal educational opportunity by the stu-
dent product. The problem with the central city educational institution according
to this analysis is the lack of middle class children in the school populations. These
faults could both be corrected by distributing poor families in the suburbs.
The curative effects of more and 'better" education on the individual
and society is vastly overrated. Perhaps the only way to nullify the detri-
mental effects of a deprived home environment on the child is to remove him
from it. Since this'solution is probably politically unacceptable and public
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faith in the education panacea is secure, policy must consider means of improving
the institution.
The -conventional school system - neighborhood schools - would require
scatteration or economic integration to the neighborhood level - the catchment
area of the elementary school. However, the e<penditure requirement could be
fulfilled and still have th.e poor concentrated in one school in the suburb.
Alternatives to dispersal include educational parks, bussing and financing
on other than a property tax basis. Educational parks are advocated by several
educational leaders, not only for the social mix they could provide but also
for educational benefits, and economies of scale. The bussing alternative would
preserve the neighborhood school and neighborhood homogeneity bur give
the schoor environment heterogeneity. The broader based financing of education
would eliminate the unequal resources basis for dispersal. The financing might
be changed through the courts, thereby avoiding political debate.
Since the education proponents can achieve their end - be they
equal education through socio-economic mixing in the school or equal educational
opportunity through equal expenditure - without a dispersal policy we note
little support for this most difficult means to the end of equal educational
opportunity.
The heterogeneity component of the "social engineering" rationale
is succinctly stated and refuted in an article by sociologist-planner Herbert
Gans.
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Population heterogeneity has generally been advocated for at
least four reasons:
1. It adds variety as well as demographic "balance " to an
area and thus enriches the inhabitants' lives. Conversely,
homogeneity is said to stultify, as well as to deprive people
of important social resources, such as the wisdom of the older
generation in the suburbs.
2. It promotes tolerance of social and cultural differences,
thus reducing political conflict and encouraging democratic
practices. Homogeneity increases the isolation between area
residents and the rest of society.
3. It provides a broadening educational influence on children,
by teaching them about the existence of diverse types of people
and by creating the opportunity for them to learn to get along
with these people. Homogeneity is thought to limit children's
knowledge of diverse classes, ages, and races, and to make them
less capable of association with others in later years.
4. It encourages exposure to alternative ways of life, for
example, by providing intelectually inclined neighbors for the
child from a bookless household, or by offering the mobile work-
ing class family an opportunity to learn middle class ways.
Homogeneity freezes people in present ways of life.
* * *
The belief in the efficacy of heterogeneity is based on the
assumption that if diverse people live together, they will in-
evitably become good neighbors or even good friends and,
as a result, learn to respect their differences. The comments
about the importance of homogeneity in social relations in my
previous article suggest that this assumption is not valid. A
mixing of all age and class groups, is likely to produce at best
a polite but cool social climate, lacking the consensus and
intensity of relations that is necessary for mutual enrichment.
Class differences also result in a mixture of good and bad con-
sequences. I noted in the earlier article that most neighbor
disputes arise about the children and that they stem from dif-
ferences in child-rearing norms among the classes and among
parents of different educational backgrounds. People who want
to bring their children up one way do not long remain tolerant
of the parents of a playmate who is being reared by diametrically
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opposed methods. People with higher incomes and more educa-
tion may feel that they or their children are being harmed by
living among less advantaged neighbors. The latter are likely
to feel equally negative about the "airs" being put on by the
former, although some may want to keep up, especially in matters
concernirg the children. This can wreck family budgets and,
occasionally, family stability as well. Social and cultural
mobility is difficult enough when it is desired, but it may
become a burden to families who are forced into it involuntarily.
The negative consequences of heterogeneity are not inevitable,
but they occur with regularity, even among the most well-in-
tentioned people. As a result, a markedly heterogeneous commun-
ity that spells enrichment to the planner - especially to the one
who sees it only through maps, census reports, and windshield
surveys - may mean endless bickeripg and unsettled feuds to
the people who actually live in it.
The degree of dispersal necessary for the heterogeneity component is
the greatest of all the rationales - neighbor to neighbor.
Alternatives to dispersal may exist in the form of heterogeneous school
experiences for the children.
The argument is salient to many planners and this is reflected in the
planning of new towns. With the concentration of planner-types in HUD this
view of a community is likely to underlie some of HUD's advocacy for balanced
communities. Since this argument is generally accepted by liberals, the desira-
bility of heterogeneity is sometimes used on the local level. But overall the
political clout of the argument is minimal.
1. Herbert J. Gans, "The Balanced Community: Homogeneity or
Heterogeneity in Residential Areas, " Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 27:5 (August, 1961): 177-8.
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The concentration of the lower class and "problem families" produces
a "culture of poverty." The Kerner Commission described it as follows:
... [Miany ghetto children spend the bulk of their time on the
streets of a crime-ridden, violence-prone and poverty-stricken
world. The image of success in this world is not that of the
"solid citizen, " the responsible husband and father, but rather
that of the "hustler" who takes care of himself by exploiting
others. The dope sellers and the numbers runners are the "suc-
cessful" men because their earnings far outstrip those men who
try to climb the economic ladder in honest ways.
Young people in the ghetto are acutely conscious of a system
which appears to offer rewards to those who illegally exploit
others, and failure to those who struggle under traditional
responsibilities. Under these circumstances, many adopt ex-
ploitation and the "hustle" as a way of life, disclaiming both
work and marriage in favor of casual and temporary liaisons.
This pattern reinforces itself from one generation to the next,
creating a "culture of poverty" and an ingrained cynicism about
society and its institutions. I
In this environment the child has no alternative successful models to
emulate. While families might be able to cope with their individual problems
of pqverty, the poverty of the environment compounds their difficulties. Dis-
persal is the only answer to a problem caused by concentration. The degree
of dispersal necessary is difficult to determine - perhaps at a level between
"schools" and "heterogeneity." The political persuasiveness this argument
1. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books,
1968), p. 262.
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had, while never great, seems to be declining as some spokesmen for the Black
community view the description of "a socially disorganized ghetto" as an
attack on their people.
Social engineering - the impact on the average suburbanite is like
rain on the ocean.
Black Power - Political Control of the Central'Cities
By 1970 Blacks held a majority of the population in three cities of
over 200,000 - Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Newark - and twelve smaller
(not necessarily central cities) cities. Some Black leaders think the dispersal
policy is as subtle as an avalanche - the dispersal policy is simply a means to
dilute their growing central city political power. While this is possible, there
is little obvious evidence that this is the case. The alternative method of
metropolitan government - annexing the central city to the suburbs as Morton
Grodzins suggested in 19581 - is a more obviously palatable alternative.
With metropolitan government the Bladks could remain confined to the central
city while the white suburbanites would have control. Grodzins cites this
argument as one used explicitly by political leaders favoring an annexation to
Nashville as far back as 1952. Whether or not the Black fears are correct, the
1. Morton Grodzins, "The Metropolitan Area as a Racial Problem,"
in Robert Gutman and David Popenoe, (ed.), Neighborhood, City, and Merro-
polis: An Integrated Reader in Urban Sociology (New York: Random House,1970), p. 490.
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division in the Black community on the subject is undermining political support
for the dispersal strategy on the federal level.
Constitutional - No Country Clubs
The last and most convincing rationale - to this author at least -
is the Constitutional and quasi-moral pillar of policy. The argument does not
depend on changing sociological or economic facts or interpretations. It
does not just apply to some suburbs, in some SMSAs, at some point in time -
it applies equally to all suburbs across the country. While the argument is used
to motivate political forces, it is most effective in the purportedly non-political
arena of the judicial system. The argument stated simply - no group of citizens
have the right to act like a private country club through their local government,
admitting only those families who can afford the entrance fee. Exclusionary
techniques, such as zoning, are being challenged in the courts on such grounds
as "equal protection" and "right to travel, enter and abide. " The courts may
eventually articulate a requirement for towns to plan for housing for all income
1. See Frank Aloi and Arthur Goldberg, "Racial and Economic
Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End? " Urban Law Annual , 9 (1971);
Norman Williams Jr. and Thomas Norman, "Exclusionary Land Use Controls:
The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, " n.d.; and Mary E. Brooks, Exclu-
sionary Zoning, Chicago, ASPO, 1970.
34.
levels - particularly for low and moderate income families. This will then
give central city poor the right and the ability to choose to live in the suburbs
or in the city.
Neighborhood level economic integration is not required by this
rationale. The poor may end up being concentrated in corners of the suburbs.
Rather than attract support for political action, this rationale tends
to let politicians "off the hook," with the attitude that the courts will take
care of the problem.
Review -- Pillars of Policy
As a would-be planner, the most intellectually satisfying rationale for
building LMIH in the suburbs is to provide shelter for the ill-housed suburban
low- and moJerate-income families. The rationales for dispersing central city
low- and moderate-ncome families in the suburbs are (in order of descending
acceptability): constitutional/quasi-moral, concentration, jobs, central city
shelter, schools, heterogeneity and Black power. Only the constitutional/quasi-
moral argument is extremely compelling as a rationale for a national policy.
- Hard core political support for the dispersal strategy appears to be lacking.
Major well organized and financed support can come from the home builders -- out
of economic self interest -- as long as they are interested in the subsidized housing market,
i.e. while other mortgage funds are tight. Civil rights groups, Blacks and "liberals"
do seem to be divided on the question of holding power in the central city "community
control" or dispersing this power by moving out of areas of concentration.
Political support brought by the other rationales can be easily diluted by
alternative means of achieving their particular goals.
THREE CASES: Local, State, and Federal
With this apparent lack of effective political support should housing
dispersal advocates bother to expend time, energy and money on legislation or
would litigation be more successful? In this thesis we examine three cases of
governments -- each at a different level -- running the suburban gauntlet.
Through these three cases we hope to be able to estimate the probability of the
American political process effectively handling the issue of economic integration--
presented ina proposal of 6uilding subsidized housing in the predominantly middle
class suburbs of metropolitan America.
Before looking under the shells, where might the dispersal advocate place
his bet? Where is the intellectual support? The federal government which has, as
a whole, the most professionalized bureaucracy and legislative staffs might be
expected to accept dispersal as an "idea in good currency. " Congress is also
reputed to be more intellectually adept and statesmanlike than the lower level
legislatures -- thus more likely to accept the concept. State government as a
rule is second -- although this does not eliminate the possibility of certain states
"leading" the federal government. The local level government, again with
exceptions, suffers from the myopia of everyday problems -- schools, parks, police.
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Where is the best level of implementation and which level has the best
tools of implementation? Probably a combination of the local and state level --
since metropolitan government is not a reality. In theory the local govemment
can make the "best" locational decisions while the state government can make the
distribution decisions among the suburbs. From the jurisdictional perspective the
state is in the best position having Constitutional authority over police power on
which zoning is based. Contrary to popular opinion, zoning power was given to
local governments by state enabling legislation, not by Divine decree. The
federal government, although in a rather ten-uous Constitutional position regarding
direct intervention in local zoning, is best able to provide the necessary subsidies.
But the real question is what level of government will act? In seeking an
answer, the authorassumes that politicians do not recognize dispersal as necessary
for societal survival and that politicians, as a general rule, want to remain in
political life and power. Recalling the discussion of the nature of the issue,
it is counter intuitive to expect local suburban politicians to eagerly accept tMIH.
The state politician is less politically liable for unpopular stands by virtue of
the number of issues, size of his constituency, the lag time between legislation
and local action, physical distance from the scene, etc. Theoretically,.the
federal politician is even better able to take unpopular positions without fatal
political consequences. To give the system and each level of government a fair
test, we want to examine three cases with the highest probability of success.
Failure in these cases will indicate probable failure of a legislative strategy
at this time.
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The local case is a study of the Boston suburb of Newton. A reputedly
"liberal" suburb of 92,000, Newton's political and intellectual climate indicated
to most observers that it would welcome a local group's proposal to build subsidized
housing on scattered sites for Newton's ill-housed residents. The proposal failed
to pass and polarized the community in the process. To generalize the Newton
case to other suburbs we analyse the problems of non-profit sponsors as purposive
interest groups and initiators of change, as well as the vulnerability of local politicos.
The state case is a study of Massachusetts' anti-snob zoning law, Chapter
774, passed in 1969. This law allows a subsidized housing sponsor to appeal an
unfavorable local decision to a state level housing appeals board. This apparent
legislative acceptance of dispersal at the state level is encouraging. However,
Massachusetts is one of the most innovative states. If dispersal is an idea
in good currency in any state, it is likely to be in good currency in Massachusetts.
But the analysis of the passage of the legislation strongly indicates that the bill
passed pri mari ly for reasons other than its merit--reasons unique to Massachusetts
politics in the summer of 1969.
The federal case focuses on HUD Secretary Romney's "open communities"
policy--giving low -and moderate-4ncome central city families the right and the
ability to choose to live in the suburbs. This policy was an attempt to use
what leverage the Administration has in money and programs to encourage the
use of federally subsidized housing in suburban areas. The case indicates that
existing levers are brittle and that even though the federal politician is least
vulnerable, the chief executive at least is too vulnerable to take an overt
economic integrationist stand. (It can be argued that the use of a case
involving a reputedly conservative administration invalidates the 38.
test of the political system on the federal level. But perhaps an analogy can
be drawn to the welfare case. Political pun'dits note that only a conservative
administration could make as far reaching a change as President Nixon has
proposed in the welfare system. The case study of dispersal policy on the
federal level tries to point out the structural difficulties that even a liberal
Democratic administration would encounter. However, a case study of
Congressional efforts toforge a dispersal policy would have been a stronger
case but this case is just now in the making.)
NEWTON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION:
THE POLITICS OF THE MORAL IMPERATIVE
Its people are committed to social Betterment and Change.
It bears few traces of parochial self-centeredness, but
extends its interests to the entire metropolitan region.
-- Newton Chamber of Commerce, 1969
Newton became a suburb of Boston, Massachusetts, when the B & W
railroad tooted by in 1834. Today, an "inner" suburb, Newton still retains the
suburban ideals--trees, grass, single family detached homes, excellent schools,
good public services, middle/upper middle class dominance. But there are signs
of decay.
The Newton school system is a national model. Many people both in-
side and outside of Newton expected a proposed scattered site plan to make
Newton a national model in the subsidized housing field.
Newton may well be a national model--for the failure of the "moral
imperative" in the "liberal" suburbia. The first section of this case study explains
Newton 's candidacy for the ground breaking role. The second section briefly
describes what has happened in Newton since May, 1968 when the Newton
Community Development Foundation was formed to provide LMIH in Newton. The
last secfion attempts to analyse possible reasons having probable general applica-
bility to rancorous housing conflicts in other middle class suburbs that make it
unlikely local systems will resolve "the housing crisis.
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WHY LOOK AT NEWTON: No Ordinary Suburb
Good Place to Live -- for jobs
With respect to the "jobs" argument, Newton is an advantageous location
for low and moderate income families. Although characterized as the "Garden City"
Newton is a major suburban employment center, ranking fifth in suburban manufacturing,
for example. In 1969, 1803 firms reporting to the Massachusetts Employment Security
2(about 80% of total) employed 22,100 workers. Slightly over one-third of the jobs
were in the services category and slightly less than one-third were in manufacturing.3
Job opportunities in construction are also significant. 4
Besides the jobs within the city, Newton's location on the Massachusetts
Turnpike and the beltway -- Route 128-gives automotive access to both the core and
suburban job markets. The tie with the MBTA gives access to Boston and the inner
suburbs for those without cars. LMIFs living in Newton would not be isolated from
employment opportunities.
Good Place to Live -- for schools
For what it's worth, Newton offers a school system with a national
reputation for excellence and innovation. The city spent $1105 per child in
1. In 1964 following Cambridge, Waltham, Watertown and Quincy, Newton,
Massachusetts, Economic Base Study, An Element of the Comprehensive Plan, October,
1967 (Newton, Mass.: Planning Department, 1967), Table 7.
2. Massachusetts Division of Employment Security, Statistics, Telephone
interview, May 17, 1971.
3. Newton, Economic Base Study, op.cit., p. 22.
-4. Ibid. , p. 12.
r
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1970, 4th highest in the Boston SMSA. This money is not all directed toward the
college-bound -Newton High School has both technical and college courses. The
city also supports a junior college offering both terminal technical degrees and
transferable probrams in the liberal arts and business.
A Good Place to Live for people of my own kind
Newton is not virgin territory for LMIF, white or black. The city prides
itself on its racial and economic heterogeneity - for a suburb. The black community,
pre-Civil War in origin, constitutes 1.2% of the 1970 city population -- almost twice
the 1960 count. The poor (under 3,000 in 1960) compose 6% of the families -- the
lowest proportion for any city over 50,000 in Massachusetts. About a thousand families
are on welfare. Not everyone else is rich. 20% earned $3,000 to $6,000 in 1960.
Although one-fifth of the labor force is professional, nearly 30% of the workers are
employed as croftsmen, foremen, operatives, private household workers and service
workers.2 New LMIFs would not have nor would they cause a cultural shock wave.
Impact on Newton -- Visually
If Newton were to house LMIF families in apartments -- which seems
likely given the economics of the situation -the strctures (six or more units per
1. Massachusetts Department of Education, Telephone inquiry, June
10, 1971.
2. Newton, ibid., p. 16.
building) would not be unique. Newton has 53 apartment buildings or complexes
1 *
containing 1766 housing units or 6.8% of the total for the city. Nor would the
new apartments be a revival of a blighted past. Over half of the apartment units
have been added in the past ten years. The production of housing has been pre-
dominantly in the multi-family form -45.7% in apartments compared with 34.7%
in single family detached residences (1960-69).
The city is not likely to tum into another Brookline. Only 0.07% of the
land in the city is available for apartment construction -- vacant and properly zoned.
Even if all the city's remaining buildable land - essentially 42 sites -- were put into
apartment construction, the character of the city vo uld not be perceptibly altered.
Furthermore, apartments have been a financial asset to Newton. Not only
do they pay more taxes per person - $341 to $287 (single family, 2, 3, 4 unit), the
apartments have only 40 school-age children out of 2245 residents.2 Theoretically,
the surplus from the high-4ncome apartments could cover the deficit from LMIH with
many children.
Impact on Newton -- Socially
Would the construction of LMIH change the socio-economic character of the
community - would Newton lose its middle/upper middle class dominance? The
Newton Planning Department located only 42 sites appropriate for multi-family
1. Newton Planning Department, Apartment Study, 1971 (Newton, Mass.:
Planning Department, 1971), p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
43.
construction. Using a rather dense 2,000 square feet per dwelling unit figure,
these sites could not possibly house more than 4,886 LMI families (2069 families
for certain with a possibility of 2817 more families -the number of families which
could be housed on several sites could not be determined by the Planning Department).
This number would not house the 5767 families earning less than $6,000 in 1960.
But assuming that all the units were filled by non-Newton families,
what would be the socio-economic impact? The families earning under $6,000
constituted 25% of the 1960 population. Adding the maximum 4886 families to the
population, the percentage under $6,000 would constitute 37/6 of the community
compared with a Boston SMSA average of 41.7% (1960). Therefore Newton should
be able to maintain an adequate tax base and a middle class dominance in the school
system.
The Rationale -- Not Social Engineering
The Newton discussion of LMIH centered on the first and simplest
rationale - a Newton need for Newtonites. Very few references were made by
the proponents to the possibility of the proposed LMIH being occupied by central
city ghetto residents. However, the suburban need was described in the most
inclusive manner -- a need for those with Newton "ties" - city employees,
narried children, elderly as well as those present residents now in substandard
1. Newton Planning Department, Low-Moderate Income Housing Study,
1968 (Newton, Mass.: Planning Department, 1971), p. 52-4.
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housing. While not the clearest possible case -- construction of LMIH for those
families living in dilapidated housing, thereafter tearing down the vacated units
-- the Newton plan was devised to have a minimal impact on the city in the form
of new school construction. Also, the "need argument" was buttressed by the
heterogeneity argument" -- "it will lose the cross-section of population which has
added vitality to the city for years."
Idea In Good Currency -- with Civics, Politicos and Professionals
Since World War 1I, Newton has produced a new housing program every
ten years -- but not without birth pains.
In 1948 Newton responded to the national housing shortage in a conservative
Republican mode. Spuming Roosevelt type public housing, the city constructed
400 single family homes for the returning Newton veterans in the remote and un-
developed Oak Hill section. The city donated the land ($100/lot) and sold the.
houses for $7,800 with no "buy back" provision to keep the area for veterans. Today
these houses sell for about $30,000. Even with the patriotic spirit of the time, the
single family home concept, and the remote location, opposition and fear of the kinds
of people that would come into Newton was voiced.
In 1958 certain Republican women recognized the needs of the elderly --
especially widows on fixed incomes. With the active support of the mayor they
lobbied a housing authority for the elderly through a divided and reluctant Board
of Aldermen, uncomfortable with "public housing. " To date, 225 units, the total
number authorized, have been constructed on four sites.
Ten years later, the gestation period for another type of housing --
for low and moderate income families -began. In the interim, the Republican
conservative reputation of the city had been replaced by a liberal image. Up to
the point of birth - the announcement of specific sites and plans - the concept
of a scattered site, non-profit sponsored LMIH constructed for needy Newton
residents had been generously nurtured by civic, political and professional groups.
To wit:
November, 1967, the Newton Board of Aldermen's subcommittee on
low income housing, chaired by a staunch conservative Republican, reported:
"The special committee. . . is unanimously of the opinion 'there is a shortage of
low income housing in the City of Newton."
Based on the available statistics which, admittedly, are
not satisfactory, it would appear there probably is a need
of upwards of two hundred units of low income housing within
the city immediately. It is the opinion of your committee in
all probability this figure is much higher. . . . It was the
unanimous opinion of all persons who appeared before your
committee that no large scale developments of low income
housing should be considered. Based on sociological studies,
it was unanimously recommended by all and by the committee
that this city should not create ghettos for low income residents. 2
Although your committee was not charged with investigating
the question of the need for moderate income housing, it is
apparent from our investigation that there is a greah need in
the city and can be covered under 221D3 Projects.~
1. Subcommittee on Low Income Housing, Report to Newton Board of
Aldermen, Edward C. Uehlein, Chairman (Newton, Mass., 1967), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 7-8.
3. 221D3 was replaced by 236 LMIH in 1968.
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Your committee was quite impressed with the possibilities of
construction under 221D3 and the intermingling of low income
and moderite income families in one project. Again it is
to be pointed out that under no circumstances would the
committee recommend that any large project be feasible for the
City of Newton. However, it appeared from the evidence
presented to the committee that smaller projects of twentyI
to fifty families or units are feasible for construction. . .
The Report closed with the faint suggestion of a suburban responsibility
for urban housing problems.
It was called to the attention of your committee by many of
the experts who appeared before it that the crisis in providing
proper dwellings for low income families in the urban communities
is not only the problem of the urban communities but is and will
become even more so the problem of suburban communies and that
long range plans to alleviate this situation should be considered
by the suburban communities, such as Newton , at any early date. 2
The Board of Aldermen implemented the recommendations of the Report --
striking the elderly limitation from the housing authority's power and directing it to
apply for Section 23, leased housing funds, from HUD.
In July 1968, the Board of Aldermen directed the Planning Department to
make a comprehensive study of the low and moderate housing needs of Newton and to
evaluate potential sites. During the preparation of the report, the Board sold a
piece of land to an apartment developer. But pressure from aroused LMIH advocates
made the Board require the developer allot three units for the Newton Housing to
rent and issueda strong resolve:
1. Ibid., p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
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WHEREAS: An integrated society is desirable for the
wholesome and full experience of life itself; and
WHEREAS: A genuine community is one in which all
human beings have the opportunity to contribute to the
welfare of others from their own experience, characteristics and
talents; and
WHEREAS: In order to achieve community integration more
fully, we must convey to black people our desire to have them
buy homes and live in all Newton neighborhoods according to
their own wants and means; therefore
BE IT RESOLVED: That the governing bodies of the City of
Newton should contin'ue their efforts to accomplish integration
and that the Board of Aldermen endorse in principle the following
statement submitted to it by homeowners in the City of Newton:
"We , the undersigned Newton home owners, express our hope'
and desire to be joined in our City by black people. We urge those
of our friends who have decided to sell their homes to make special
efforts to insure that these listings are known to potential buyers amdng
black people by advertising in ways which are likely to be seen or
heard by them, by dealing with real estate agents who will make the
fact that Newton homes are for sale known to them, and by contacting
associations likely to be able to encourage responses from the black
community.
We feel that our City can benefit a great deal by having black
people among us. Our children will benefit in and out of the class-
room. Our local institutions will benefit by having the enthu'siasm
and talent of an emerging people in our midst. Our lives will be
fuller as we come closer to understanding and loving all men as
neighbors. We welcome our black brethren to share in the bounty
and building of our City. "I
The Newton Democrats were the first political unit to issue a statement
supporting LMIH:
1. Newton Planning Department, LMIH Study, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
August 7, 1968:
1. The immediate construction in Newton of low and
moderate income housing to help alleviate the present housing
shortage.
2. The principle of economic integration in housing.
3. The reserving, as a guiding principle, of some units in all
new apartment housing built in Newton, whether on public or
private land, for families with low and moderate incomes. I
The Planning Department's study, released in September, 1968, gave
professional approval to the earlier Aleiermanic report:
The special Aldermanic Subcommittee concluded that
approximately 200 lower income units were required . . .
we can support this original contention, but consider it as
a base figure which must be continuously reevaluated. . . .
Our analyses also indicate a significant need for housing for
moderate income families. ..
Our analyses lead us to conclude that the most productive
combination of forces possible to assure the development of
low and moderate income housing in the community would be. . . .
Private nonprofit, cooperative
or limited divident corporations - Acquire and develop recommended
sites for construction of combination
low-moderate income units and rent
supplemented units. It is recommended
that these developments be limited to
20 to 30 housing units in accordance
with the "scattered, low density"
units suggested by the Aldermanic
Subcommittee. 2
1. Newton Democratic City Committee, "Statement of the Newton
Democratic City Committee in Support of Low and Moderate Income Housing,"
May 7, 1969, p. 1.




In March, 1969, the Mayor, Monte Basbas, appointed a Housing
Coordinating Committee "to provide means for official coordination of the many
public and private activities aimed at accomplishing the state's low-moderate
income housing goals of the City."1 The Committee was chaired by the city
planner and had representatives from the Board of Aldermen, Redevelopment
Authority and Housing Authority.
In April, 1969, the Executive Committee of the Newton Republican
City Committee issued a policy statement drafted by the future executive director
of NCDF. The statement commended the Aldermanic report and the professional
document of the Planning Department. The Republicans rais ed the ante: ". . . there
are statis.tics in both reports to indicate that the actual need for both low- and
moderte-income housing exceeds 500 units. "2 While the report emphasized the
single family home ownership routine, it did state:
Non-profits corporations should be encouraged to investigate
the opportunities under these programs [236 and MHFA] but
these innovative programs are discouraged in Newton by the
high cost of land. We therefore recommend that the City of
Newton lease for a long term appropriate city owned land to
a non-profit corporation for the express purpose of constructing
low-moderate income housing. 3
1. "Housing Coordinating Committee Holds Organizational Meeting,"
The Newton Villager and Transcript, June 12, 1969, p. 2.
2. Newton Republican ~City Committee, Policy Statement on Low- and
Moderate-income Housing in Newton, April 9, 1969, p. 2.
3. lbidl.p. 6.
50.
On May 5, 1969, the Board of Aldermen accepted the Planning
Department's report of September, 1968 and resolved:
That to encourage and facilitate the provision of low
and moderate income housing, the City shall not release any
of the city owned property named in the report for other
purposes unless the Board of Aldermen decide that the site
is not suitable or available or required for low or moderate
income housing, . ..
That with respect to private property named in the report the
Board of Aldermen when it considers a site for any purpose shall
include in its consideration the suitability and availability of
or need for the site for low and moderate income housing. . . .
Two days later, the League of Women Voters and the Newton Community
Relations Commission (city organization) sponsored an all-day conference on "Newton's
Need for Low- and Moderate-income Housing. "2 Almost 300 people -- a surprisingly
high number - appeared. Addressing the group, Chester Hartman, then Assistant
Professor of City Planning at Harvard University, remarked, "'To my knowledge no
other suburb yet seems to have been able to attract such a large number of people to
a conference like this with such apparent seriousness. '3 The conference found the
need for at least 400 housing units for LMIFami lies.
1. City of Newton in Board of Aldermen, #435-69 (582-68[2]), May 5,
1969, adopted 15 yeas, 1 nay, 8 absent.
2. Other sponsoring groups were the Housing Coordinating Committee of
the City of Newton, the Newton Chamber of Commerce, Newton Committee for
Fair Housing and Equal Rights, Newton Community Council and NCDF.
3. Mrs. Lawrence Rubin and Hirsh Sharf, "Conference on Newton's
Need for Low and Moderate Income Housing May 7;: 1969; A Follow-up Report,
n .d.
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Such housing must be provided for those who live or work in
Newton (especially young marrieds, the elderly, and city
employees) and a certain percentage should be reserved for
residents of the core city.. .
Many sites in different parts of the city should be developed
at the same time to minimize protests by neighborhood groups.
Developments should be small - not more than 50 units --
to avoid creating new ghettos. . .
The City should encourage private developers to do as much
as possible by making sites easily available to them.
Support was urged for the Newton Community Development
Foundation. 1
On the same day, May 7, 1969, the Newton Democratic City Committee
commended the housing conference and the Republican City Committee and reminded
the public of its support for LMIH the previous year. Noting that 'The housing area
is not, however, one in which partisanship should play a role" they confirmed 'The
creation of housing opportunities for persons of low and moderate income is indeed
'Newton's critical need."' "Private group, both non-profit and profit making, can
utilize existing federal and state programs to make inroads upon this need, and we
encourage and support such efforts. "2
In November, 1969, the Mayor wrote the following to the president of
NCDF:
1. Ibid., p. 1.
2. Newton Democratic City Committee, 9':ct., p. 1.
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Your explanation of the goals of the Newton Community
Development Foundation and the approaches for reaching those
goals was most informative, and I find that I am in complete
agreement with them. I was particularly impressed with your
scattered site, low density approach and with the spirit of
cooperation with which you are underbking the project.
The City must do its share to help you succeed, and for my
part, I will make every effort to make available City owned
land for the development of low and moderate income housing. . . .
I feel that Newton 'is very fortunate to have a church group like
NCDF that has the hoad support and expertise you have
demonstrated to develop greater housing opportunities for our low
and moderate income families.I
The following month, the Board of Aldermen unanimously passed a
resolution supporting the NCDF concept and urging contributions.
Whereas the Newton Community Development Foundation Inc. has
been established by church and clergy men and women to aid in
filling -a great need for housing for families of low and moderate
income in Newton, and
Whereas the government and citizenry of Newton have testified
confirming that need, and
Whereas the Newton Community Development Foundation inc. is
presently preparing a plan and proposal for constnucting approximately
500 such dwelling units scattered throughout Newton on 6out ten
sites of two to three acres each in a manner intended to provide
low and moderate income housing at minimum cost to Newton while
providing maximum social benefit to our citizens, and is seeking
$100,000 through public subscription to pay for preparing the pro-
posal and acquiring the land;
Therefore Be It Resolved That:
The efforts of the Newton Community Development Foundation Inc.
are commended, and this Board recommends and encourages the
citizens of Newton to aid and support the efforts of the Foundation
so that a proposal for low and moderate income housing can be
1. Monte G. Basbas, Mayor, Letter to Mr. Robert C. Casselman,
Chairman, Newton Community Development Foundation, November 21, 1969.
prepared which will help fulfill the needs of Newton citizens
and will be acceptable to them. 1
While the preceding documentation clearly indicates that the concept
of LMIH on scattered sites for Newton residents (at least) was an idea in good
currency, we cannot say that the danger signals of a possible miscarriage were
absent. The Planning Department in the September, 1968, Low-Moderate
Income Housing Study openly stated the problems involved in a section entitled
"Community Attitudes on Housing -the Dichotomy."
It is apparent that while the City of Newton during the past two
to three years has taken measurable steps toward the recognition
of its basic low-moderate income housing needs and has set in
motion certain actions designed to meet these needs, there exists
today in the community a basic dichotomy in attitudes which
militates against effective implementation of any comprehensive
h.ousing policy.
This dichotomy, and the paradoxical situation which it creates,
plainly stated, is that while the community may exhibit an
increasing awareness of its housing responsibilities, the practical
and political realities of finding acceptable sites for low and moderate
income housing developments generally run counter to what the
protectors of the "Garden City" image consider to be sound land use
planning.
Again, further complicating the picture, is the fact that many
well-intentioned residents of the community find themselves on
both sides of the issue; that is, in agreement with the basic
philosophy, but diametrically opposed to the land use decision
required to create the project on a given site. . . .
Most recently, the old Bowen School sale and possible use for
low income housing brought a considerable acrimonious debate
as neighborhood residents saw the project as inconsistent with the
aims of the area, while concerned housing groups, made up
1. Newton Board of Aldermen, "Resolution,'City of Newton in Board
of Aldermen, December 15, 1969, #1037-69.
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largely of residents living beyond the neighborhood, saw the
site as a desirable locus for low income housing.
Again, paradoxically, many of the potential low-moderate
income housing sites are found in modest residential neigh-
borhoods. These neighborhoods, which would most directly
feel the effect of the project, have residents with the lowest degree
of mobility and financial resiliency. Often, in contrast, the groups
most fervently stating the case for low income housing are composed
of persons of fairly high income and mobility who reside in totally
developed areas. Such a situation has obvious connotations.
If this lengthy statement of opinion on the dichotomy in community
attitudes can be summarized briefly, one would have to conclude
that, to tnly meet its stated housing goals, the community must
achieve a reconciliation of polarized community values. Such a
reconciliation to the center of the issue must come from the City
administration, the Board of Aldermen, neighborhood associations,
nonprofit housing corporations, the fair housing groups and in-
dividual citizens. It is obvious that it cannot be accomplished
any other way.I
But we must also note that these warning signs were present before the
political bodies and the public officials made their strong public commitments to the
concept of scattered site LMIH in Newton.
The Classic Case -- Probably Significant
Newton is examined in this thesis for one major reason: it is generally
considered to be a "classic" case -- if it can't happen in Newton , it can't happen.
The folk wisdom of the day says a "liberal " community is most likely to accept LMIH.
1. Newton Planning Department, LMIH Study, ibid., 12-14.
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Newton has a "liberal" glow from its innovative school reputation, concentration
ofpoesoas 1  2 pouain 3
of professionals, college educated, and Jews in the population. Although
once a conservative Republican town, 39.8% of the registered voters are Demo-
4
crats and 27.6% are Republicans. In the most recent election , Newton gave the
"liberal" Father Drinan 55% of its vote in a contest with a former Republican State
Rep. and the 14 term Democratic incumbent in which Father Drinan won the
District with 37/. Thus the commonly posed question: if Newton can't do it,
who on earth can? 5
Unfortunately, the significance or "classic-ness" of the Newton case is
problematic. Political scientists are still spastically groping for acceptable
theories and positive correlations between characteristics of a community (not to
mention accurate measure of the characteristics) -- political culture, concentration
or diffusion of power, political structure, community differentiation and continuity,
and community integration -- and innovations or actions in such issue areas as urban
6
renewal, public housing, fluoridation, welfare levy, etc. No studies of suburbs
1. 1960-- 21.5% of Newton's employed were categorized by the U.S.
Census as professional compared with 14.6 in the Boston SMSA.
2. 1960 -- 23% of the adults had completed college compared with 9.6%
in the U.S.
3. Estimates range from 38%-42% based on a survey of voter registration
in 1969.
4. Voter registration as of October 15, 1969. Total: 48,386.
5. "Liberalism in the Suburbs, " Newsweek, 76:1 (July 6, 1970): 57.
6. Michael Aiken and Robert Alford, in "Community Structure and
Innovation: The Case of Public Housing, " American Political Science Review, 64:3
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Footnote #6 from preceding page (continued): (December, 1970): 843-864
illustrate and compound the confusion but the following presents the reader with
a glimpse of the complexity:
Some Theories of Community Innovation
Nowhere have the various explanations of community innovation been
brought together. In part this lack of theoretical integration is due to
diverse concepts, since what we have called innovation has been called
community decision making, community decision outcomes, and policy
outputs. The five theories explaining innovation are:
(1) Political Culture: Cities with majorities holding "public-regarding
values" are hypothesized to be more innovative with respect to policies
benefiting the community as a whole than cities dominated by groups with
"private-regarding values. " [Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson,
City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); James Q.
Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public--Regardingness as a Value Premise
in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58:4 (December, 1964), 876-887; and
James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, Communication to the Editor,
this REVIEW, 60:4 (December, 1966), 998-9993
(2) Concentration or Diffusion of Community Power: There are three
aspects to this argument: concentration of systemic power [Amos M. Hawley,
"Community Power Structure and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal
of Sociology, 68:4 (January, 1963), 442-431] diffusion of power through
mass citizen participation, [Robert L. Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal,
"Community Status as a Dimension of Local Decision-Making," American
Sociological Review, 32:6 (December, 1967), 970-984] and centralization of
elite power. ITerry N. Clark, "Community Structure and Decision-Making,"
in Terry N. Clark (ed.), Community Structure and Decision-Making: Compara-
tive Analyses (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 91-126;
and "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban
Renewal in 51 American Communities, " American Sociological Review,,33:4
(August, 1968), 576-593.] In each case the hypothesis is the same, namely,
the greater the concentration of power, the greater the degree of innovation.
Conversely, the greater the diffusion of power, the lower the degree of
innovation.
(3) Centralization of Formal Political Structure: Cities with centralized
administrative arrangements and a strong mayor, that is, cities with city
manager or partisan mayor-council governmental structures are hypothesized
to be more innovative. [Crain , Katz, and Rosenthal, op. cit.; see also J.
David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War
on Poverty," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New
York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 267-292.]
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and LMIH per se are in the available literature. The author attempted to plug
Newton into the major theories but found the task impossible. Until political
scientists prove otherwise we must rely on the folk wisdom's verdict: Newton will
remain liberal as charged and a significant case.
NCDF -- No Bunch 6f Neophytes
The proverbial last but not least reason for examining Newton is the
character and quality of the "change agent" -- the Newton Community Develop-
ment Foundation. NCDF had several attributes which work -- in theory -- to
minimize resistance to change: indigenous character, a selfless purpose, and
expertise.
Footnote #6 from preceding page (continued):
(4)Community Differentiation and Continuity: Older and larger cities have
been hypothesized to be more bureaucratic and consequently less
receptive to policy innovations, suggesting that younger and smaller cities
should exhibit higher policy innovation. [Thomas R. Dye, "Urban School
Segregation: A Comparative Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 412
(December, 1968), 141-165.3
(5)Community Integration: Cities in which community integration breaks
down or is extremely low have a lower probability of innovation or other
collective actions. Consequently innovation should be highest in integrated
communities. [James S. Coleman, Community Conflict (New York: The
Free Press, 1957). Also see Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and
Political Support in Urban Politics: A Case of a Fluoridation Referendum,"
American Joumal of Sociology, 68:5 (March, 1963), 513-526.]
We have presented these five explanations separately because it is possible
to conceive of them as five independent factors in the innovativeness, speed of
innovation, and intensity of outputs in a community political system. One or
more of these factors may be either spurious or intervening variables for the
operation of another, more fundamental factor.
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NCDF could not be attacked as an outside force attempting to impose
an alien solution on Newton. The group was founded by Newton clergy,
directed by a board of Newton civic, political and business leaders, run by a
life-long Newtonite as executive director and financially supported by a member-
ship of 700 Newton residents. NCDF has been described as a Newton solution
to a Newton problem designed by Newtonites. Even the architect lives in Newton.
Besides giving the group an aura of legitimacy, the indigenous character
should give it the knowledge and background to pick its way through the social
and political processes of the community. The NCDF Board had members active
in both political parties, elected, appointed and former city officials and members
who were active in other civic groups.
Being a non-profit houing sponsor, NCDF was immune from slur of cross
materialism. Furthermore, the participants were not eligible to directly benefit
from the endeavor, i.e. live in the housing.
Although NCDF was a "purposive interest group," it had expertise in
areas outside of "good intentions. " Church groups have often had difficulties
establishing credibility within communities and in the housing field. The Newton
clergy appeared to give full power to the lay board of directors. The board itself
had expertise in design, construction and management. Some members had previous
experience in government housing programs and other non-profit housing organiza-
tions. They in turn hired a full time executive director (and full time assistant) with
1. Interfaith Housing, The Suburban Noose (Boston: Interfaith Housing Corp.,
December, 1969), pp. 33-4.
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with real estate experience who had just completed a tour as the executive
assistant to the Massachusetts Commissioner of Community Affairs. After
reviewing 24 architects, the NCDF board selected a Boston firm with experience
in designing over 1000 units of low and moderate income housing units. The
site plans and designs the firm presented to NCDF were of first rate quality.
The Board was capable of monitoring the quality control and had some experience
in "selling" the product. Members had been involved in other "do-gooder" and
fund raising drives. The chairman is credited with single-handedly persuading
the Democratic Massachusetts Legislature to accept a Republican Governor's
reorganization and modernization plan. All in all, NCDF was no bunch of
neophytes.
Now, look at Newton.
1. Interview with Former Senate President Maurice Donahue, Cambridge,
April 16, 1971.
I
NEWTON: In a Nutshell
In the spring of 1968, a group of Newton clergy formed the Newton
Community Development Foundation. Its purpose: "to provide significant
quantities of LMIH in Newton. " In appointing a lay board of directors, the
clergy attempted to have a wide representation of Newton. The Board decided
to build 500-700 LMIH units on ten to twelve sites scattered throughout the 14
villages and 8 wards and present them to the city in one package. -The target
date for presentation was December, 1969 -- after the municipal election. They
expected to raise $35-40,000 by February 1st, 1969, for the first year expenses.
By the end of April, $19,000 was pledged. In the summer, the Board hired an
executive director to raise funds, choose sites, develop plans and direct publicity.
NCDF gave a slide show presentation of its LMIH scattered site concept to nearly
every church group and several business and civic organizations. NCDF distributed
twelve thousand folders describing the need for LMIH and NCDF's program during the
fall and winter of 1969. That November, NCDF met with Newton's Board of
Aldermen which agreed to form a housing committee to work with NCDF to find
surplus city land for half the sites. In December, NCDF launched a fund drive for
$100,000 needed by January for land options, site plans, etc. Pleas were made
through the churches and synagogues. Both partisan political organizations and many
civic organizations contributed. By the end of January, they had $37,615 in pledges.
................ 11,11.0
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The six private sites were optioned in late April. NCDF immediately
met with the Board of Aldermen to match four city sites for scatteration through-
out the city. The next day all the neighbors of- the sites were notified by handbill.
During the next two days NCDF directors held ten meetings with neighbors to
explain the concept and the individual site plans. The neighbors were not pleased.
Within two weeks a citywide organization, the Newton Land and Civic Association,
emerged to fight the NCDF plan. During the same period, 11,000 names on
petitions opposing the sites were collected.
Every site needed aldermanic approval for a zoning change or permissive use
designation. Five heated public hearings were held in late May and early June,
1970. The first hearing featured a letter from the Secretary of the U. S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, George Romney, which "wholeheartedly sup-
ported" the plan as an "experiment. . . having significance for other communities
in the state and throughout the country." Aldermen stopped counting and began
weighing their mail.
As the Aldermanic Land Use Committee deliberated, the City Planning
Department recommended denial of two sites and the Planning Board, denial of six
sites. Unable to reach agreement in public meetings, the Aldermen held a secret
barbecue in August. The following week the Land Use Committee reported out a
seven site compromise of 325-375 units. Besides dropping three sites, two city
sites were switched, a residency requirement was set for two-thirds of the units
and all units were to be placed in a "public residence" zone designed to limit
the use of the land to LMIH.
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The next week NCDF failed to win the necessary three-quarter
majority -- by one vote: seventeen for; six against; one seat vacant.
NCDF considered filing under Chapter 774, the anti-snob zoning
appeals procedure. Deterred by the possible two year court suit (774 Law not
yet deemed constitutional) and buoyed by the possibility the Board of Aldermen
would adopt a Public Residence Zone which would ease requirements for subsidized
housing sponsors, the Directors voted to wait and see. Also upcoming was a
special election for a vacancy on the Board of Aldermen -- the distinct possibility
of electing the vote NCDF needed.
The special Aldermanic election in December, 1970, was a one-issue
campaign -- pro or con NCDF. Over one-fifth of the registered voters turned out.
With eight candidates in the race, the candidate backed by the Newton Land and
Civic Association polled 5846 votes to his nearest pro-NCDF rival's 2682. In all,
the anti-NCDF candidates polled 7238 of the 11 ,406 votes cost.
In January, NCDF asked the Newton Board of Aldermen to approve the
package within a month or NCDF would "go 774. " The Aldermen did nothing.
The proposed Public Residence Zone also died for lack of action. (Reheard but died
again.)
Under Chapter 774, NCDF could use only the six private sites they controlled.
With increased density, redesigned and fully detailed site plans, NCDF applied to
the Newton Zoning Board of Appeals for a comprehensive permit. Three very long
nights of hearing were held in May. Besides NCDF, the site plans, and the concept,
63.
the anti-snob zoning law was attacked. Two incumbent aldermen, who had
voted for the seven-site compromise, and one mayoralty candidate, who had
voted for Chapter 774 as a state representative, attacked NCDF and its use of
11774. "
In June, 1971, three alternates and one regular member of the Zoning
Board of Appeals (four of the five regular members disqualified themselves under
challenge for supporting NCDF in the past) voted 3-1 to deny the permit. At
this writing the decision is being reviewed by the State Housing Appeals Committee.
Should the City of Newton receive an adverse decision, the matter will be taken
to the State' Supreme Court by either the City or the Newton Land and Civic
1Association.
1. The preceding "nutshell" is a recount of the public and undisputed
facts of the Newton case. The following analysis may contain statements that
are "perceptions of reality" by some of the participants which would be disputed
by others. Nevertheless, people operate on their perceptions, thus the author
considers these worthy of note. The author also believes that identifying specific
sources of information would serve no academic purpose while possibly adding to
the conflict in Newton. The material in the "nutshell" and analysis sections is
based on the following: newspaper stories, editorials and letters to the editor
between May, 1968 and August, 1971, in the Newton Graphic (circulation
approximately 8,000), The News-Tribune (Newton)(circuation approximately
10,000) and the Newton Villager and Transcript (circulation approximately 5,000);
unpublished student papers by Susan Green (Vice President, Newton League of
Women Voters), "Increasing the Supply of Low and Moderate Income Housing in
Newton, Massachusetts: The Housing Controversy at the Local Level," Wellesley
College, May 25, 1971, "Newton Community Development Foundation: The
Analysis of an Interest Group as a Social System," Wellesley College, January 11,
1971, Deborah Fiedler, "'Open Communities' and NCDF: Search for a Suburban
Solution to Low Income Housing Needs," Harvard Law School, September, 1970,
Celest Arden, "The Problems of Moderate Income Housing in the Suburbs and the
221d3 Program in Boston Metropolitan Area," MIT, May 14, 1969, Frank Mann,
(continued)
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NEWTON SORTED OUT: Interests in Conflict
The preceding factual recount of the Newton case does not denote the
character of the conflict: it was rancorous.
(footnote continued from preceding page) "Civil Defense in Newton: A Case
Study in Administrative Frustration, " Senior Thesis, Harvard University, 1955;
the files of the Newton League of Women Voteys; Census data and studies by
Newton City Planning Department; letters and petitions received by the Newton
City Clerk; public hearings for the "community residence zone" and the Chapter
774 permit; minutes of the Newton Community Development Foundation Board of
Directors meetings; interviews with board members and executive director of
NCDF, members and leader of NLCA, members of the Newton Board of Aldermen,
members of the Newton League of Women Voters, editor of one Newton paper,
and random Newton residents. Much of the analysis is based on Professor James
Q. Wilson's lectures in "Orpnizational Behavior and the Political Process,"
Government 235, Harvard University, Spring Term, 1970.
1. 'in conventional conflicts, established means of political expression
are used to influence the outcome of issues. Opponents regard each other as
mistaken or as pursuing different but legitimate goals, but not as the representatives
of evil forces. Such tactics as threats of punishment, personal vilification, and
deliberate, conscious deceptions are not involved. In contrast to conventional
conflicts, rancorous conflicts are characterized by the belief that norms about the
waging of political conflict in American communities have been violated. In such
conflicts, actions occur which produce a shared belief that tactics used to
influence the outcome are 'dirty,' 'underhanded,' vicious' and so forth."
William A. Gamson, "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics,"
American Sociological Review, 31:1 (February, 1966): 71.
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Chairman of NCDF speaking before the last public hearing on the NCDF sites
(June 3, 1970):
I am not going to complain about some of the highly personal
criticisms I have received, some of the villification, some of the untruths
and innuendoes. Harry Truman's statement still stands, in my book: If
you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen. That applies to me
and it most certainly applies to you.
But I do want to ticIs off a few of the things I am getting tired of.
I am getting tired of having people say they are in favor of housing and
are merely opposed to this particular plan. I am tired of hearing long
speeches like that from the chairman of the opposition, . . . which make
these protestations of concern for the less fortunate and then proceed to
demolish every aspect of a genuine and thoughtful proposal which tries
to meet those concerns. I am tired of having spokesmen for the opposition
freely admit that there is a need, and 5 minutes later proceed to refute
every source of evidence that supports that need.
Yes, I am tired of hollow sta.tements and inflamatory criticism.
Selections from.Letters to the Editor: Newton Villager and Transcript, May 21 and 28,
1970;
Regardless of which side of the NCDF issue we're on, it is important
that we be told the truth. I'm tired of hearing the half-truths, evasions
and misinformation [the NCDF executive director] is feeding us regarding
zoning. . . . He has repeatedly told us that if he is successful in
acquiring rezoning for any proposed site, but cannot bild [sic) on it for any
reason, it then automatically reverts back to its original zoning. Stop
leading us astray. We deserve to be told the truth. . . .
The NCDF must be pretty desperate when they have to resort to
illegal distribution of their literature-through our school children. . . .
Distribution of this type of literature in the public schools is expressly
fobidden [sic. When first grade children are made the unwitting and
unsuspecting tools of an organization supposedly dedicated to the betterment




In its May 8th Newsletter the Auburndale Community
Association announced that it would present "a special fact finding
program on the NCDF proposals". [sic) It also announced that ACA
members who were present could vote their support or non-support
of the NCDF proposals. The results of the entire evening would serve
to assist the ACA Board in determining the stand ACA would take on
the matter.
The Sunday before the meeting, May 10, the congregations
of three Auburndale churches, . . . were given a paper described
an [sic] "An Important Notice." This notice, authorized by the
three ministers, announced that the meeting of the ACA would be
held and a vote would be taken regarding the NCDF proposal. It
then stated:
"We know that those opposed will be there. Therefore, it
becomes imperative that many of you join the A.C.A. now and
attend the meeting of Wednesday in order that many of us may cast
an affirmative vote for this project. But you have to be a member.
So join now . . . The opposition will be there. If you believe in
this, will you be there as a member? Vote "yes" in favor of the
Newton Community Development plan and the sites chosen."
I would like to question the ethics involved in "stacking" a
fact finding meeting with already committed proponents of one point
of view in order to influence the Board of a com- [sic] question the
validity of a vote arrived at after the distribution of an Important
Notice. The Treasurer of ACA reporte [sic] that 121 people became
members between Sunday and the beginning of the meeting, 50 of them
by mail.
I would also like to point out that the "opposition" mentioned in
the ministers' notice are not selfish scoundrels, but include civic
minded thoughtful citizens (some are undoubtedly members of the
three congregations) who are also concerned with the need for low
and moderate income housing, but question whether the present
NCDF plan is the way to achieve this housing. .
While circulating a petition opposing the zoning change for one
site, it was possible for me to urge all those opposed to attend the ACA [sic]
meeting and vote against NCDF. I felt to do so would make a travesty of
a fact finding meeting, and to urge people to join the Qrganization in
6?.
orde; to vote on one issue would defeat the purpose of the ACA.
Instead I urged only those who were undecided, who wanted to
hear the other side and to get more information to attend. The
final vote was 104 in support of NCDF and 57 opposed, and large
headlines in a local paper announced this fact. My appeal is for
fairer tactics in the future.
With such an auspicious beginning, why did NCDF fail to obtain
the rezoning but succeed in polarizing Newton? NCDF has been accused --
by NCDF proponents -- of all sorts of blunders.
Their strategy was wrong. They should have taken the time to "educate"
the community to the need and the scattered site concept, instead of the power
play with the Board of Aldermen. They should have gone straight to the Aldermen,
kept a low public profile, and not wasted time, money, effort trying to educate
and mobilize the community. (There is confusion on what exactly the strategy
was.) They should have gone "anti-snob" in the first place.
Their tactics were wrong. They should have had different spokesmen,
contacted different people for political support. They should have made a citywide
mailing to tell the community the facts. They should have contacted and worked
with the abutters before the sites were negotiated. They should have built one
pilot site first to prove themselves to the city. They should have put all the units
on one site. They should have used the Section 235 (homeownership) program.
They should not have picked sites that were wetlands. If they had not picked a
site in Ward Eight, the opposition would have never been able to have the
organizational leadership and financial backing and ultimate success it had.
Their execution was poor. They should not have insulted this group
or strong armed that Alderman in that manner. The architect should have combed
his hair differently. They should have gotten all but one pro-NCDF candidate
out of the special Aldermanic race. They should not have concentrated their sup-
port on an ultra-liberal. They should have gotten the vote out on election day.
And on and on.
However valid and significant these points may be, many seem to
apply specifically to the Newton situation. The following analysis is an attempt
to look for generalities -- or in the prophetic words of HUD Secretary Romney --
the ":;*gnificance for other communities in the state and throughout the country."
First, we will review the characteristics of the housing controversy,
specifically the issues salient to Newton.
Second, we want to look at the rules which any agent proposing altera-
tion of the municipal zoning status quo must follow. As in most social systems and
institutions, the formal and informal rules give the advantage to the opposers of
chcnge.
Consequently, third, we want to examine NLCA as an opposing group
and NCDF as the proposer of change--their relative ease of forming and maintain-
ing coalitions. The nature of these roles together with the formal rules gives NLCA
a stronger position vis-a-vis NCDF.
Much of the responsibility for providing LMIH in the suburbs rests on
shoulders of non-profit sponsors, such as NCDF. These groups can be analyzd
in more general terms as "purposive" interest groups--groups which have goals
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which do not benefit their members. The trend now is in the direction of a purpos-
ive interest group connecting with a limited dividend, but most of the following
remarks will still apply. The Newton Land and Civic Association can,on the
other hand, be analyzed as a material interest group--assuming the core of its
membership are abutters who saw the NCDF proposal as a threat to their material
well-being. The Newton case illustrates the relative strengths and weaknesses of
each when these two groups confront each other.
In analyzing NCDF more specifically as a subsidized housing sponsor,
we see that its flexibility is constrained by FHA regulations and cost limitations
imposed upon the already constraining nature of the real estate market. (NCDF
did have a more difficult problem in choice of sites than one might find in less
"developed" and newer suburbs.)
Finally, the complexity of housing development and impact on the
community leads to problems in public discussion. The subjective nature of facts
and standards appear, giving the advantage to the opposition ... again.
Each of the above points will be examined in greater detail before we
look at the issue's affect on the local politicos.
Character of the Issue -- Redistributive
First, the issue involves change. Enough said.
Second, the issue is redistributive in all respects. The subsidized
housing program itself is redistributive on the national level. Although this aspect
is not normally an anti-LMlH rallying point in a liberal suburb, it was mentioned
70.
occasionally. The property tax impact was more salient to the Newton homeowner.
NCDF could not give an exact figure and estimates were left to the wild imagin-
ation. The most salient aspect of the redistributive issue, to the abutters at least,
was the effect the NCDF plan might have on the value of their property. One
Alderman claimed during the "774" hearing that the value of a house near one
NCDF site had gone down 24% when the owner tried to sell. True or not, that
type of statement unsettles most people--their home is their major investment.
The issue was redistributive in a social sense as well as financial. It
was seriously questioned whether, for example, an area housing 150 families in
$30,000 to $65,000 houses could assimilate 57 new families eligible to live in
subsidized housing. If families pay to live in a middle class neighborhood, to have
their children associate with middle class children, then changing the class mix
would, in a real sense, be a financial loss. Nor is the impact evenly distributed
in the neighborhood. Neighbors close to the site are in a socio-economic minority.
The majority of their children's friends could easily be of another socio-economic
background.
The third aspect of the issue involves the sanctity of zoning. Residents
remarked that they bought in such and such an area because it was zoned at a
certain level of restrictiveness. They expected it to stay that way. If the integrity
of zoning is violated promiscuously, what is sacred?
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Rules of the Gauntlet -- Opposition's Advantage
The procedure to obtain a zoning varience puts the burden on the pro-
poser of the change. Specifically in Newton, a two-thirds vote of the Board of
Aldermen is needed to change the restriction on a parcel of land--with the
approval of the abutters. Should only 20/6 of the abutters object, the proposers
must convince three-quarters of the Aldermen that the abutters' parochial objections
are outweighed by a community -wide interest. Objectors have a second chance,
in Newton at least, when the site plans come before the Board for approval. Here
again the proponents have the burden of convincing three-fourths of the Board.
Ease of Coalition -- Advantage to the Opposition
The opposition appears to have few problems in forming and maintaining
a coalition. People could join NLCA for any number of reasons. That is, they
could oppose NCDF for one or many reasons--zoning and/or building codes should
riot be violated, the proposed sites should be used for recreation or conservation or
open space, the plan would overcrowd the schools, raise the taxes, bring outsiders
into Newton, etc.
Coalition maintainance can be endangered in two main ways. The
group may become too extreme for some members. They would prefer to remain
silent rather than be associated with a group of "racists," for example. The leaders
of NLCA disassociated themselves early from those they considered the "lunatic
fringe "--specifically one very loquacious Wallacite. The opposition's strength
can also be diluted by concessions from the proponents. For example, NCDF did
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convert some opponents by their flexibility on changes in design and unit mix
on particular sites. But the proponents flexibility is circumscribed by its own
necessity to maintain a coalition (as well as economic, FHA etc. constraints).
Given the nature of the system (advantage to the opposition), proposers
of change need all the support they can muster--they need to form coalitions to
conserve their limited resources and maximize their impact. Even when NCDF was
really the "only game in town" it was continually in financial trouble. But
coalition formation and maintainance is more complicated for proponents than for
opponents. Not only do the proponents need to agree on the goal, they need to
reach accord on the means. "If you don't do it right, don 't do it at all. " In this
case for example, agreement had to be reached on such issues as the quantity of
the need (number of units), the quality of the need (elderly-family mix), type
of housing (apartments, town houses, single family detached), characterestics of
the people served (tenant policy), the scattered site concept, the specific ten
sites, the strategy and tactics, etc. The Newton Fair Housing and Equal Rights
Committee asked NCDF to make their tenant policy explicit before they would
lend their support. As mentioned above, the need to maintain the coalition limits
the proposer's ability to maneuver and make compromises. It becomes very
difficult for leadership to know at which point the saliency of the means outweighs
the saliency of the goal. For example, NCDF fought a residency requirement for
three-fourths of the units until it appeared that accepting this restriction might
get the whole package through.
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Group Incentives -- Problems of Purposive Interest Groups
While a purposive interest group is free of the taint of self-interest,
this also means that the group's salience is rather low to most members. NCDF
members would not benefit directly from the housing they were proposing. Still,
the efforts of the group were only tangential to their daily lives. They might
benefit from living in a heterogeneous community but this never appeared (to the
author) to be a propelling factor. Most NCDFers appeared to be driven by a moral
imperative to at least take care of Newton's "need' As a volunteer organization
besides, NCDF had to compete with jobs and other civic and recreation and family
interests. Considering all this, NCDF did have a remarkable response in terms
of volunteer help--one veteran of volunteer purposive interest groups remarked
that she had never before seen this magnitude of effort.
Purposive interest groups can have more direct benefits to the leaders
of the organizations. Exposure of a "good cause" gives one a type of publicity
which cannot be purchased. Therefore, work in this type of organization is
beneficial to those thinking of political careers (and not bad for business, either).
Although NCDF affiliation is not a political asset at present, NCDF leadership
positions were considered political ly valuable. Conflict arose within the Board
of Directors relative to which individuals (and consequently, which party) might
benefit politically from NCDF's good deeds. This endangered its coalition prospects
as well as general public creditibility.
More unique to non-profit housing sponsorship is the public's difficulty
believing that none of the directors of NCDF would make any money on the pro-
Ijects. Thus the group has the problems of low salience of a purposive interest
group without the benefits of an altruistic public image.
Even with the benefits to the leadership, symptoms of the low salience
appeared in the 20-member Board of Directors. The minutes have several re-
ferences to the problem of absenteeism at the monthly meetings. There was also
a problem of turnover. Of the twenty-one individuals who were directors when
the sites were announced in the Spring of 1970, only eight of those were directors
in June, 1971.
But a more damaging effect of the group's low salience is its fund
raising ability. None of the directors appeared overly enthusiastic about this
aspect of his responsibility. NCDF had difficulty starting fund drives. They had
difficulty getting pledges. They had difficulty collecting pledges. The money
was needed for such mundane items as pencils and paperclips (and legal fees,
site plans, land options, staff saleries) which are difficult to make as appealing
as sending money to CARE for feeding a starving child. NCDF's financial plight
severly constrained their ability to maneuver. They could never afford to make a
city-wide literature mailing in order to pursue a full dress "community education"
strategy, or simply to counter the attacks made upon them by the opposition. Nor
did they have the financial resources to gather data on such things as the number
of city employees living outside of Newton eligible for NCDF housing. The
opposition was able to point out gaps in their presentations, reflecting poorly on
their competence to build and manage the proposed housing.
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Nor do they have the resources as a purposive interest group or the
legal ability as a non-profit sponsor, to offer incentives to the city in forms
of commerical development or other types of housing developments which could
affect the decision on the LMIH proposal.
Another problem associated with the low salience of a purposive
interest group is the necessity to keep moving, be visible, and reach a goal
within a fairly short period. For example, NCDF was criticized for not spending
time to "educate the community. " This process is very time consuming and visible
reinforcements of progress are difficult to imagine. (Further, it would not
differenciate NCDF from other housing groups in Newton.) This proposed strategy
also contradicted the rhetoric--"the need was critical and significant action must
be taken now"--which was necessary to interest members in the first place. As
it was, the development of the proposal went on for two years before the specific
sites were prese ted for public approval. During this time NCDF was trying to
maintain presence in the public mind and membership interest by housing assistance
work--find existing housing for poor families. However, this became such a
drain on staff time that the primary goal of NCDF was being set back. Also,
the belief in the "need" being critical and the goal being reached as soon as
possible mitigated against the acceptance of the pilot project suggestion--
prove yourself then you can do more. The organization would have had difficulty
maintaining itself at the level of activity necessary to put on ten individual zoning
battles overa prolonged period of time.
Purposive interest groups are also constrained by the "means"-
Off"It.
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strategy and tactics - they can employ to reach their goal. They must not
violate other values held by their supporters. For example, NCDF did not take
the "774"route in 1970 for several reasons, but one reason they always pro-
fessed was faith in the liberal ideal of persuasion by rational argument and
education. Going snob zoning was "thumbing their nose at the community,"
"shoving it down their throats," "showing no confidence in Newton's ability
to solve its problems," "they had a responsibility not to divide the community,"
etc. Another example is the choice of scattered sites as opposed to the same
number of units on one site. Current sociological ideology proscribes massing
poor people together. "We don't want a Columbia Point in Newton. " This
constraint in "means and values" considerations is similar to the problems of
reaching agreements in the discussion on "proposing groups coalition forma-
tion. " It seems to be a particularly significant problem or constraint to the
leaders of purposive interest groups.
Group Incentives -- Advantages of Material Interest Groups
The Newton Land and Civic Associqtion offered general material
benefits to all Newton residents - if Qnly in the form of a $2.004housand
savings on their tax rate. Abutters and neighbors of the ten sites could per-
ceive more significant effects - from current property value to decibel land
maintenance.
Unlike NCDF's goals, the goals of NLCA were salient. This has been
reflected in the organization's actions in the year of its existence. Within two
weeks from the NCDF site announcements, a city-wide, grass-roots organization
was in operation collecting 11,000 petition signatures, writing letters to office
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holders and newspaper editors. Its leader was a man who had had no particular
experience in politics and little in civic work. (He is now a candidate for
Alderman at Large.) The organization had no trouble raising money for two
city-wide mailings, sound trucks, or advertisements. One neighborhood group
raised enough money to put up a competing bid for the NCDF site.
The clearest example of NLCA's strength relative to NCDF's occurred
in a special election for the "18th vote" (as NCDFers would say) in December,
1970. NLCA amply demonstrated that they were not just a few noisy abutters.
Their candidate did not squeak by, he took 29 of Newton's 33 precincts and
every ward (in total, pro-NCDF candidates did win one ward). The turnout
was quite high--over a fifth of the registered voters--for a special election.
Only 51% came out for the previous municipal election when 24 seats on the
Board of Aldermen were at stake and the mayoral contest was so close that it re-
quired a recount. The NCLA members were manning the, phones and reminding
voters (supporters) of the election until twenty minutes before the polls-closed.
The race had eight candidates in the field. Three were anti-NCDF.
NLCA showed the strength and discipline of the organization and salience of the
issue by being able to focus on one particular candidate. For example, the
strongest opposition to NCDF came from the south section of the city which
is heavily Jewish. A Jew from the area was running very hard against NCDF.
However, the NLCA calculated that an Italian candidate, not as vocally opposed
to NCDF, who already had some ethnic support in the north end of the city
would have a better chance of winning. NLCA leaders virtually demanded that
their members vote for the Italian -- 'We are the leaders, this is the issue, you
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owe it to us. " In the Jewish ward in the south of Newton, the NLCA
designate beat the resident ethnic by three to one. Furthermore, the NLCA can-
didate is a Republican in a city with only 27.6% of the voters registered
Republicans.
The city-wide strength that NLCA displayed in the election destroyed
the NCDF political theory that they would have enough strength to protect the
Aldermen who supported LMIH. The same liberal coalition who had, just the
month before, delivered 55% of the Newton vote to Father Drinan on the
Vietnam issue was not able to muster over 24% for their anointed candidate.
Perhaps this was due to poor organization, perhaps to the higher salience of the
war issue, or perhaps liberals on Vietnam withdrawal are not necessarily liberal
on LMIH in their neighborhoods.
FHA Baggage -- Very Awkward
FHA cost limits and regulations made NCDF vulnerable to attack at
several points. FHA' s land cost limits and NCDF's desire to keep the den-
sities as low as possible made it necessary to seek donations of land from the
city. Although the Board of Aldermen tossed "surplus" city sites in and out of
the scatteration package, they were not responsible for releasing the land. As
it turned out, the City Recreation Department and School Departments did not
consider their land "surplus." The FHA cost limits on the dwelling units themsel-
ves force NCDF to ask for variances on the (outdated) Newton Building Code.
This left them vulnerable to charges of building inadequate shelter-- which
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would be slums and fire hazards.
Federal tenant selection policies and income limits were other
sources of controversy. The government regulation that gives priority to
families displaced by public action was used by some opponents to show that
NCDF elaborate tenant procedure for selection was a farce. They suggested
that Roxbury residents would fill the projects since no Newton families had
been displaced by public action in several years. NCDF had tried to sell
their program as housing for city employees. The opponents pointed out that
Newton's firemen and policemen earned too much to come within the FHA
income limits. While the opposition's "facts" did not give the whole picture,
there seemed to be enough truth in the contentions to make uncommitted re-
sidents begin to wonder about NCDF's credibility or competence.
Real Estate Economics and Management -- Newton Realities
Single family detached homes--better fitting the "character of the
neighborhood" and bringing in fewer families--would have lessened the opposi-
tion, or driven it to other points of contention. But NCDF determined that the
land cost in Newton ruled out the use of Section 235.
According to NCDF, the economics of development and management
made the ten sites a non-negotiable point. However, they were flexible with
the unit mixes on each site. But NCDF did agree to accept fewer sites and
fewer units. Thus a credibility problem developed. As NCDF changed aspects
of the site plans and mixes the news would filter down slowly. This meant
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people would hear NCDF say one thing to one group and something seemingly
contradictory shortly thereafter to another group. Again, credibility problems.
NCDF also said a pilot project vould be ecomonically feasible. Some Alder-
men had difficulty believing this.
The Planning Department's study of vacant land found only 42 sites
suited for development. The sites available for sale at a price near FHA limits
severely reduces this number. Consequently, NCDF ended up with one site
that, by popular vote, is a natural wet land.
The real estate market seems to necessitate secret negotiations. Not
even the NCDF Board was aware of which sites were under consideration until
the package was assembled. Two directors had suggested speaking with neighbors
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before the sale negotiations involve them in the decisions. (This method had
been used by on director when chairman of the Newton Housing Authority in
search of sites for elderly housing.) The suggestion was deemed meritorious but
impractical. Indeed, NCDF was attacked for "springing" the sites on the
neighbors and the city.
While one may think one is dealing in hard facts -- densities, property
taxes, pupil ratios--what are too-high densities, too-high taxes, too-high pupil
ratios, etc. Or who is an expert? Is a site a natural wet land? Do you believe
a Harvard professor or the Army Corps of Engineers, League of Women Voters,
City Planning Department and the local ecology lobby? When does a city
have more social problems than the police can handle? When the police chief
and abutter says so? How much is too much traffic? What is an adequate
amount of play area? Do LMI children need more play area than middle
class children? What is the maximum density that will not destroy the
"character of the neighborhood"? What is the "character of the neighbor-
hood"? What is "adequate" transportation for LMI families? What really is
'Newton's need for LMIH?" Both sides had their city planners, educators,
psychologists, sociologists and ecologists to disagree on the "facts."
Thus,
THE NEWTON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION
-- a proposer of change
-- low salient, purposive interest group
burdened by
-- a redistributive issue
-- FHA and real estate restrictions, and
slipping on
-- value coated subjective "facts,"
following a prescribed path





THE NEWTON lAND AND CIVIC ASSOCIATION
-- opposer of change
-- high salient material interest group
and
THE NEWTON POLITICOS
-- participants, observers and judges.
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Politics in Housing -- Uncomfortable Quarters
A brief examination of the Newton political scene illustrates
several ways the local political system is "handled" by a controversial LMIH
issue. Newton also illustrates how politica try to cool the issue so they can
again use housing as a tool in their own game plans.
Political Background
Until the 196 0 's, Newton was a conservative Republic WASP political
stronghold. The "napartisan" twenty-four member Board of Aldermen was
virtually self-perpetuating. If a member did not intend to run for reelection,
he would resign a few months before the biennial election. The Board would
appoint a replacement, thus being the incumbent in the next election. The
Republican City Committee was the gatekeeper of the political arena. Today
the Committee's control is very much weakened, aldermanic vacancies are
filled by special elections, and the Democrats have eleven seats on the Board.
(Five of the eight Ward Aldermen are Democrats and Sixteen Aldermen-At-
Large are Republicans.) Although a non-Republican non-WASP has never been elect-
ed mayor, liberal Jewish candidates have come very close in the last five
years. Newton political life is, then, unsettled and competing. This political
competition--perhaps even paranoia--is not obvious to the average Newtonite
who sees non-partisanship and assumes the decisions are made on the basis of
merit. But the competition does appear to affect the time when issues are
brought up and how they are handled. As we will note later, the solution of
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the housing problem of LMI families and elderly--through the Housing
Authority--has been subordinated to political game strategy.
Role Perception
Although the system is unsettled, not all Aldermen are competing.
The Newton Board of Aldermen has the normal range of legislative types.
Some are ideologues who will go down the line for a cause or a philosophy--
be that liberal or conservative. Some are representatives of the majority whether
or not the decision they make on that basis reflects their own judgement on the
matter. Some are politicos preparing for higher callings who check the tires be-
fore choosing the band wagon.
Consequently, mixing conservatives, registers of majority opinion,
future mayors and governors with a liberal proposal which has polarized the
community, the probability that seven of twenty-four aldermen will not want to
pass the proposal is high. But assu ming the local politicians want to effect a com-
promise on the particular issue at hand, they are hampered by the technical com-
plexities involved.
Technical Complexities
For the most part Alde.rman are not schooled in the ways and means
of FHA, the real estate and construction industries. This lack hampers their
ability to come up with political compromises which are also economically
feasible. For example, during the committee work on the "Public Residence
~M.LM
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Zone" the Alderman who had proposed the zone to ease the restrictions on
builders of subsidized housing unknowingly made a technical suggestion that
would have effectively knocked out the NCDF proposal.
We Are They
The politician's proximity to his constitutents appears to be impor-
tant to the disposition of controversial issues on the local level. Since being an
Alderman in Newton is a volunteer position requiring two full board meetings and
two committee meetings per month, there is little chance for a "we, the
Alderman--they, the voters" feeling to develop. The legislative social system
reportedly exists in state bodies and can alter the outcomes of issues (as will be
further explained in the following chapter). Local legislators live, work and
socialize with their constitutents more than with their fellow Aldermen. A
controversial issue puts a strain on all his relationships. An abutter's "How can
you do this to me?" may be more poignant and persuasive than some proponents
abstract argument about Newton's moral responsibility. Since opponents are
likely to be more exercized, Aldermen wanting personal peace and safety are
likely to side with them. It was reported that one Newton Alderman, when
trying to sneak out of a very heated meeting was bodily picked up and returned.
He became very vocally opposed to NCDF.
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Issue Scarcity and Visibility
For politicos oriented toward the next campaign, the number of
local issues does not give them much ability "to do the right thing" on an un-
popular issue. Unlike the state and federal levels, the local level does not
generate a great variety or quantity of issues in the two years between elec-
tions. Most of the business Aldermen handle is routine. Education, land use
decisions, and the tax rate are the normal range of issues. The Aldermen have
no control over schools and therefore have only a limited control over taxes.
Land use decisions normally involve different neighborhoods with different
questions--should the electronics firm build an addition, etc. They are not of
city-wide interest.
One Alderman seriously considering running for mayor saw that NCDF
would be the issue. He was one of the leading opponents to the plan in the
Aldermanic debates although (it is reported) he personally thought the idea had
merit. But even for those Aldermen who are not seeking higher office, a contro-
versial issue threatens their position by destroying their relative anonymity.
Thus without the quantity and variety of salient-issues the politico
simply does not have the opportunity to muddy his record by being liberal here,
conservative there.
There has been no hotter issue in Newton than NCDF. Normally the
average Newton resident has little about which to complain. Therefore, many
residents do not clutter their minds with the knowledge of their Alderman's name.
But when a salient issue arises the Alderman's anonymity is lost. Residents find
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out who he is, watch how he votes. One anti-NCDF petitioner unknowingly
knocked on her ward Alderman's door. When he explained why he could not
sign her petition, she replied that up until now she had not known or cared who
her Alderman was, but now would be certain to watch how he voted on NCDF
and take appropriate action on election day.
Increased Participation
This tendency is enforced with an issue that is seen as a material dis-
advantage to the opponents and only the "right thing to do" to the proponents.
Aldermen concerned about their future will rationally heed the opponents. The
petitioner illustrates another point: hot issues bring voters out of the walls. The
Alderman cannot depend on his hard core of friends and supporters to carry him
on election day. NCDFers realized this too late. Using their "Drinan" lists
from the election the month before, NCDF supporters thought they had enough
voters committed to take the election based on their calculation of the voter
turnout. They missed by a factor of two.
Housing in Politics--Housing Loses
With rancorous conflict at the community level the local politico
is exposed to attack. He will lose no matter which side he takes--lose votes,
lose friends, lose sleep, lose business. But as far as his political career is
concerned the preceding interest group analysis indicates he is likely to be
hurt more deeply by the opposition material interest group--Newton Land and
Civic Association. The rational politico will side with the opposition but at
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the same time try to shake lose some of the less committed (to the NCDF plan
per se) pro housing forces.
A Not Too Hypothetical Newton Scenario
The establishment Republican. mayoral candidate is a state
Representative who voted for Chapter 774 in 1969. At the Newton "774" hear-
ing he spoke against NCDF. Within a few days he voted to uphold the anti-
snob zoning law against a repeal attack in the Massachusetts Great and General
Court. In the House of Representatives he is seen to be "for 774, but not in
Newton. " In Newton, he is said to have "private thoughts on NCDF. "
He wants to be mayor. The other major candidate is of the same
ethnic background. He is a former director of NCDF and member of the Board
of Alderman. The obvious strategy is to gain the support of the NLCA. He is
backed by the leader of the NLCA and endorses him for Alderman. But the
mayoral candidate cannot be against meeting Newton's need. The opposition,
for the most part was not against housing and meeting Newton's need--they said.
Therefore the candidate must find an instrument besides NCDF for meeting the
"need". "NCDF is not the way. The Newton Housing Authority is."
The Newton Housing Authority members are appointed by the mayor
and confirmed by the Board of Aldermen. By giving the local housing authority
the sole legitimacy to provide for "Newton's need", the politicos have two
advantages. The need is redefined: the Housing Authority can only build for
low income families and elderly. (NCDF was predominately for moderate income
I
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families.) Therefore the number of units and the number of sites required is
drastically reduced. The site selection is in the control of the politicos:
sites will be cleared by the mayor. Unlike the "do-gooders', the Housing
Authority will not pick "good" sites that will put them on the spot politically.
A relevant site criterion is the impact it will have on election chances. Newton
observers perceive this situation occuring now; it goes something like this...
"Say, good supporter and present mayor, I need something to show the
housing moralists worried about "Newton's need. " Get your appointees on the
Housing Authority to announce some sites shortly after I denounce NCDF as not
the answer. Be sure to put the sites in areas which will embarrass my Democratic
opponent, the Alderman, put one in the heavily Democratic Italian ward where
they fought NCDF so hard. Put another one in the Black area, on the land they
are trying to get for a playground. Put some innocuous elderly units near the
NCDF site that is before the State Board of Appeals. I could win some points
there. They can argue that they should not have the NCDF family housing be-
cause they will have the elderly. Then my opponent and all the pro-NCDF Demo-
crats on the Board are on the spot. If they vote against the sites they will look
like hypocrites. People will see it as a political move--don't give the
Republicans any credit for solving the housing need. "
Who loses when the LMIH is the pawn of politics? The moderate
income families, since the Housing Authority cannot build for them. The low
income families, since they are relegated to the least controversial sites or
sites designed to maximize political opponents embarrassment-- any relation to
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"rational land use planning " and residents' needs are or second order consequence,
perhaps even purely coincidental.
CONCLUSION: MOVE IT UP
Newton is no ordinary suburb. Other suburbs probably are not as
potentially receptive to LMIH as Newton is. However, we think the problems
described in the group analysis and the tensions in the political system are applicable
to other LMIH sponsors and other local governments in suburbia. Considering all
that was working against them, it is remarkable that NCDF came within one
Aldermanic vote of approval.
At this writing, the NCDF proposal is not dead. The Chapter 774 pro-
cedure may impose 300-odd units of subsidized housing on the polarized community.
The abutters may even discover that their worst fears are not realized and live com-
Fortably with these new neighbors. If so, the opposition could, but not necessarily
will, be lessened the next time around.
Chapter 774, or some state law, may not only be useful in building sub-
sidized housing but also in lessening the rancorous conflict at the local level. This
is based on the assumption that people get more exercised when they feel they can
affect the outcome. Chapter 774 moves the question out of obvious local political
control to local administrative control. If it is reasonable to assume that zoning
boards of appeal tend to be less subject to political pressure than boards of alder-
men, the n a technically sound plan will have a better chance to survive. The
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objectors will not feel as confident that mere numbers will determine the outcome.
This sensof impotence and the consequent lessening of conflict should logically
increase if the decision is raised to a higher level of government. By looking
at the passage of Chapter 774 in Massachusetts we try in the next chapter to
determine the probability of other states being scapegoats for the local politicos.
"774". ANTI-SNOB ZONING:_ 91
THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION
If we cannot buy this, then there is no hope for the hopeless.
-- Senator George Kenneally
If the Newton case is not unique, then fighting through the local
political process is, at least, discouraging. The local governmental strategy
will consume considerable time and energy and have a high rate of failure.
If there were political successes, the product would rarely be in terms of a
"rational" solution to a housing problem which is really metropolitan in scope.
The metropolitan level of government is the ideal body to have the
responsibility and authority to execute a rational solution to the housing problem.
From the political perspective, action on this level would not be hampered by
many of the constraints cited in the Newton case. However, the metropolitan
proposal has at least two drawbacks. First, metropolitan government does not exist.
A pipe dream of political scientists, businessmen and editorial writers of the 1950's,
metropolitan government has only pale manifestation in Miami, Nashville and
Indianapolis. Although a considerable improvement over the local governments'
cast of thousands, the second drawback is the number of potential metropolitan
governments to be "educated" -as many as 233. The next actually existing level
of government limits the cast to fifty. Can we look to the states?
STATE GOVERNMENT: A Dinosaur
Since Lord Bruce praised the American states as the ''laboratories" of the
nation, many observers' attitudes and perceptions of state government have
radically chang'i. American government resembles the dinosaur with the state
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level most akin to the herbivorous species - having the smallest brain and
slowest reflexes. State government appears least capable of coping with the
urbanizing environment - the hardening tar of our age. This conclusion is
drawn from a list of observations which includes incompetent personnel, bulky
and outmoded constitutions, diffusion of responsibility, fiscal dieting, etc. The
worst characteristic is state governments' alleged malice towards the cities. 1
For many years political scientists diagnosed the primary cause for
state governments' city malice and mental deficiency as legislative malapportionment.
Small towns and rural areas were over-represented at the expense of the cities. The
Supreme Court dissolved this blockage in Baker vs. Carr in 1962. Convinced of the
curative effects of proper apportionment, Walter Heller suggested federal revenue
sharing with the states to meet the urbanization problems in 1964.2 But as reports
of post operative behavior accumulate, there is growing doubt that malapportionment
was the causal factor. 3
Indeed at the time of the Supreme Court nling, the suburbs were more
victimized by malapportionment than the central cities. Therefore the political
gain has been in the suburbs. The cities may be less well off under suburban
1. Roscoe C. Martin, The Cities and the Federal System (New York:
Atherton Press, 1965).
2. Walter Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1966).
3. Richard Hofferbert, "The Relationship between Public Policy and
some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American
Political Science Review, 60:1 (March 1966): .73-3.
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leadership than the rural squirarchies. Chicago's Mayor Daley observed,
"'At least you could buy the rural legislators! "' A frustrated Carl Stokes,
Mayor of Cleveland, complained, "'One man-one vote hasn't changed a thing
as far as the central city is concerned. Instead of the farmer with his conserva-
tism and detachment, you now have the man from suburbia, who is as conservative
and detached, and sometimes as hostile to the city, as the rural member."'I As
political scientist William J.D. Boyd observes, "The United States is an urban
nation, but not n big-city nation. The suburbs own the future."2
In spite of the fact that Massachusetts' population is over half suburban,
during the same summer the Moon was zoned American, the Great and General
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a bill intended to limit the
snob zoning ability of its affluent suburbs. Did this legislation represent an "idea
in good currency," an "idea whose time had come" in state government? If so,
would other states succumb to the same rationales or at least exhibit the same be-
havior? In this chapter we present a case study of the passage of Chapter 774 -
anti-snob zoning legislation in Massachusetts - to indicate a probable answer to
the two questions.
For a state government, Massachusetts is relatively near the edge of the
tar pit heading out. The case presents a state that -- relative to other states -
1. A. James Reichley, 'The Political Containment of the Cities," in
Alan K. Campbell, ed., The States and the Urban Crisis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 173.
2. William J.D. Boyd, "Suburbia Takes Over," National Civic Review,
55 (June, 1966): . 298.
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is progressive in both traditional state functions and the new state function of
housing. If any state legislature would be receptive to anti-snob proposals,
Massachusetts would be one of the first. - The case also presents a state that -
relative to other states -- does not have a severe housing problem or a large
Black or poor population. Suburbanites in Massachusetts would seem to have
less to fear than those in many other states.
DINOSAURUS MASS: Relatively Innovative -- Generally
The judgment that Massachusetts is a fast learner -- relative to the
other states -- is made by an analysis of the time it takes a state to adopt a
new idea. Jack Walker, writing in the September 1969 American Political
Science Review, bases his scoring on the enactment of 88 different programs
covering the areas of health, welfare, conservation, education, administrative
organization, planning, police and correction, civil rights, taxes, labor and
professional regulation. Each state receives a numerical score based on the time
it took the state to adopt the program after the first state and before the last. On
this basis Massachusetts is the second fastest or most innovative following only New
York and immediately ahead of California, New Jersey, Michigan and Connecticut.]
Housing is missing from Walker's list of typical state functions. Traditionally
a private market domain, the Federal government has only recently taken the pro-
vision of low and moderate income housing the least bit seriously. Until very
1. Jack Walker, "Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States,"
American Political Science Review, 63:3 (September, 1969):88O-Q89.
recently, only a smattering of states had their own programs.
-- in Housing
After the years of constricted building volume during the Depression and
World War II, Massachusetts passed a low-income veterans housing program in
1948 to ease the shortage. Within six years the state had constructed about
15,000 units. As the veterans program ended the building phase, the Common-
wealth started providing housing for the elderly in a continually expanding pro-
gram. Between the two programs the state has out-produced the Federal government
in Massachusetts by a ratio of 3:2. Furthermore, based on a rough calculation of
the state's percentage of poor and percentage of substandard units (U.S. Census
1960 definition), Massachusetts has more federal housing than its "fair share."
In 1964 the General Court ordered a commission to study the low-income
housing situation. As a result the legislature passed a rent supplements program,
a low-ncome large family housing program and set up the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency to provide loans for moderate-income housing construction.
Relative to most states, Massachusetts' concern for housing is over-
whelming considering it ranks 7th in the percentage of standard units. The rate
of improvement of its housing stock between 1950 and 1960 was just slightly below
the national rate. Even during the present housing recession, the state does not
appear to be hit as hard as the nation.
1. Statistics on Massachusetts housing were pulled from the Mass. Dept.
of Community Affairs and the 1960 U.S. Census during the summer of 1969.
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Relative state rankings is one measure. However, a more politically
relevant statement is that 200,000 families or about 12% of the population
presently live in substandard housing. The rhetoric of several State officials
and representatives and the newspapers characterize this situation as not a
problem but a "crisis.
To provide low and moderate-income housing one needs builders (local
housing authorities, non-profits or limited dividend corporations), subsidized
mortgage money and reasonably inexpensive land. The State has helped provide
for the first two. As previously noted, suitable land in the cities is decreasing
and the cost increasing. Most of the subsidized units have been constructed in
the central cities and inner suburbs. The problem now defined by both the lack
of land and the feeling that the suburbs were not putting in their share helped
focus attention on large lot zoning in Massachusetts.
ANTI-SNOB ZONING: Developing an Idea in Good Currency
The suggestion that large lot zoning might not be totally beneficial was
neither new to Massachusetts nor unique to the State. It was, however, approaching
the status of being an idea in good currency after a twenty-odd year development.
Homebuilders were probably the first to see the great peril of large lot
zoning -- albeit mostly to themselves. For this and other problems the Massachusetts
Homebuilders Association managed to have the General Court set up a special study
commission to consider a state zoning appeals board. In 1955 the commission did
not see the virtue of the proposal. The MHBA mounted another fnuitless drive
for the board in 1960.1
Planning types began to note the consequences of large lot zoning
in the late '50 's. A 1958 study of the Boston SMSA noted that residential de-
velopment capacity had been reduced by 39% in the period between 1946 and
1956 by means of zoning techniques.2 But publications of the Urban Land
Institute, in which this type of study appears, are not widely disseminated or
quoted in scare headlines of the press.
Massachusetts Senate President Maurice Donahue introduced a resolu-
tion to have the Legislative Research Council study alleged discrimination
against minorities by use of zoning. In June 1968, the Council found little direct
racial discrimination but noted the impact of large lot zoning on economic
3discrimination.
The crescendo of anti-snob zoning reports reached its peak with the
publication of two Presidential Commissions on urban problems and urban housing.
1. Massachusetts. Report of the Legislative Research Council Relative
to Reducing the Zoning Power to City and County Government. Mass. S. 1133,
June, 1968, p. 191.
2. Massachusetts Dept. of Commerce and the Urban & Regional Studies
Section of M.I.T., "The Effects of Large Lot Zoning on Residential Development,"
Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin, No. 32 (July,1958),. 8.
3. Massachusettsp. .,p. 94.
4. U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems, Building the American
City (U. S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C. , 1969). U.S.




The 1968 reports of the Douglas and Kaiser commissions pointed to the insidious
discriminating effect of large lot zoning. Although not the best known of the
Presidential Commissions, the reports'findings did produce articles in the Massa-
chusetts press.
THE GREAT AND GENERAL COURT: Confronting the Issue (?)
Within this atmosphere of receptiveness of housing legislation, a
feeling of a housing crisis and a somewhat popular anti-snob zoning attitude
among certain "progressive" Representatives, the 1969 Session of the Great and
General Court of Massachusetts opened with Democrats outnumbering Republicans
almost 3:1 in the House and 2:1 in the Senate and a Republican in the Governor's
chair. Five large lot zoning bills were on file. The following narrative will try
to describe the process by which those five bills became the first anti-snob zoning
legislation passed by any state legislature. The case is quite detailed for two
reasons: 1) to indicate how difficult the normal state legislative process is, and 2)
to point out the unusual and possibly unique circumstances by which this legislation
ran the state legislative gauntlet.
1. "Zoning Discriminates, Paul Douglas Claims," Boston Globe,
May 14, 1968.
2. The narrative is based on interviews with several of the participants.
The following is a list of interviewees but for their protection, specific informa-
tion is not attributed to any one individual.
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(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Rev. Ed Blackman, United Church of Christ, Dec. 9, 1969.
Alexander Cella, Assistant to Senate President Maurice Donahue,
Dec. 9, 1969.
Ma.jrice Donahue, Former Senate President, April 16, 1971.
John Eller, Assistant to Speaker David Bartley, November 25, 1969.
William Finnegan, Staff member of House Ways & Means Committee,
November 25, 1969
Alex Koval, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, December 9, 1969.
Helene Levine, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, December 18, 1969.
Martin Linsky, Representative to Massachusetts Great and General Court
from Brookline, October 8, 1969.
William McDermott, Massachusetts Home Builders Association, December
9, 1969.
K.K. Raitanen, Principal Planner for Department of Community Affairs,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 25, 1969.




The subject matter coming before the Urban Affairs Committee
(formerly Metropolitan District) has changed over the last few sessions.
Once it dealt almost exclusively with MDC recreation bills but only about
half of the 277 bills before the 1969 session concerned that topic. With the
rising interest in housing and related urban matters the work of the committee
was becoming more "relevant."
The UAC attracted many of the new action oriented young "Reps"
not barnacled with habit and tradition. Unlike the Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives, the Massachusetts Speaker makes all committee appointments -
both Democrats and Republicans. With this power he can effectively regulate
the output of legislation in most cases. For example, the last Speaker was certain
to maintain an anti-birth control majority on the Social Welfare Committee. The
appointments to the UAC were made by former Speaker Quinn with the concurrence
of Speaker David Bartley. One can assume that Quinn and Bartley were aware
they had given control to the young moverickish Reps.
Unlike most states and the U.S. Coingress, Massachusetts employs a
joint committee system. Except for the Committees on Rules and Ways & Means
the substantive committees are membered by both the 40 senators and the 240
representatives. Besides making legislating more efficient, this arrangement
increases the power of the chairman. The chairman of the UAC, Senator John
1. Barry M. Portnoy, "Membership in the Club: Denizens of the Massa-
chusetts House of Representatives," Harvard Journal of Legislation, 6:2 (January,
1969), Joint system used only in Mass. , Conn., and Maine.
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Moakley of South Boston, had become more liberal lately - as is evidenced
by the scores achieved on the ADA tests for the previous three sessions.
This may have some parallel with the advancing age of the then U.S. Speaker
John McCormack, also of South Boston. But with a sincere interest in better
legislation Chairman Moakley has given up some of his control by allowing
the formation of sub-committees -highly unusual for the General Court.
Into the receptive atmosphere of the UAC came 277 bills -- 5 dealing
with large lot zoning. Three typical self-interest bills were submitted by builders -
although one was unusually sophisticated. The other two were attacks on suburban
zoning on behalf of low income people. Republican Representative Martin Linsky's
(Brookline) bill would have simply exempted housing authorities, non-profits,
limited dividends, cooperatives and condominiums (for low and moderate incomes)
from local zoning. As with all bills before the General Court, the five zoning
bills were given a public hearing (Wednesday, March 19, 1969). The normal oppo-
sition to the builders' proposals came from planning types protecting their sacred cow.
Linsky's bill was supported by the Massachusetts Federation for Fair Housing and
Equal Rights.
The UAC was not satisfied with any one of the bills but some members
wanted to pursue the subject of zoning and low-income housing further. Led by
Linsky, the young Turks asked Chairman Moakley to form a subcommittee. The
1. Massachusetts Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action,
"Legislative Supplement: Bay State Citizen." issues for 1965-1969 sessions.
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formation of the subcommittee and the amount of wor< put in by its members is a
rare occurrence in the General Court. The work of the subcommittee began
under a severe time constraint. All bills must be reported out of committee by
the fourth Wednesday in March or the bill is given an automatic unfavorable
report, i.e. killed. That rule gave the subcommittee one week from the time
of the hearing to work up a satisfactory version. As the week drew to a close,
Linsky and the subcommittee were not happy with the product.
During this critical week, John Eller, a young aide to the Speaker,
was interested in what the committee intended to do with the low-income housing
situation. After contacting Linsky, he discussed the time problem with the
Speaker. The Speaker agreed that if the UAC would report out one bill before
the deadline he would hold that draft in suspended animation in the clerk's
office until the committee could draft one satisfactory to him ad the committee.
Rules exist for the leadership's convenience. The Speaker's power is extensive and
perhaps necessary, like the thumb on a hand, considering the size of the House -
240 individuals.
Also during this week the general public was alertec by a front page
article in the Boston Globe. The article brought to some readers visions of
12,000 poor folk overrunning Lincoln, Wellesley, Weston and Dover. It also
perma.,ently labelled the bill "Snob Zoning."
As the Speaker had suggested, the UAC passed the draft Linsky had
tossed together. The real drafting began with an ad hoc committee composed
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of Rep. Linsky, Rep. Richard Landry (D-Waltham), Rev. Edward Blackman of
the United Church of Christ, John Eller for the Speaker, and Alex Koval of
the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (funded by O. E.O.). Koval was the
principal draftsman of the fifteen separate versions the committee developed.
The draft with which everyone concurred -- partly because they were
exhausted after two months -provided for builders under Federal or Massachu-
setts subsidy programs to take advantage of a special process. If the town in
which the builder wished to obtain a zoning change had less than 1 1/2% of its
residential, commercial and industrially zoned land covered by subsidized
housing, he could apply directly to the local zoning board of appeals. Should
they deny his petition or grant it under conditions which would make building
uneconomic, he could appeal this decision to the district planning commission
which would review and could overrule the local decision. Particularly interest-
ing is the time requirement. The process cannot take more than four months.
which, compared to the traditional court route of two to three years, is revolutionary.
The purpose of the bill as Koval viewed it, was to bring the subject up
for debate. He had no indication of the degree to which the Speaker would support
the bill. In an effort to keep the debate as rational and educational as possible,
they made it as palatable to the suburbs as possible without losing city support.
For example, the regional planning commission -an advisory board of members
of local planning boards -was employed as the final appeals agency. While this
is rational -- the regional body should know its regional needs better than a state
group - it is also slightly dangerous considering the back-scratching possibilities.
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On the other hand, the drafters did not sugar-coat the bill by asking
for state funds to pay for any community cost which might accrue from the new
less affluent suburbanites for fear of not obtaining city support.
While the drafting went on and on, the press got wind of various
versions. Misinformation circulated widely. Articles talked about "mandatory"
construction and "ghettoes of affluence." Before the final draft was even near
completion, the Federation of Planning Boards passed a resolution opposing it and
Fair Housing groups decided to make snob zoning their cause for the year.
Unlike the U.S. Congress, Bay State committees do not issue reports
with proposed legislation. Custom and tradition had not calcified Linskyyet,
and he suggested writing a brief report to attach to the legislation. After the
normal "but it's never been done" with the Clerk's Office, it was printed. The
twenty line statement served as a legislative history and intent and was widely
quoted in newspaper articles thereby helping to clarify some of the issues.
In the middle of June with the draft complete, a critical strategy
decision had to be made. Linsky went to Chairman Moakley to determine how
the bill was to be reported out. It obviously was not the same bill the committee
had approved in March. Giving the new bill a public hearing would expose it to
already intensifying opposition. Some of the committee members were opposed or
becoming uneasy. Moakley decided to replace the new draft with the one
floating around the Clerk's Office without public hearing or committee vote. Thus,
the power of the committee chairman.
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House Ways and Means Committee
On June 26, H.5429 was reported to the House and immediately sent -
the way of all legislation -to the House Ways & Means. This important
committee reviews virtually all legislation in executive session. Unlike most
committees, Ways & Means has a reasonable number of staff members. It was
here that snob zoning was first seriously threatened.
The bill was assigned to staffman William Finnegan, a former Rep from
working-class Everett. Now living in middle-class suburban Scituate, his view
of the world had been altered enough to see the bill as a "ridiculous, a
nefarious attack on home rule and ought to be quietly disposed of without further
fanfare. In a showdown with Eller, Koval and Helene Levine (lobbyist for
Massachusetts Law Reform), Finnegan's lack of authority was pointed out to him.
John Eller made it clear to the committee that the Speaker wanted the bill
reported out favorably. It was.
Ways & Means did make two changes in the bill. The special appeals
process could not be used if the town had an excess of ten percent of its housing
units in the subsidized category. The towns now had two outs -- area and number.
Secondly, the committee changed the location of the appeal from the region to
the state -a three-member committee appointed by the Commissioner of the De-
partment of Community Affairs.
1. Draft of an article to be published(?) by Rep. Martin Linsky and
John Turner, "WatchOut Suburbs -- Here Come the Cities."
A~UaUaki'
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Had this legislation been processed on the national level, HUD
would have been in with both left feet. But on the state level DCA barely
made an imprint. Perhaps because DCA is a new department it is rather in-
effective in negotiating with the Legislature. The General Court has managed
to keep the department almost incompetent by understaffing and underpaying.
The bill was not unnoticed at DCA. An advisory commission ordered
by the Legislature in 1967 to investigate and study planning and zoning (headed
by then MIT City Planning Chairman J.T. Howard) endorsed the objectives of
the bill but recommended the Department oppose passage because "this bill
would be harmful, not because it would result in bad consequences -- though in
a few cases it might -but because it would more likely result in no consequences,
and would defer grappling with the real issues involved in furthering its laudable
objectives. But DCA said they would support the bill if they were given a
piece of the action - "We feel that it is important that state-wide standards be
established for expediting the development of low-and moderate-income housing,
and that the proposed legislation should provide for a co-ordinated state role in
this process."2 By moving the appeals to DCA, the bill was assured of DCA's
support -- for what it was worth.
1 . Letter by Professor J. T. Howard to DCA, June 20, 1969.
2. Letter by Julian Steele, Commissioner of DCA to House
Ways & Means Committee, July 8, 1969.
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House Floor
By the time the bill was ready to come out of Ways & Means, the
General Court was beginning its end of the session rush. The bill was still
given minimal chance - 'The housing measure which is the most explosive
and appears to stand the least chance of passage, according to observers, is
House 5429. "' John Eller was being very careful to bring the bill to the floor
when the Speaker would have his full strength.
On Thursday, July 31, 1969, the snob zoning bill was brought to
the ibor. Rep. Daley (R -Wellesley) proposed a local veto amendment.
This tested the temperature of the water. The Speaker lost the vote 103-119
with 18 abstentions. He recessed the House for a half an hour while he stoked
the fire. The temperature was up where he wanted it on the next vote -- 129-94
and 17 abstentions. He had changed 18 votes (9 were permanent converts while
the rest wandered now and then) and brought in 3 absent reps. 2
While debate is often as useless as rain on the ocean, the speech by
Rep. Bruce Zeizer (R-suburban Wellesley and former HUD employee), is credited
with removing any intellectual opposition to the bill. He stressed the safeguards,
especially the protection against greedy builders slapping up flimsy little boxes.
This was especially necessary because the Massachusetts Homebuilders Association
was actively lobbying for the bill. In an effort to show the Homebuilders had a
1. David R. Ellis, "Prorogation fever rising on the Hill," Boston Globe,
July 25, 1969.
2. My calculations from roll calls H. 359-62,368-70,July 31 & August
4, 1969.
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social conscience, lobbyist William McDermott was giving it everything he
had. Unfortunately, this type of help was not needed.
Over the weekend the shocked suburbanite officials began to express
sentiments of genuine horror. But on Monday the Speaker was able to keep
the temperature hot enough and the bill was sent to the Senate.
Senate
As in the House, all Senate bills go to the Ways & Means Committee.
Here again the zoning bill hit a snag in the person of Chairman James "Blackie"
Burke - probably the second most powerful man in the Senate. Burke is not a
champion of subsidized housing. But Sen. Moakley was able to convin, Burke
of the merits of the bill by means of its political advantages. The bill was
released unchanged to face a somewhat dubious future in the Senate.
Unlike its national counterpart, the Massachusetts Senate is more
conservative than the House. Although Democrats outnumber Republicans 2:1,
most of the Democrats are liberals of days gone by.
As in the House, the leadership was the key to the Senate passage.
Before the bill was even in the House, Alex Koval and Helene Levine approached
Senate President Maurice Donahue (Holyoke) about supporting the bill. He
jokingly agreed if they could get it through the House. The day after the bill
passed the House he stood by his word and issued a press release giving the bill
his full support.
Donahue first brought the bill up when Sen. James DeNormandie
(R - Lincoln), the on+ opposing senator on the UAC, happened to be absent.
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The bill survived the first home rule amendment by only two votes, 17 to 19.
Sen. Ronald MacKenzie (R-Burlington), who had opposed the crippling amend-
ment on the first round, offered an innocuous amendment to add two members
appointed by the Governor to the DCA appeals board. Moakley was trying
to fight all amendments to keep the bill from being sent back to the House.
MacKenzie lost 18-19.
Donahue again brought the bill up for final reading when Sen. De-
Normandie was absent -out of the country. The proponents were now more
concerned about not passing in the Senate than they were about the situation in
the House. Moakley allowed MacKenzie's amendment in order to gain his sup-
port. On the final vote the leadership convinced two senators they had pushed
the wrong light before they counted the vote and the bill passed 15-13.
Governor's Office
Having repassed the House (115-100), the legislation was sent to Acting
Governor Francis Sargent on Thursday, August 21, 1969. Had the Governor
vetoed the bill, that would have been the end. By all political odds, a Republi-
can Governor should have done just that. Acting Governor Sargent, however,
had been talking about the housing crisis all year. His urban affairs aide and
former liberal Democratic Representative, Al Kramer, was on the Senate floor
lobbying for the bill. While Kramer only obtained twovotes, these were critical
to the passage. 1 On Friday, a delegation of fifteen Republicans visited the
1. Karen Schneider, "Innovation in State Legislation: The Massachu-
setts Suburban Zoning Act," B.A. Thesis, Radcliffe College, March 1970, p. 87.
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Governor to pressure him to veto while only Linsky and Zeizer urged him to
sign it. His cabinet was split down the middle.
Although many suburbanites were fortunately on the Cape, a large
protest meeting was being planned for the coming Monday. But the Governor
ended all suburban hope by signing the bill in seclusion late Saturday after-
noon. Massachusetts was the first, and tO this date only state to crack snob
zoning.
MERIT OR MISCHIEF: Why It Passed
The large question remains -did the passage of the bill reflect
legislative approval of the concept and rationales of anti-snob zoning or
were the merits minor factors while the major factors wer e unique to the time
and place. This question cannot be answered by mere Skinnerian observation.
One must attempt the difficult -to penetrate the mystical realm of motivation,
i.e. why the bill passed. I will attempt a cut at this analysis by looking at
the absolutely critical actors in the process - the Speaker of the House, the
President of the Senate, the Governor and the winning coalition.
The Speaker
David Bartley, from the non-affected city of Holyoke, was in his first
session as Speaker. At his youthful age of thirty-four, one could assume the
Speakership is not his last political stop. We noted his influence at three
critical points:1) during the drafting -by holding the proxy bill in the Clerk's
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Office while the committee drafted a full bill; 2) in Ways and Means
Committee - by protecting and getting the bill released; 3) on the floor --
by using all necessary power to press for passage. He had at least four motives.
1) He took the chair when the 240 member House was under considerable pressure
from good govemment groups to reduce its size. The innovative snob zoning law
is a useful counter to the argument that the House is too large to be effective in
passing "good"legislation. Leading this drive was the suburban-based League of
Women Voters. 2) Snob zoning was a terrific issue to embarrass a Republican
Governor - especially one who was fighting to reduce the House; had told
the leadership he would sign their pay raise (if passed) then made political points
by vetoing it; and was standing for election within a year. Not coincidentally,
the Speaker and the President of the Senate are both from Holyoke. The Speaker's
cohort hoped to be running against that Republican Governor. 3) He was
intent on embarrassing the "sunshine liberals" -- his major source of difficulty
in the Democratic membership. They tend to vote independently and represent
affluent suburbs.] 4) It is possible that his assistant John Eller (former Divinity
student) oonvinced him of the merits of the legislation.
1. Representative Alan D. Sisitsky, "The 'Anti-Snob' Zoning Act of
1969," unpublished seminar paper, Harvard University, Government 247,





Senate President Maurice Donahue had a reputation for supporting
housing legislation. We noted that the Senate President called a press con-
ference to announce his support of the bill. The effect that action had on other
senators was not ascertained. Although the former Senate President claims that
he never asked anyone for a vote during his entire tenure, we might assume
that the action was not entirely wasted in terms of votes. Secondly, the
President does have control of the calendar and Donahue did bring up the bill
when he knew a certain opposing senator would be absent. He did introduce
the resolution for the Legislative Research Council to study the effects of zonitg
back in 1967. But he did not announce public support for the bill until it
passed the House. While it is good to embarrass the Governor, there is no
political point in antagonizing possible suburban supporters by backing the bill
until necessary - especially for an undeclared candidate.
The Governor
Although the Governor's maneuver on the pay raise issue severely
cramped his hand on the snob zoning, we noted the two votes his agent
reportedly secured in the Senate. Most importantly, he did sign the bill.
Al Kramer lobbied the Govemor very hard. Kramer apparently convinced
the Governor that he could lose by not signing the bill -- contrary to Bartley,
Donahue and some of the Governor's other advisors' analyses. In the next
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election, Kramer's argument went, the suburban Republican would have no
other choice than Sargent and would, as Massachusetts Republicans tradi-
tionally do, close ranks. If he vetoed the bill, his Democratic opponent,
possibly Senator Donahue, would accuse him of hypocrisy. In a state which
is 2:1 Democratic, Sargent needed support from independent liberal and urban
votes which this legislation was likely to attract. Also, the probability that
the legislation would be tested in the courts and no housing would be built as
a result of the law for some time, would cushion the negative impact his action
might have on his suburban voters. (The results of the 1970 election indicate
that Kramer was correct.)
The Masses
One can at least conjecture that as far as the leadership -- Speaker,
President, Governor -is concerned the merits of the legislation were not the
major factor in the calculation. Had these individuals not seen a political gain
aside from the merits, the legislation would not have had their strong support,
without which it would have failed.
While the leadership is a critical factor, brute political force is rarely
enough to pass controversial issues. But perhaps snob zoning was an "idea whose
time had come" - recall Massachusetts' progressive housing legislation, crisis
1. Schneider, , p. 90, based on interview with Al Kramer.
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rhetoric, anti-snob zoning legitimized on the national scene. Even "time
has come" ideas frequently need powerful leadership to protect them from
reactionary guerrilla attacks. If the idea's "time" had really come, then it
would be in good currency with the core group of the winning coalition.
In an effort to check this I will briefly describe another "first" by the General
Court - in 1965 -which has an uncanny resemblance to the passage of the
snob zoning law.
Racial Imbalance -- Only the Players Change
In the spring of 1965, education and civil rights groups approached
the leadership with a bill to force school committees to deal with racial im-
1balance. The Speaker indicated willingness to work for it although it was a
Senator from Brookline who gave it the initial push. Strategy was developed
to avoid public hearings and committee votes by substituting their comprehen-
sive draft for a five line statement which had already been heard and given an
unfavorable report. A late filing would have required an impossible 4/5
consent of the House. The brief bill was quietly revived on the House floor
and sent to Ways & Means for reconsideration. In the meantime the Republican
Governor announced his own racial imbalance legislation thereby putting the
1. The story of the racial imbalance passage is taken from James
Bolner, Civil Rights in the Political Process: An Analysis of the Massachusetts
Racial Imbalance Law of 1965 (Bureau of Government Research, University of




Democrats on the spot. The Democrats announced they intended to switch
the bills in Ways & Means. But the chairman had no sympathy and had a
militant ally -- a Rep from Holyoke who had been ousted from the chairman-
ship by the Speaker. Since the bill would not pass the Ways & Means Com-
mittee as it works on the unanimity principle, the Speaker slid the bill to the
Rules Committee which he chaired. When the now switched bill was brought
to the floor, the Speaker was prepared with a well researched ruling to the
point of order objection by the Boston delegation led by Paul Murphy. The
first vote showed the Speaker on the short end but he managed to hold the bill
with a minimum of amendments and pass it to the Senate. Senator Burke of the
Senate Ways & Means Committee wrote his own version of the bill from the
piece passed by the House and the draft submitted by the Governor. On the
Senate floor, George Kenneally (D-Boston) led the unsuccessful fight against
the bill. The bill had to be sent back to the House where Murphy was success-
ful in getting a parental notification of busing amendment. The Speaker
recessed the House for half an hour after which the amendment was defeated.
The legislation was passed against the protests of the cities by the suburbanites
and a few rainy day urban liberals. Although opponents continued to fight with
dilatory tactics, Governor Volpe signed the first racial imbalance law on August
5, 1965.
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The similarity with the process of the passage is interesting but
the dissimilarity among the people involved is instructive. Leading the floor
fight in the House for snob zoning was none other than Paul Murphy:
We are dealing with a legislative effort to eliminate
a social ill . . . There are human beings in Massachusetts
being deprived of decent housing . . . Class discrimination
is the most dangerous of all discrimination. 1
He was on the floor through the debate and voting as the indispensable strong
arm of the Speaker. The Sunshine suburban would-be-if-it-weren't-for-his-
bill liberals tried to trip up their conscience and step over it by resorting to
home rule (version of States' Rights) arguments. The bill would "do away with
local zoning," was the "death knell of local government, " was "socialistic
and un-American. " "The suburbs were doing their part by sending money to
the cities.2
The Senate debate for the proponents was carried eloquently by
Murphy's former team player Sen. George Kenneally:
If we cannot buy this, then there is no hope for
the hopeless. . . . Give the young, the colored, the
poor an opportunity to have gross; if you vote for this
amendment [local veto] you prove that the Negro has
a right to hate white people. 3
The Senate debate was much more explicit about the racism involved.
Murphy and Kenneally were not isolated changes. The snob zoning
was passed by a coalition of urban conservatives and liberals and a few rainy




day suburban liberals (e.g. Bruce Zeizer, Wellesley). A check of the 149
House members who were present in both 1965 and 1969 shows a switch of
50 votes -- 39 changed from anti-racial imbalance to pro-anti-snob zoning
and most were from the cities.
Perhaps the Murphys and Kenneallys of the General Court have seen
the light in the last four years. Unfortunately this thought may be put to rest
by Murphy and Kenneally's action a few weeks after the passage of the bill.
They were found leading the fight against Federal "in-fill" housing in their
districts because as Kenneally said, with no more memory than a mirror, his
people "were fearful of the type who would be brought into the area. "2
Many of the urban Reps were honest in declarations that they were
out to get back at the suburbs for recent legislation thrust on them, i.e. the
racial imbalance act. It is reported that at least one Boston Rep was negotiating
to trade the repeal of the snob zoning act for the repeal of the racial imbalance
act.
The Politics of Retribution -- How Significant?
Another view of this passage conterids that the politics of retribution
was not involved. All else being equal, the urban representatives would have
1. Vote for 6/21/65 (ADA Record) & House vote #368, 8/4/69, 108-114.
2. Linsky & Tumert f.
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voted the same way had there never been a Racial Imbalance Act. It is
argued that the urban representatives would not have been hurt by the
legislation, could even have seen the legislation as a means to ease the
congestion in their districts -i.e., they voted on the merits. I The degree
of vindictiveness involved or not involved is impossible to measure. But the
following will outline why this observer thinks the politics of retribution was
the cement which held the winning coalition together.
First, all things could not be equal without some degree of retribu-
tion involved. Recall -one of the Speaker's prime motives was the desire
to nail the recalcitrant "sunshine liberals."
Second, it is impossible to know if the margin of victory reflected
the outer limits of the Speaker's power or simply the comfortable margin
needed. We will assume for the analysis that the vote was fairly close -- as
indicated by the many predictions of its failure.
Third, note that the bill was very mild, if not weak. It did not
constnuct housing, eliminate zoning, or attempt to change the character of
the suburbs. It relied on private initiative and public funds, both of which
were in short supply. Still the opposition from the suburban reps was intense.
The bill offered not immediate or significant relief or the housing problems of
the urban reps' districts. It seems unlikely that the urban reps received much
pressure from their constituents to support the legislation. Their vote, one way
1. Schneider, op. cit., pp. 111-12.
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or the other, would not be remembered by their constituents on election day.
Unless they were members of the free floating group of reps who vote for
every "right cause" they had no compelling reason to care one way or the
other. Yet, the urban reps' support was intense.
Fourth, the House must be considered as a social group not just a col-
lection of calculating machines - for votes or morals. The members must
see and work with each other every day. They develop friendships across
party, town and even urban-suburban lines. Other bills that they want will
come up a'fter this particular vote. Had only the leadership and the intractable
ideologues been involved in the support of the bill, the suburban reps should
have been able to call on past favors and friendship to defeat the bill. The
factor which could have prevented the success of the method is the Racial
imbalance Act. Retribution was very possibly a significant factor.
SPREADING THE IDEA: Is It Worth It?
The anti-snob zoning bill passed. Unfortunately, the case strongly
suggests that the law was enacted for reasons other than the merit of its concept.
The supporters have not been able to amend the law to correct simple drafting
errors in one-and-i-half sessions which further supports the retribution theory.
Regardless of the reason the legislation passed, the mere fact that it is on the
books helps proponents in other states. The average time for diffusion of inno-
vation among the states, according to Jack Walker's analysis, for the period
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1930-1966 has been 25.6 years. Still almost two legislative sessions have
passed and no state has followed Massachusetts' lead.2 A brief look at New
York is instructive.
Karen Schneider in her thesis Innovation in State Legislation: The
Massachusetts Suburban Zoning Act contends that New York is the state most
likely to pass anti-snob legislation. She notes that the New York City dele-
gation constitutes nearly half the state legislature. Jack Walker cites New
York as the most innovative state. The Federal government has modeled
housing legislation on New York programs. The best known anti-snob zoning
lobby group is based in New York. Reports of the problems of zoning and
housing abound. New York has the nation's only Urban Development Corpora-
tion. Although the UDC has power to override local zoning it has not overtly
exercized that power.
After the passage of the Massachusetts law, the Executive of Nassau
County, Eugene Nickerson, introduced similar legislation in New York. It
did not pass. Furthermore, in March of 1971 the New York Assembly amended
the power of the UDC - removing its zoning override. While this is not likely
to become law, the stripping does indicate the direction of the wind.
1. Walker, op i.,p. 885.
2. National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing and
Suburban Action, Inc.
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New York is not unique. .Politicians in New Jersey have difficulties
even discussing the issue. Although it seems reasonable to conclude that
anti-snob legislation will not sweep the states like a prairie fire, some states
will pass such legislation. Since states are notorious for 'borrowing," Chapter
774 may be duplicated elsewhere. Wisconsin is a case in point. A carbon copy
of "774" (with a couple of smudges) may pass this session (1971).2
Recall Professor John T. Howard's criticism (see p. ) of the proposed
legislation: ". . . it would likely result in no consequences. . In the year
and three-quarters Chapter 774 has been in effect, indeed, no housing has been
constructed as a direct result of the appeals procedure. The State Board of Appeals
announced its first decision -- overruling Hanover's denial of a permit for 88 units
of elderly housing -- on July 13, 1971. Ground is not broken as Hanover is
appealing the decision to the Massachusetts Superior Court. Two and a half years
could elapse before the constitutionality of the law is determined. But ''774"
apologists allege other types of consequences: new housing authorities, increased
applications for elderly housing, suburban discussions of the issue. The non-use of
the process is the result of several problems with the legislation. 3
1. For an incisive analysis of the New Jersey situation see Margaret Power,
"Getting Together: State Coalitions for Metropolitan Change," forthcoming Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
2. The author has no information on politics of the Wisconsin proposal.
3. Barbara Rabinovits, "Snob Zoning Fails, Serves as Catalyst," Boston Herald
Traveler, November 8, 1970, section 5, p. 1. Evelyn Keene, "Antisnob zoning law
fails, but succeeds," Boston Globe, January 3, 1971, p. 47. Anthony J. Yudis,
"Anti-snob zoning batting big .000," Boston Globe, July 11, 1971, p. A-47. Rep-
resentative Martin Linsky speaking at the Suburban Housing Conference held at
Brandeis University, May 1, 1971.
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First, the law may be unconstitutional. Second, assuming "774" is
constitutional, a developer may be in court an average of a year if the town
appeals, as it most likely will do, every adverse state decision.I Developers
may not have the financial staying power. Third, the developer must invest --
and thus risk -- considerably more money in "774" comprehensive permit
application than in a simple change of zoning request. Fourth, FHA has not
accepted applications until the developer has proper zoning thus making it
impossible to qualify as a sponsor under "774" (Massachusetts Housing Finance
2
Agency will accept preliminary applications. Fifth, a private developer could
endanger necessary community cooperation for future non-subsidized developments
by invoking Chapter 774. One shot non-profits, such as NCDF, can incur their
neighbors' displeasure. Sixth, Turnkey housing is not included in the legislation,
thus limiting the possible development of housing. Seventh, the law relies on the
initiative of the limited number of non-profits and limited dividend corporations
rather than making the town seek solutions to the problem. Eighth, by giving the
developer the "choice" of site selection, the best planning for the town and LMIH
may not be achieved.
1. Interview with Allen Rodgers, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute,
Waltham, Mass., May 1, 1971.
2. After two years, HUD changed the FHA procedure -- "a conditional
letter of feasibility [will be issued] when a proposal is determined feasible in all
respects except that a zoning change is needed. " David R. Ellis, "Sargent names
2 zoning men," Boston Globe, August 7, 1971, p. 3.
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All in all, "774" may be more symbolic than substantive. As Professor
Howard suggests, the law being on the books gives reluctant politicians an
excuse for not "grappling with the real issues involved in furthering its
laudable objectives." Now it may also-give politicians in other states,
who can see its non-effects, a way of not dealing with the issue of subsidized
housing in the suburbs.
Although the state legislator is better protected politically -- to
withstanding electoral repercussions, better positioned legislatively -- to
solve metropolitanwide problems, and better poised -- to see the broader
issues, than the local politico, anti-snob zoning is not an idea whose time
has come on the state level.
OPEN COMMUNITIES:
THE POLITICS OF FORCED INCENTIVES
Q: Mr. President, concerning Governor Romney's plan, to
what extent should the federal government use its leverage to
promote racial integration in suburban housing?
A: Only to the extent that the law requires in two cases,
as the result of acts passed by the Congress, that the Federal
government not provide aid to housing or to urban renewal where
a community has a policy of discrimination and has taken no steps
to remove it. On the other hand, I can assure you that it is not the
policy of this government to use the power of the Federal govern-
ment or Federal funds in any other way,in ways not required by
the law, for forced integration of the suburbs. I believe that
forced integration of the suburbs is not in the national interest.1
With that December 10, 1970, statement, President Richard M. Nixon
announced the death of an infant HUD policy -- "Open Communities" -- conceived
to disperse subsidized housinqin the suburbs. Although its life was short,'Open
Communities'traumatized its mother HUD and father The White House. In this chapter
we will look closely at the life of this policy because it illustrates the realities of
existence at the Federal level if one wants to disperse the poor to the suburbs through
the utilization of subsidized housing. We will examine some of the advantages the
Federal government has over the other levels of government; the Federal tools or levers
available to implement a dispersal policy; the intellectual acceptability of dispersal;
"Open Communities" life and times; causes of a dispersal policy's inevitable demise.
1. "Text of President Nixon's Dec. 10 News Conference," Congressional
Quarterly 28:52 (December 18, 1970): 3034.
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THE FEDS: Approach-Avoidance
The Federal government has several characteristics which attract dispersal
advocates. First, there is only one government to "educate. " Lobbies can score
with the least expenditure rather than scattering their fire in fifty states. Second,
with access to an expanding tax base and deficit spending, the "Feds" are an easy
touch for money -- compared with the states. This characteristic is important if
'bribes" for acceptance of LMIH are deemed a necessary tactic. As noted in the
Massachusetts case, the suggestion to reimburse the suburbs for expenses incurred
by accepting LM1H was not included for fear of losing central city support of the
bill. Third, and most important, the highest concentration of urban professionals
has been attracted to this level of government. The reference groups of these pro-
fessionals are not in government but in the universities and professional societies.
Receptive to the ideas in good currency in the universities, these professionals can
advocate these ideas somewhat effectively in the bureaucracy and even in Congress
-- through committee staffs and individual Congressmen's staffs. These three charac-
teristics, among others, have contributed to the Federal government's reputation of
being "innovative" -- relative to the states.
While the "Feds" are likely to be more receptive to the concept of dispersal
and have fewer minds to be convinced, implementation of the policy is more diffi-
cult than on the state or local levels. The Constitution prohibits the Federal govern-
ment from dealing directly with zoning, housing or other activities falling under
publIc safety, health, welfare or morals. This regulatory power resides in the states.
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These bodies may delegate portions, i.e. land use regulation, to the "creatures
of the states" -- local governments. While the federal government may not regulate,
it may provide funds to promote the general welfare (U.S. Constitution, Article 1,
section 8). This ability to spend and desire, but inability to regulate, has led to a
proliferation of grants-in-aid. The Federal government offers money (carrots)
for some particular function it wishes performed and attaches requirements (sticks)
to the funds. In this manner, then, the Federal government has influence or
"leverage" in areas not enumerated in the Constitution.
BRITTLE LEVERS: Programs and Money
Federal leverage is a fragile tool designed by both the Congress -- passing a
law or program - and the bureaucracy - administering the program or enforcing the
law. At the end of the chapter we will briefly check some Congressional efforts to
increase the stockpile of levers. For the present we will look at the Administration
because dispersal advocates are more likely to succeed in this branch. Why? The
bureaucracy -the Department of Housing and Urban Development -- is impacted
with professionals most likely to be receptive to the dispersal idea. Secondly, the
laws and programs are available -- theoretically at least -- to begin to implement
the concept.
1. This is not to imply that the two designers are separable -- the bureaucracy
influences the drafting of the law and the Congress the administration.
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Lever -- Executive Order
The Administration has several types of levers available. The first is
the executive order. This devic.e alters the methods and rules by which the
Federal bureaucracy goes about its business. In this case, President Nixon in
February, 1970, ordered Federial departments and agencies to "consider" the
supply of LMIH when making bcational decisions for offices and installations.
Actually, the General Services Administration, the landlord for most govern-
mental units, had been doing just that since the previous March (1969) when it had
yielded to pressure from fair housing groups and the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights. This Order merely made this policy uniform throughout the Federal govern-
ment. This Order was considerably less exacting than an Order recommended by the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights the following March (1970). Order 11512 does not
make a supply of LMIH a precondition for relocation but only a "consideration" --
one factor in the calculation. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights not only makes
an adequate supply a precondition but requires existing government installations to
be removed if the areas do not provide an adequate supply. If the town refuses to
augment the supply and the installation must locate in the area, the Federal govern-
2ment will provide the necessary housing.
The recommended Order indicates the lever can be quite strong but it has
inherent limitations. How many suburbs might this affect? It is difficult to determine
1. Executive Order 11512.
2. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Federal Installations and Equal Housing
Opportunity (Government Printing Office.: Washington D.C. , March 1970), pp. 22-23.
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(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
1. The community under consideration shall demonstrate that there is
a sufficient supply of housing within means of lower-income families
to meet the needs of present and potential employees, or that such a
supply of housing will be produced within a reasonable period of time
after the installation is to be located there. Among the ways in which
this requirement may be satisfied should be the following:
a. The community has taken the necessary steps, including
adoption of a "workable program" or local government ap-
proval, where required, to permit operation of the various
Federal lower-income housing programs requiring such govern-
mental action;
b. The community maintains zoning ordinances, building codes,
and other appropriate land use requirements that facilitate pro-
vision of lower-income housing in all sections of the community;
and
c. Plans for such lower-income housing adopted by builders or
developers have reached an appropriate point of maturity.
4. All Federal departments and agencies currently operating installations
in communities which fail to satisfy the requirements of the Executive order
should be required to develop and adopt affirmative action programs to
promote achievement of the goals of the Executive order. In the event such
a program proves unsuccessful and a community in which Federal installations
are located fails to take the steps required by the Executive order, or fails to
give satisfactory assurance that such steps will be taken within a reasonable
period of time, it should be rendered ineligible for future expansion by in-
stallations already located there or by other Federal departments or agencies.
Federal departments and agencies also should be required, where feasible,
to take action necessary to remove their installations from such a community,
including nonrenewal of leases and disposal of federally owned buildings.
5. In cases where the location of the installation in such a community is
required by, or its removal is inconsistent with, the mission of the depart-
ment or agency and the supply of housing for lower-income employees
within reasonable commuting distance is inadequate, the department or
agency should exercise its authority to provide housing to meet the needs of
cur.rent and potential lower-income employees. Congress should appropriate
sufficient funds for this purpose.
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impact or the distribution nationwide. Certainly housing patterns in Washington,
D.C. would have been affected had this been policy from 1963 to 1968 when GSA
relocated 42 components of 18 agencies in the Washington suburbs. I The Order is
still essentially a carrot or bribe. How large an installation or how desperate a
town would be necessary for the leverage to have effect? How many suburbs
which have deliberately excluded LMIH would be likely to change stance for
an FHA office, a Government Printing Office plant, or an ABM site? Many of
the suburbs under attack for exclusionary zoning would not care about the first
or want the other two. Besides the limited number and distribution of government
facilities and the limited number of suburbs that might bite the carrot, there is a
third limitation on this administrative action -Congress. Congressional dis-
pleasure -- especially intense when an installation is removed for any reason -
can manifest itself in apathy or hostility for pet pending Administration proposals.
Lever -- Racial Discrimination Cut-off
The second class of levers is attached to program grants. One variety is
the fund cut-off authorized by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
SEC. 601. No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.
SEC. 602. Each Federal department and agency which is empowered
to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, 6 y
1. Ibid., p. 7.
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way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of
insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the
provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability
which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection
with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or
order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to
this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal
to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity
to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on
the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply
with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be
limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other
recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be
limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in
which such non-compliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action
shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has ad-
vised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot
be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating,
or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to
comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the
head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the
committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction
over the program or activity involved a full written report of the
circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall
become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of
such report.
and Title Vill of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
SEC. 801. It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States
SEC. 808.
(d) All executive departrre nts and agencies shall administer their
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development
in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this title and
shall cooperate with the Secretary to further such purposes. 1
1. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, Equal Opportunity
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 2, 4, 13-14.
131.
Unlike the Executive Order which could deal with the supply of LM1H
per se, this lever has to be connected to racial discrinination. Title VI
limits the termination of funds to the one specific program-in which racial
discrimination is found. Title VIII can mea., the termination of all funds
relating to housing and urban development from any department. As we shall
see, this case seems to indicate that the determination of the authority given
to the Administration by these two laws is more political than legal. Early in
1970, Secretary Romney appeared to be in agreement with Sol Rabkin, General
Counsel and Richard F. Bellman, Staff Counsel of the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., who argue
... The compelling interpretation of the law must be that
receipt of federal aid is conditioned on a local community-
abstaining from any use of its local governing power to dis-
criminate on the basis of race; the use of zoning power with
a racially discriminatory impact makes a local community
ineligible to receive any federal grant or aid. Nor is enforcement
of Title VI optional: HUD may not disregard this limitation. ..
To allow some of HUD's programs to be used by the local
government beneficiaries to strengthen existing patterns of racial
segregation in housing is utterly inconsistent with the statutory
duty imposed on the Department to administer all its programs
relating to housing and urban development so as to affirmatively
further the policy of equal opportunity in housing for all. . .
But by August 26, 1970, Secretary Romney was compelled to just wonder, "Now
at this point I am not certain as to the authority we have in this area, and I think
if Congress wants to make our authority in this respect clear on that point it should
do so. "2
1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, Part 5, De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination, 91st
Cong., 2d. sess., August 25, 26, 27, September 1, 1970, pp. 2924-5.
2. Ibid., p. 2785.
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But before Secretary Romney's confidence in his powers faltered,
we saw the infamous incident in a white wodking class suburb of Detroit --
Warren, Michigan. In the middle of an urban renewal project-- $1.3
million spent and applying for $2.8 more -the City Council was told by HUD
that they had'to demonstrate that Warren is known to be an open community,"
presumably invoking Title VIII. After a series of threats, counter threats,
charges, counter charges, Warren could not be perceived by any Black family
as "open " nor did the city have an urban renewal program -- by their own
choice (more detail follows).
The Warren incident points up some of the inherent limitations of this
tool. In the short run the Feds can either win or lose with the fund cut-off
threat. They might lose because the threat was not large enough -- continuance
of an open space grant is not worth integration. Or, they might lose because
the bludgeon was too large -threatened by the full power of the Federal govem-
ment the community recoils and tells the Feds to get out, i.e. Warren. In both
instances the problems, which might have been solved by the program grant used as
the club or twig, are exacerbated. The threat may elicit the desired action and
HUD wins -- in the short run. However, overt threats tend to strain relations,
normally diplomatic in character, between levels of government. Future cooperation
is imperiled. 2 The alleged maltreatment of one town will adversely affect the
1. Francis D. Fisher, HUD Chicago Regional Administrator, Letter to
Warren City Council, quoted in Martin V.B. Weston, 'Warren Keeps Most of
Its Castle Intact," City, 5:1 (Jan./eb., 1971): 78.
2. Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1970),p. 207-9.
ad-
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acceptance of HUD in other towns. The local Congressman will normally
object and gain sympathy and support for his colleagues who realize their
own vulnerability. Therefore this lever seems to be very costly whether
it works or not.
Lever -- Contract Performance
A second variation of the program grant lever is based on performance
conditions agreed to when the funds were originally contracted. Non-compli-
ance allows HUD to terminate the funding at any point.. Unlike Titles VI and
VIII, the requirements are not confined to racial discrimination but rather have
a direct effect on the quality of the program product - mostly in physical
planning terms. Secondly, there is a greater degree of predictability - the
city generally knows what is expected when it receives the grant. However,
bureaucrats make the requirements somewhat ambiguous, thereby allowing
themselves discretion in the enforcement. This lever was used "successfully"
in Toledo, summer, 1970.
All of Toledo's HUD program funds - $15 million -- were cut for not
fulfilling one of the more socially oriented workable program requirements --
scattered site relocation housing. The city council had responded to area
residents' "shrieks" and cancelled three public housing sites outside the ghetto.
HUD had the backing of the area Congressman, Thomas L. Ashley (D), only
because he believed HUD was "trying to do the right thing in the long run for
the country, " otherwise he believed he "could have prosecuted the case against
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HUD successfully on the grounds of lack of uniform policy and gotten the
funds reinstated from the start."
The limitations are similar to those mentioned above. However, there
is more difficulty here making the punishment fit the crime. Should one
really hold up all programs for an inadequate code enforcement program?
Or stop urban renewal because the city has no vacant land on which to put
scattered site relocation housing and cannot open up the suburbs? In HUD
the responsibility for workable program requirements is separate from the large
operating programs such as urban renewal. This has led to zestful enforcement
of requirements to the point that the large cities may have the political power
to remove urban renewal from under the workable program. Thus with too
enthusiastic enforcement, the Feds may lose leverage altogether. HUD and
its constituents, especially the large cities, have a symbiotic relationship
which must be maintained. As a HUD official remarked, "'HUD cannot hold
up a big city urban renewal program over the workable program issue. The
department just has to have big city support for anything it wants to do.'"3
Lever -- Funding Criteria
The third variation is a refined version of the cut-off. Using project
grants for which the demand exceeds the supply, the bureaucracy attempts
1. William Lilley III, "Housing Report/Romney faces political perils
with plan to integrate suburbs, " National Journal, 2:42 (Oct.17, 1970):. 225,6-7.
2. The Nixon Administration has included urban renewal in its special
revenue sharing legislation which has no workable program.
3. Lilley, op. cit., p. 2256.
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to elicit the desired behavior by making that action a requirement to
obtain the funds. These requirements need not have any relation to the achieve-
ment of the goal of the program. For instance, HUD devised a point system.for
parceling out its popular -applications to grants run 10 to. 1 -- water sewer
program. A town receives a certain number of points for its recent activity in
public or subsidized housing. Prior to institutionalizing this lever, it was
used on an ad hoc basis. Stoughton, Massachusetts, is a case in point.
For three years Interfaith Housing Corp., a Boston-based non-profit
group - had been negotiating with the town of Stoughton to build 104 sub-
sidized units. The town had not been helpful. In the summer of 1969, the
Board of Selectmen had decided not to approve the development because it
would overtax the water system. The Board would consider the proposal
after they had a new water system. The town applied to HUD for a water
grant. lHC volunteered to help secure the grant if the Board of Selectmen
would "recognize its obligation to ensure an adequate supply of housing for
low- and moderate-income persons and'families."2 Explaining that HUD
was now one big family, the Metropolitan Development project manager
refused even to check the feasibility of the application until "Interfaith can
1. HUD Circular, "Project Evaluation System," MPD6220.2. The
Housing consideration points are awarded if 1) there has been activity in
LMIH during the previous three years, 2) the project will service areas of
substandard housing, 3) the project will be accessible to families of low and
moderate incomes.
2. Interfaith Housing Corp. , The Suburban Noose (Boston: Interfaith
Housing Corp., 1969), p. 25.
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be regarded as a reality and beyond the formative stages in the Town of Stoughton. "
Stoughton has 104 new units of subsidized housing and a new water system.2
The weaknesses of this lever are similar to the ones inherent in the Executive
Order. There are a limited number of programs which the possible deprivation would
evoke a positive response if LMIH were a very controversial issue in the town. The
coverage is also limited. The water and sewer grant, for instance, has been used by
only about one in ten suburbs since 1966.3 The danger is that, with the points system
overloaded with social engineering, programs will be underutilized. Of course, if
the program is really popular and necessary, the Congress can be motivated to inter-
vene and make the housing consideration minimal or illegal. This lever does have the
advantage over the other program levers of not inciting as much public rancor -he dowiisrnd
1. Interfaith Housing Corp., o Appendix F, quoted from Stoughton
Town Manager's Report, July 22, 1969, p. 3.
2. Interview with Philip Rosenberg, Acting Program Manager, HUD, Boston
Area Office, Boston, Mass., Nov. 9, 1970.
3. George Romney, "Statement of Secretary George Romney to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights," Washington, D.C., June 15, 1971, p. 4. How-
ever, the interest in and future of the program is much greater than the one in ten in-
dicates. HUD has received over 7,155 inquiries from cities, towns and counties (in
1960 there were 4,144 municipalities, 2573 townships and 310 counties inside SMSAs
[U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. V, Local Governments
in Metropolitan Areas, Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. , Oct. 1964, p. 23) requesting
more than $4.4 billion. Three-quarters have been rejected for lack of funds. For
example, in Massachusetts, with 351 cities and towns, 225 applications remain un-
funded. (HUD, Summary of the Community Development Water and Sewer Program
Activity Cumulative as of ApriT 30, 1971 [Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. , 1971], p.
1.) Congress has been trying to remedy this under funding. Water-sewer is now
HUD's most effective program lever and may be in even more demand in the future
as ecology, health and population standards increase while financial capabilities
decrease. (Interview with Rep. Richard Hanna, D-Califomia, Washington, D.C.
June 30, 1971.)
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publicly denounced as racist or inept. The points system may offer pro-housing
local public officials a thin shield to protect'them from the political responsibility
of approving LMIH. The heat is transferable to the Feds without the local official
being backed into a corner defending local pride.
Lever Casing -- Presidential Leadership
The final part of the Federal mechanism is like a casing which allows the
previously described levers to function - as well as they can. This casing is
Presidential approval which runs from presumed tacit approval to overt active
commitment. Without it, the levers have little dredibility. All localities,
whether or not they are in programs, suffer a "free floating anxiety" about the
possibility or inevitability of Federal intervention. This leadership in itself may
elicit "voluntary" action. The "remarkable development" in Dayton, Ohio is
probably an example.
Last September the white suburbs in the five county areas surrounding Dayton
"voluntarily" agreed to accept 12,291 units of LMIH (public and subsidized) within
the next four years. Eleven per cent of the area's 900,000 people and thirty per
cent of Dayton's 243,000 are Black. One of the area's suburbs had its $65,000 open
space grant application rejected by HUp "because the city had restrained its human
relations commission from seeking housing for black families. The communities
1. John Herbers, "Suburbs Accept Poor in Ohio Housing Plan," New York
Times, December 21, 1970, p. 42.
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accepted a plan prepared by the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission
with one possibly foreboding exception: they refused to give preemptive zoning
powers to the local housing authorities.] This action occurred, as it turned out,
at the zenith of Romney's Open Communities policy.
A December 16, 1970, New York Times dispatch reports on the causal factors:
. . . Officials here say that in the long run a firm Federal policy
for open communities is essential to the success of the Dayton Plan.
The officials, most of whom are Republicans, are worried about
how much support [political] they will receive from Washington.
They believe the plan fits the philosophy expressed repeatedly
by George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
but they are disturbed by President Nixon's news conference state-
ment last week that 'forced integration of the suburbs is not in the
national interests.'
The Dayton plan, they say is voluntary, not forced, but one of the
factors that brought its acceptance was the belief that H.U.D.
would use Federal grants in a way that would encourage open
communities.
'If political pressures build up so that the suburbs can continue to
flout low and moderate income housing and still get their money
from Washington there is little we can do,' said one official.3
The article also mentions thpt "crowds of irate citizens fought it [the plan]
vigorously. " Now that the Presidential casing has been removed and remembering
Newton, just wait until the sites are actually selected.
So, in summary, what can be said of Federal levers? They are awkward to
use, often the wrong size, and brittle. But if used extremely skillfully they can
1. Dale Bertsch and Ann M. Shafor, "A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami
Valley Regional Planning Commission Experience, " Planners Notebook, '1:i
(April,1971).: passim.
2. Herbers, op. cit., pp..1and 42.
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transfer the political heat and responsibility from the local politicians to the less
vulnerable Federal politicians. The levers can help disperse LMIH into the
suburbs -- if they are used. The dispersal concept must first be intellectually
acceptable to the Administration. We will look at the rationales which appear
to be salient to the White House and HUD.
CONCEPTUAL ACCEPTABILITY: The White House and HUD
The concept of dispersal is intellectually acceptable to the White House.
The chief proponent for the strategy was urbanologist and Presidential Counselor
Daniel Patrick Moynihan - "'I am a Dispersal man . . . To the extent that a
society has problems due to concentrations of race, that society would minimize
those problems by spreading them out."" He has written in Toward a National
Urban Policy, "Efforts to improve the conditions of life in the present caste-
created slums must never take precedence over efforts to enable the slum population
to disperse throughout the metropolitan areas involved. "
Moynihan has particularly disparaged the "gilding the ghetto" proposals of
the late sixties. The "jobs are in the suburbs" rationale seems to be particularly
salient to the White House. One nameless White House official states, "'We just
cannot provide adequate and good job opportunities in the ghetto. . . . The
1. Lilley, op. cit., p. 2253. The source of much of the information in
the following pages is found in this article. Mr. Lilley used confidential HUD
memos and documents and interviews with 40 present or former HUD officials.
2. Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., Toward a National Urban Policy (New York:
Basic Books, 1970), p. 10.
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economics are such that most industries will not locate in the ghetto and that job
creation will be at the edge of urban growth . . . . the jobs argument is very
persuasive with this Administration; Vice President Agnew, for one, has picked it
up." Besides Moynihan's pronouncements the White House has the academic under-
pinnings of Harvard economist John F. Kain whose two articles, "Postwar Changes
in Land Use in the American City," (1969) and "Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto,"
(1969) have been widely circulated throughout the Administration.I Acceptance
of the "jobs" rationale is not inconceivable for an administration whose number one
domestic goal is "workfare" to replace welfare. Traditionally business oriented, a
Republican Administration would likely point in the direction of dispersal were there
the possibility of suburban labor shortages resulting from the concentration of the
low skilled in the central cities. Furthermore this rationale removes the intellectual
responsibility of pouring money into the slums where Republican constituents are not
normally found in vast numbers.
The education rationale is also mentioned. "One White House official's
interpretation of Coleman's conclusions is that 'compensatory education programs
don't work; they just pour dollars into the ghetto. The real answer is to put dis-
advantaged kids into a better environment."' 2 Again, no intellectual compulsion
to pour money into the ghetto.
1. Lilley, o c, p. 2253.
2. Ibid.
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It is not inconceivable that a Republican Administration might find certain
aspects of the dispersal idea alluring. 1
With the concentration of urban professionals in HUD one might expect
the department eventually to embrace a dispersal policy. However, convincing
the political head -- the Secretary -is critical. When George Romney came to
HUD he was a production man. In Detroit, the product was Ramblers. In Washing-
ton, he had a Congressional order of 600 thousand units of subsidized housing to
fill every year. Thus the emphasis the first year was "Operation Breakthrough" --
an attempt to rationalize the production of housing. Production inevitably leads
to placement. The "no vacant land" rationale is salient: "'It's an economic fact
of life that the sites are not available in the cities, so the subsidized housing has
to go to the suburbs."'2 However, half of the ten cities chosen for the "Operation
Breakthrough" demonstration, for example, experienced considerable neighborhood
opposition to the subsidized units. 3
1. While the White House does not profess the following rationale, one can
speculate with Anthony R. Henry, Director of the National Tenants Organization,
"'Dispersal would help Republicans politically because it would dilute pockets of
low-income people in center cities which are coming to control the political life
there. Regardless of what people say, center cities are the heart of U.S. economic
life, and now there is an effort to disperse those centers at exactly the time when
the black and the poor are coming to power there."' (Lilley, p. 2262)
2. William Dockser, Assistant Commissioner of Subsidized Housing, quoted
in Lilley, op. cit., p. 2260.
3. John Herbers, "Federal Housing Projects Stir Strong Opposition Across
the U.S. ," New York Times, July 14, 1970, p. 67.
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Romney is also a strong civil rights advocate. In Michigan he had
1pushed through reforms on both the state and local levels. As Secretary
of HUD he was obliged to enforce the housing portions of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1968. With these two mandates -production and integration -
an '9>en Communities policy" was not an illogical development.
THE RISE AND DEMISE: Romney's Open Communities
The following narration relates the events which transpired when an
idea in good currency and federal levers run the suburban gauntlet.
Although there appeared to be little debate about the need to pursue
an "Open Communities" policy, captured confidential memos and documents relate
0
internal dissention about the tools available to implement a dispersal policy. The
two Black assistant secretaries (Samuel C. Jackson, Assistant Secretary for Commu-
nity Planning and Management and Samuel J. Simmons, Assistant Secretary for
Equal Opportunity) interpreted the Civil Rights Acts especially the Fair Housing
provision of the 1968 Act as giving the Secretary the legal authority to use the
"cut-off" lever. The in-house lawyer, General Counsel Sherman Unger, and
Lawrence M. Cox theri the Assistant Secretary for Urban Renewal (both former)
disagreed. Unger argued the laws allowed the Secretary to hold public hearings
0
and subpoena probable offenders but not cut off funds. While Unger's interpretation
might have been purely legal, Cox was clearly concerned about his own program
1. Congressional Quarterly, Candidates 1968, January 1968.
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responsibilities. Besides the cut-off issue, he was at odds with Jackson over his
zestful enforcement of the workable program requirements dealing with urban renewal. 1
Simmons and Jackson won the initial skirmish. Apparently directives were
issued to all regional administrators to target suburbs in their areas which would be
2
most susceptible to federal influence. Appropriately, a suburb of Detroit -- Warren,
Michigan -- came up as the classic case.
Warren was the first Michigan city to be certified for urban renewal under the
Neighborhood Development Program in early 1969. The town had 1300 dwelling units
which needed to be rehabed or removed. In the winter of 1970 the town had already
$1.3 million in renewal funds and was applying for $2.8 million more. A survey of
the civic leaders indicated a positive attitude toward urban renewal. With the property
tax rate locked at 9 mills by the city charter, Warren was in a financial pinch operating
3
on a budget half the size of neighboring Dearborn, a suburb with 78% fewer residents.
Warren is a city of 180,000 working class whites and 50,112 blacks -- 50,000
of which "live" in a cemetery. With a 30% black employment rate in the factories
and a supply of middle income housing, the white suburb is blatantly racist.
In 1967, Romney, then Governor, had to send in the state police to
1. Lilley ,pasm
2. Interview with William Lilley ill, National Journal, Washington, D.C.
October 28, 1970.
3. Martin V.B. Weston, 'Tales of the Suburbs: 1. Warren Keeps Most of
Its Castle Intact," City 5:1 (Jan./Feb. 1971): 77-80.
144.
protect a mixed couple (who had purchased a home in Warren) from a mob.
In 1969, the city rejected a low-4ncome housing project because they feared
it might bring Blacks into the town.
In January, 1970, two Nixon-appointed task forces recommended the
dispersal strategy and use of fund cut-off to implement it.2 The reports were
not publicly released until July. Secretary Romney at this point was making
speeches to the effect that "'every American is entitled to a decent home
near his work and every American child is entitled to a quality school near
his home,' and "that with Federal help, states and cities must end 'mislocation
of people in relationship to their jobs and daily activities to end our separation
economically, socially and racially.'"3
In February, 1970, Nixon issued the Executive Order directing Federal
agencies and departments to take the supply of LMIH into "consideration" when
contemplating locational changes. (See p. )
In March, Vice President Agnew, speaking before the National Alliance
of Businessmen, is heard mouthing the liturgy of Davidoff and Gold of Suburban
Action, Inc. published in the January issue of the Journal of the American
1. Jerry M. Flint, "Blue Collar Workers of Warren, a Detroit Suburb,
Fight to Keep Negroes Out," New York Times, August 17, 1970, p. 18.
2. The President's Task Force on Low Income Housing (R.J. Saulnier,
Chairman) and the President's Task Force on Urban Renewal (M. L. Colean, Chairman).
3. HUD NEWS, Jan. 29, 1970, cited in Ambrose Klain, "Zoning in
Suburbia: -Keep It, Reject It or Replace It?" Council of Planning Librarians
Exchange Bibliographies (Monticello, Ill.: Council of Planning Librarians, March,
1971), p. 9.
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Institute of Planners. To wit, he rejects the assumption that because primary
problems of race and poverty are found in ghettos, solutions to these prpblems
must also be found there. The prosperous white suburbs must help provide
housing for inner-city slum-dwellers.
With his mild implementation -the Executive Order -- and the Vice
President's profession of faith, the President unveiled his school desegregation
policy on March 24, 1970. Besides endorsing the neighborhood school and
rejecting busing, two points were clear. The President believes in an enclave
2theory of integration. Secondly, the President indicated he would use court
orders rather than fund cut-offs to end de jure segregation of the schools. It
would appear HUD did not see that the modus operandi of school desegregation
and housing desegregation might be analogous. Rather, HUD seized upon
another part of the President's statement, "Open Communities, " as its raison
d'etre -
The goal of this Administration is a free and open society.
In saying this, I use the words 'free' and 'open' quite
precisely.
1. Warren Weaver, Jr., "Agnew Advocates a Suburban Drive to Aid
the Slums," New York Times, March 8, 1970, p. 1. David K. Shipler,
"Agnew, in Suburbs Speech, Borrowed from Memo," New York Times, March
19, 1970, p. 26. Mr. Gold remarked, "'We don't want to accuse the Vice
President of plagiarism. We're delighted. We're always being looked upon as
Communists by the suburbanites."' The Vice President did not mention the use
of exclusionary zoning which is the t~int of the Gold-Davidoff AlP article.
2. "An open society does not have to be homogeneous, or even fully
integrated. There is room within it for many communities. . . . It is natural
and right that we have Italian or Irish or Negro or Norwegian neighborhoods..."
(President Nixon's March 24, 1970 statement on school desegregation).
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Freedom has two essential elements: the right to choose,
and the ability to choose. The right to move out of a mid-
city slum, for example, means little without the means of
doing so. The right to apply for a good job means little
without access to the skills that make it attainable. By the
same token, those skills are of little use if arbitrary policies
exclude the person who has them because of race or other
distinction.
Similarly, an 'open' society is one of open choices --
and one in which the individual has the mobility to take
advantage of those choices.1
In the spring of 1970, the HUD Regional Administrator (Francis D.
Fisher) began to nudge Warren. He wanted some evidence of "affirmative
action" in compliance with the Fair Housing section of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act -- specifically a board "duly charged with responsibility for development
and implementation of an affirmative fair housing program." 2 Finally realizing
that the regional administrator was actually serious, a delegation of Warren
officials traveled to Washington to give Secretary Romney their theory of
"natural happening": Warren had three Black families in 1966 and an increase of
25 by 1969.3 The mayor called this "substantive progress. " The Secretary disagreed.
'You can try to hermetically seal Warren off from the
surrounding areas if you want to, but you won't do it with
federal money.
1. Statement of George Romney, Secretary, HUD, before the Senate
Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, August 26, 1970. "As
part of this Administration, this Department is deeply involved in assuring all
Americans both 'the right to choose' and the 'ability to choose.' These are
the basic goals of our Department's evolving 'open communities' policy." p. 5.
2. Weston , op c.,p. 78.
3. Twenty-two families live on the grounds of a federal installation.
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You will find that it will be impossible to do. We are living
in a nation now where everybody is interdependent. Black
people have as much right to equal opportunities as we do.
God knows, they have suffered so much they may have more right.
Inexorably there is going to be change, so you might as well face
up to it now and agree to these requirerre nts.
(A verbatim account of the meeting was published in the Detroit News on July
24, 1970.) Then he challenged them to have "'political courage like I did to
get a fair housing ordinance passed in Birmingham'" (city near Romney's home). 2
On return to Warren the Council refused to pass the HUD drafted proposal but
did pass a diluted version. Not coincidentally, the draft was a verbatim copy
of the Birmingham ordinance. The Regional Administrator was cornered into
certifying Warren.
In June, attention focused on Toledo, where, as described above (p.
HUD was successful with the cut-off lever.
On June 2, Romney suddenly appeared before the House Banking and
Currency Committee's Housing Subcommittee to propose an amendment to the
Administration's housing package presented much earlier in the year. The
Department made no effort to publicize and little effort to explain the amend-
ment buried in fifty-hree pages of testimony. 3 The proposal had taken two
months longer to clear the White House and Justice Department than the
1. Lilley, op.cit.,p. 2257.
2. Weston, o it.,p. 79.
3. John Herbers, "Romney Asks Ban on Rules Curbing Housing for
Poor," New York Times, June 3, 1970, p. 1.
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omnibus bill.I His testimony indicated the amendment was intended to
prevent the arbitrary use of zoning to exclude Federal LMIH in undeveloped
or predominately undeveloped areas which are in the path of development
if the exclusion is inconsistant with the state or local master plan. The
enforcement of the proposal was to be by litigation brought by the Justice
Department or an individual entitled to federally assisted housing, not by HUD
fund cut-off. Actually the Attorney General had broader authority under
Section 813 of the 1968 Civil Rights Act than the proposal delegated. 2
Nevertheless, there was immediate outspoken opposition in the Subcommittee. All
five Republicans and one Southern Democrat eventually defeated the proposal
(5-6 vote on August 11 , 1970).3
In the summer of 1970, HUD was working on the fourth available
lever -- requirements to obtain funding. Romney held sequestered summit
1. William Lilley, 111, "HUD Start to Limit Local Zoning Powers,
National Journal, 3:12 - (March 20, 1971): 605.
2. Rabkin and Bellman, Senate, E. E. .,. , p. 2926.
Recently, in the case of Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City
of Lackawanna, supra, a federal district court found that the
Attorney General had jurisdiction under Section 813 of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 to challenge a racially discriminatory land-
use determination by Lackawanna officials. This ruling makes it
clear that the Attorney General may file federal court actions
under the 1968 law attacking all discriminatory zoning and other
land-use practices. The Department of Justice therefore currently
enjoys even broader litigative powers in this area than HUD's open
communities bill presumes to bestow.
The ruling in Lackawanna was upheld by the Supreme Court.
3. Lilley, "HUD ,' op. cit. p. 605.
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meetings (July 7 and September 19) on the proposed drafts for tenant
selection and site selection requirements for FHA subsidized housing and
public housing and quantified performance pre-requirements for the urban
development programs. Before the final drafts were ready, the FHA insuring
personnel were given verbal instruction by the Assistant Secretary for Housing
Production and Mortgage Credit, Eugene A. Gulledge
. I told them that they must give priority to projects
that would increase housing opportunities throughout
the community, including parts where there has been
no low-income housing previously. 1
The tenant selection called for
. . each sponsor shall adopt an affirmative fair-housing
marketing plan for the selection and assignment of eligible
tenants and purchasers designed to achieve and retain racial
balance and shall select and assign eligible tenants and
purchasers in accordance with this plan. 2
These tenant and site selection requirements turn on the assumption that the
building industry is desperate enough for the funds to make the fights on the
local level for suburban sites. 3
1. Lilley, Housing," op cit., p. 2260.
2. Ibid.
3. Romney in a confidential memo, "'I think that this housing shortage
provided an opportunity to begin to penetrate these [suburban] barriers and
open up these metropolitan districts. . . "' Assistant Commissioner for Subsidized
Housing,. William Dockser: "'%uilders are willing, in return for the subsidized
market, to put up with ar rules and regulations. It's an economic fact of life
that the sites are not available in the cities, so the subsidized housing has
to go to the suburbs."' Lilley, "Housing," op. cit., p. 2260.
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July 21st, The Detroit News blew the HUD cover with front page
headlines, "U.S. PICKS WARREN AS PRIME TARGET IN MOVE TO
INTEGRATE ALL SUBURBS. " The News printed HUD memos as proof of
the charges in stories that ran four consecutive days. This time Romney
went to Warren. On July 27th, the Secretary appeared before Detroit's
suburban mayors and officials promising
'There is not now, nor will there be a HUD policy
mandating forced racial integration in the suburbs. . .
The department does encourage integration through
voluntary action. And we have a statutory mandate
to enforce a national policy of fair housing. lAuthor's
emphasisJ But our role is not to prescribe quotas or numerical
standards which a community must meet.'l
Outside the hall, 300 angry whites holding signs such as "'Romney gives us
a HUD-ache"' scuffled with police. Based on Romney's clear denial of
"forced integration," the Mayor fought to keep the urban renewal, winning
5 - 4. But within eight days, the Greater Warren Civic Association collected
14,800 signatures to put the question on the November ballot.
By August 4th the first political repercussions of the Warren incident
were felt - by Mrs. Romney. As the Republican convention's choice for the
party nomination for U.S. Senator, Lenore Romney was expected to have no
problems in the primary. That was before Warren. She barely defeated a
little known conservative challenger. Michigan political pundits found a
1. Weston, 2o. cit., p. 79.
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direct relationship between the electoral results and her husband's
activities in the Detroit suburbs.
All remained calm until Romney testified before the Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, August 26th. With no more
memory than a mirror (an occupational niewsiiy, no doubt) the Secretary stated:
[Warren] had an obvious practice of discrimination
in the community. So our Department took the posi-
tion that Warren had to at least establish a genuine
human relations commission if it were to qualify for
additional urban renewal funds because it had to be
clear that people would be protected from discrimi-
nation in Warren.
They are not going to get the money unless they comply
with that requirement. 2
The Mayor demanded a public apology and threatened to abolish HUD funds in
Warren if he "detected that HUD is attempting to force integration. .
Rormney made a second and more significant backtrack that day. He
stated first equivocally,
Senator MONDALE. . . . In your opinion, does it
authorize HUD to withhold funds in order to achieve
this objective, and to what extent does HUD do so,
and in cooperation with other agencies seek to do so?
Secretary ROMNEY. Well, No. 1, I think it is difficult
to say with great precision just what that very general
language actually authorizes. 4
1. Weston, op. cit., p. 2259.
2. Senate, E. E.O., op. cit., p. 2786.
3. Weston, op. cit., p. 79.
4. Senate, E.E.O., op. cit., p. 2770.
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then unequivocally,
Senator JAVITS. . . . May I ask why you have this lacuna
in your testimony, that the presidential task force recommended
that Federal funds be denied to a community that does not
make housing available to low- and moderate-income families,
and yet in your testimony you say you are not doing that,
without telling us why.
You say HUD has not adopted the approach recommended by a
recent presidential task force in a community that does not take
steps to make housing available to low- and moderate-income
housing. That is on page 14 of your testimony.
If you have to hit hard, why are you not doing it?
Secretary ROMNEY. As I indicated in my response to Senator
Mondale, we have not done it because we are not clear that
we have the authority to do it. The affirmative language of
the Fair Housing Title relates to fair housing -- preventing
discrimination. It doesn't indicate that we are mandated or
aJthorized to take the steps proposed by the task force, and
that -is the reason.1
that he did not have the authority under the 1968 Civil Rights Act to cut off
funds. He fully explained the details of and his need for the zoning amend-
ment previously presented to the House Banking & Currency Committee which
had already defeated the measure (August 11, 1970).
On October 17, 1970, the National Journal published a feature article
on the progress of the "Open Communities" policy based on interviews with over
40 present and former HUD officials and confidential documents and memos.
HUD officials promised the "Open Communities" policy they had been developing
1. Senate, E. E., . cit. p. 2784-5.
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for eighteen months would be implemented right after the November
Congressional election. The helpful HUD officials were rather upset that
the article had been released before the election, as they had been assured
it would not. The White House reportedly found the article informative and
1disconcerting.
November 3, 1970. Warren, Michigan rejected urban renewal
(26,471 to 19,906) -- first city in the country. Michigan rejected Mrs. George
Romney by 5-1 margin. Michigan also rejected a $100 million bond issue for
low income housing.2 For various reasons, the nation rejected Republicans
generally. HUD public affairs officials began to discourage the term "open
communities. "3
In a syndicated column, November 6th, Republiccri political strategist
and former assistant to Attorney General John Mitchell, Kevin Phillips,
sounded the alarm - "HUD [is] stalking suburbia through sewers.
During the summer, Secretary Romney was badly burned
in his attempt to use a cut-off of federaI funds to compel
the city of Warren, Mich., to move toward HUD-announced
standards of racial balance. Although Romney backed down
before a huge groundswell of local resistance (after irre-
trievably ruining his wife's Senate candidacy), the Warren
1. Interviews with William Lilley III of the National Journal and
author of the article, October 28, 1970 and William Dockser, HUD Assistant Conmionr
for Subsidized Housing, October 26 & 29, 1970, Washington, D.C.
2. Jerry M. Flint, "Suburb Rejects Housing Program," New York Times,
November 8, 19 7 0, p. 56.
3. Simpson Lawson, "Open Communities: Frozen Federal Levers," City
5:1 (Jan/Feb. , 1971): 75.
episode am:arently did not teach him a much-needed lesson
in sociology and politics. Despite the fact that housing
production and racial relations are bound to suffer from
inflamed community hostilities, HUD remains openly com-
mitted to using federal housing programs to engineer "racial
balance" in the suburbs.
These federal blueprints and objectives stand in basic conflict
with the Nixon administration's announced "support" of
neighborhood schools and its opposition to the idea that de-
segregation requires ethnic or racial balance. It is this kind
of contradiction -this lack of ideological or sociological
consistency or conceptual overview - that goes a long way
in explaining why a Harris poll taken in October found that
a substantial plurality of American voters disapprove of
President Nixon's handling of race relations. . . .
The White House shows no sign of taking corrective action.]
Shortly after the election Secretary Romney asked the Justice Department
to file suit against Black Jack, Missouri (a suburb of St. Louis) for "'a blatent
violation of the Constitution and the law."',2 This action also became public, to
the chagrin of HUD officials. Allegedly, Black Jack had become incorporated
for the purpose of zoning out a 236 project. Justice remained silent. Then a
New Yor< Times article quoted "highly placed sources" as saying that Attorney
General Mitchell, close friend and political advisor to the President, had asked
Romney to switch to another post in the Administration. Romney had been acting
counter to the Administration's housing policy -- a charge to which he reportedly
1. Kevin Phillips, "HUD Turns to Sewers," Washington Post, November
6, 1970, p. A23.
2. John Herbers, "How do you break the ring around the City?" New
York Times, January 10, 1971, p. E3.
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replied, "'What the hell is the Administration policy? It changes from
day to day and hour to hour.' Both Cabinet members denied the entire
report.
On December 2, 1970, the House of Representatives' debate on the
1970 Housing bill indicated Congressional reaction to the LMIH housing pre-
requisites on the water-sewer grant application which had become effective
in October. A Southern Republican (Ben Blackburn, R-Ga.) offered an
amendment denying HUD the authority to evaluate water-sewer applications
on the basis of a housing consideration. The amendment passed without
debate on a voice vote. 2
December 10, 1970, the President made his "forced integration"
statement and went out of his way to restate it in his conversation with the
news commentators on January 4, 1971.
MR. SMITH: . . . Someone, I think, told you earlier
about telegrams that come to us and ask us to ask you
questions. I would like to put one to you from a telegram.
In your last news conference you said you opposed forced
integration in the suburbs. Well, if a suburban community
should use zoning and land use authority to block housing
development for minority groups and, in fact, there are
cases where it has happened, would you or would you not
apply the Federal Fair Housing Law to prevent that?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith, what we are talking about here,
first, is carrying out the law and then, second, going beyond the law.
1. John Herbers, "Mitchell is said to advise Romney to take new
post," New York Times, November 22, 1970, p. 1.
2. "House Approves 2.4 Billion for Housing Programs," Congressional
Quarterly 28:51 (December 11, 1970): 2941. The Amendment was dropped by
the House-Senate Conference Committee.
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I also said in that news conference, as you will remember,
that I was pledged to carry out the law, this law and every
other law, and that I would carry it out.
The law, as you know, does require that there can be no urban
renewal funds, that there can be no Federal housing funds,
in any community that has a policy which is discriminatory
insofar as fair housing is concerned. But now the law does
not now require or, in my opinion, allow the Federal Govern-
ment to have forced integration of suburbs. There is argument
on this point.
I realize, for example -and I do listen to some of your
commentaries and I read them all -- I know Mr. Chancellor
has very strong feelings on this - I believe that that is the
best course: We are going to carry out the law. We are going
to open up opportunities for all Americans to move into housing,
any housing that they are able to afford.
Buton the other hand, for the Federal Government to go
further than the law, to force integration in the suburbs,
I think is unrealistic. I think it will be counter-productive
and not in the interest of better race relations. 1
When newsmen asked the Secretary about the Black Jack case in early
January, he said it was awaiting over-ull policy review in the White House. 2
The Attorney General stated that he and the Housing Secretary had not com-
pleted a search for "'Congressional intent in this broad area"' but "'If we have
responsibilities, we will carry them out, and if we don't have responsibilities
imposed upon us, we won't assume them. '"3 Romney also informed newsmen
1. "Partial Text of Nixon's Jan. 4 Television Interview," Congressional
Quarterly 29:2 (Jan. 8, 1971): 100.
2. Herbers, "How . . . City," op. cit., p. E3.
3. Lawson, op. cit., p. 76.
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that he would not resubmit the zoning amendment as recent court decisions
had accomplished what he had wanted the legislation to do.
President Nixon expanded his "forced integration" remarks in a
February 17th news conference and a March 22nd chat with Howard K.
Smith on ABC. Not only did the President feel that forced racial integration
was not in the best interest of the country but he also felt that any use of
Federal power to change the economic character of a neighborhood was uncon-
stitutional. Both ethnic and class neighborhoods had the Presidential seal of
approval.
'This Administration will enforce the law of the land which
provides for open housing. Open cities, open suburbs, open
neighborhoods are now a right for every American. . . .
However, this Administration will not go beyond the law or in
violation of the law by using federal power, federal coercion,
or federal money to force economic integration of neighborhoods.'
[Distinguishing between "forced integration" and "enforcement of
laws on the books'l
'In the one case, the laws on the books deal . . . with human
rights, the rights of an individual to buy a house . . . or rent
a house or apartment. . . . In the other case, what we are
talking about is economic considerations having to do primarily
with the zoning.
'Where this is involved, it seems to me there is a clear distinction.
The law does not require . . . does not allow the federal govern-
ment to use its monetary and other power, coercive power, for
the purpose of changing the economic pattern of a neighborhood.
. . . The law does not require that the federal government step
in and provide in a neighborhood the type of housing that an
individual could afford to move into.'
1. Herbers, "How . . . City," op. cit., p. E3.
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[March 22 distinguishing between economic and racial exclusion]
' . if you have a situation where people are living in a certain
area, say, who have purchased their homes -- let us say they are
$20,000 to $25,000 homes -- then for the federal government to
come in and say, "We are going to insist that we will, in effect,
break up this community, break it up from an economic standpoint,
because those homes are too expensive for some people to move into"
[their racial characteristics aside],. . . I do not believe that kind
of forced integration is constitutional, and it certainly is not required
by the law. Until it is required by the law, we are not going to do it.
April 5, 1971. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lackawanna 2
case thereby upholding the Circuit Court of Appeals decision against the New
York town for "'willful contrivance by city officials to deprive Negroes of their
housing rights under the Equal Protection Clause. "' The court found that
Lackawanna had a history of segregation. When a subsidized housing sponsor
obtained properly zoned land in a white section of the city, residents objected.
The city responded by enacting a moratorium on subdivision construction,
rezoning the land for park and recreation use, and expressing an interest in
purchasing the land for a park. The court noted all the municipal actions were
1. Simpson Lawson, "Senator Ribicoff joins the issue of 'forced integration,'
City 5:2 (March/April 1971): 7 & 10.
2. Kennedy Park Homes Assn. , Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp.
669 (W.D. New York 1970).
3. Sheldon J. Plager, "Judicial Review 1970 Policy, Planning and the
Courts," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 37:3 (May, 1971): 180.
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contrary to prior city behavior and official city plans. The court found the
intent or motivation of these official acts to be racially discriminatory.
April 20, 1971. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld bussing as a
means to desegregate the southern de jure school systems. The decision conflicted
with the President's stated views supporting the inviolability of neighborhood
schools but the President responded (through Ron Ziegler speaking for the President),
'The Supreme Court has acted and their decision is now the law of the land. It is
.2
up to the people to obey.
April 26, 1971. The Supreme Court's decision to uphold a California
constitutional provision requiring a referendum on every federally financed public
3
housing proposal "shocked" and demoralized LMIH and civil rights advocates.
In the Valtierra case the Federal District Court found the referendum requirement
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by placing a special
burden on a group of people "not rationally differentiable in light of any legitimate








John Herbers, "Change Foreseen," New York Times, April 21, 1971, p. 1.
John Herbers, "Housing's Struggle in Suburbs, " New York Times, April
p. 20.
90 S. Ct. 1873, 2247 (1970), Sub. Nom. James v. Valtierra.
Plager, op. cit., p. 179.
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reverse a 1963 position that "the states of course are prohibited from discriminating
between the rich and poor as such. 1 The majority contended the 14th Amendment
applied to racial discrimination, not economic discrimination. Finding no evi-
2dence of racially discriminatory intent, they upheld the provision.
April 29, 1971. Secretary Romney personally doused a suburban Washington
conflict between the Montgomery County Housing Authority -- wanting to lease
(under Section 23) Watkins Glen, 52 units of newly constructed "luxury" ($45,000)
townhouses -- and Potomac (Md.) residents --- wishing to protect their "constitutional
rights. " Here was an excellent test of economic integration. The question was not
the integrity of zoning and building codes. The structures were up. The question
was: who would live there? Poor whites and blacks or middle class whites and
blacks?
After two nights of "emotional" public hearings attended by 2,000
people, a group of area residents sued for and were granted a circuit court injunction
barring the authority from in "any way agreeing to enter into a contract. "3 With
the help of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a group of potential
residents filed suit in Federal District Court to lift the injunction. The Housing
1. Douglas v. California 372 U. S. 353 361, 1963.
2. U. S. Supreme Court 150 226 October Term 1970.
3. David W. Hardy, Court Halts Watkins Glen Lease Plan," Washington
Post, April 2, 1971, pp. C1-2.
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Authority's executive director and president of the potential residents group
received threatening calls. An informed source reports certain HUD officials
living near Watkins Glen attempted to pressure the Philadelphia Regional
Office into rejecting the proposal.
On the day the Federal Court ruled to lift the injunction, Secretary
Romney told a Washington Post reporter the Watkins Glen proposal was not
"economically feasible. " Mr. Romney added:
'If you've talked with some subordinates down there, maybe
they don't have all the facts,' a statement which proved to
be correct. When Mr. Mann [the reporter] called 'the
subordinates down there' in HUD's regional office in Phila-
delphia they told him that they had indeed requested additional
information from the Housing Authority and that, at the time of
his call, it had not yet been furnished. They had therefore
not yet been able, they said, to make a decision regarding the
plan's economic feasibility. 1
There is no doubt the plan was economically feasible -- under the system used
to determine economic feasibility by the Philadelphia Regional Office before
the question of "luxury" housing for the poor.2
1. Editorial, "Mrs. Martin, Mr. Comer and Mr. Romney, Washington Post,
April 30, 1971, p.
2. Interviews with Steve Browning and James Skiles, Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C. , June 23, 30, July 22, 1971.
Examination of Montgomery County Housing Authority's records on Watkins
Glen, Silver Spring, Md., June 30, 1971. Before the controversy, the Philadelphia
Regional Office of HUD allowed "averaging. " A local housing authority was
allowed "X" number of units and "Y" amount of Federal subsidy. Some units could
come in above the technical limit of Y/X if some came in below.
A second change in the midst of the controversy involved income limits. In
1968 the regional office had declared the Montgomery County limits too high. The
LHA objected and HUD, while never revoking the new limits, allowed the authority
to operate under the old ones -- until Watkins Glen. The LCCRUL filed suit in
Federal District Court, July 22, 1971, alleging the above.
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June 1, 1971. The question: Should the Federal government compel
suburbs to accept subsidized housing?" was debated on the nationally broadcast
PBS "The Advocates. " Although the total audience vote was smaller than
average (usually 5,000 but 2,307 for this question) the sentiment was decisive:
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President Nixon issued his long awaited statement
between layers of news of his daughter's wedding cake.
1. The Advocate Mail Tally Sheet, Show #31, Housing.
1163.
The actual content of the 8,000 word brief is important (see Appendix for
complete text) but more important is suburbia's impression of the message.
Forced to base their perceptions on media accounts, the suburban thinking
may be best indicated by newspaper play.
THE NEW YORK TIMES
NIXON TO ENFORCE RIGHTS MEASURES FOR U.S. HOUSING --
But He Refuses To Impose Low and Middle-income Units on Communities
2 TYPES OF SEGREGATION --
President Stresses Racial Bars are Unconstitutional, but Not Economic Kinds.
President Nixon pledged today-to enforce existing prohibitions against
racial discrimination in housing but said he would not use Federal
leverage to force local communities to accept low- and moderate-income
housing against their wishes. In a major policy statement . . . Mr.
Nixon clung to and reinforced with elaborate arguments the distinction
he made at news conferences this year and last between "racial" and
"economic" segregation. . . . he insisted that there is nothing in
existing low that authorizes, much less mandates, the imposition of
low- and moderate-income housing on affluent communities. 1
BOSTON GLOBE
NIXON VOWS FIGHT FOR OPEN HOUSING
But won't battle economic bias2 and
1. Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Nixon to enforce rights measures for U. S.
Housing," New York Times, June 12, 1971, p. 1.
2. S. J. Micciche, "Nixon vows fight for open housing," Boston Globe,
June 12, 1971, p. 1.
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HOUSING leaders deplore policy as retrogressive
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
OPEN HOUSING -- WHAT NEXT?
Federal officials and all their minions, says President Nixon, cannot
lawfully and/or constitutionally do much more to open up the suburbs
to the blacks and poor. 2
ROMNEY HOUSING PLANS COME TUMBLING DOWN
Behind President Nixon latest open-housing statement lies the steady
weakening of the federal "open communities," alias "forced.integration"
policy -- dying in its attempt to run the suburban gauntlet. 3
BOSTON RECORD AMERICAN
NIXON URGES -- BUT WON'T FORCE -- OPEN HOUSING IN O.S.
SUBURBS (A.P.)
President Nixon yesterday promised limited preference in the distribution
of federal aid to metropolitan areas that open suburban housing oppor-
tunifies for poor of all races. But . . . the Chief Executive said his
Administration 'will not attempt to impose federally assisted housing upon
any community.' 4
1. Evelyn Keene, "Housing leaders deplore policy as 'regressive,"'
Boston Globe, June 12, 1971, p. 4.
2. Courtney R. Sheldon, "Open Housing -- what next?" The Christian
Science Monitor, June 12, 1971, p. 1.
3. Christa Carnegie, "Romney Housing plans come tumbling down,"
The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1971, p. 1.
4. Associated Press, "Nixon urges -- but won't force -- open housing




President Nixon said today the federal government will encourage but
not require the nation's suburban communities to open housing oppor-
tunities to the poor of all races. In a 15 page statement almost 8,000
words in length, the chief executive repeatedly emphasized the limita-
tions of federal integration power and offered no new programs to use
the leverage of government aid for dramatically opening up suburban
communities to minority group members. 1
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
NIXON'S POLICY ON HOUSING SEGREGATION (New York
Times Service)
President Nixon pledged yesterday to enforce existing prohibitions
against racial discrimination in housing, but-said he would not use
Federal leverage to force local communities to accept low- and
moderate income housing against their wishes. 2
LOS ANGELES TIMES
NIXON SAYS HE WILL NOT FORCE LOW-RENT HOUSING ON SUBURBS
Promises to Enforce Laws against Racial Discrimination but Contends that Economic
Segregation is Local Matter
President Nixon said Friday, his Administration would "fully and fairly"
enforce laws against racial discrimination in housing but would not
impose federally aided low-income housing projects on the suburbs. 3
1. Associated Press, "Nixon's housing stand, " Kansas City Star, June 12,
19 71 
, P 1.
2. N.Y. Times Service, "Nixon's policy on housing segregation," San
Francisco Chronicle, June 12, 1971 , p. 1.
3. Don Irwin and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Nixon says he will not force low rent
housing on suburbs, " Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1971, p. 1.
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National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing:
"...deliberately deceptive. Economic discrimination and racial discrimination
in today's time are synonymous. "
National Urban League:
"sadly disappointing. It is a fact of American life that the poor and the black
have not been welcomed in suburbia, and now the exclusion which fosters
polarization has been officially sanctioned. "I
American Civil Liberties Union:
"This is the major social problem today and it is deplorable the Administration
doesn't recognize it."I
U. S. Conference of Mayors:
(Pres. James Tate, Mayor of Philadelphia)
"I feel pretty badly2. It certainly doesn't help our problems here, or in any other
city in America.
National Urban Coalition:
Mr. Nixon "appears willing to abandon to local determination a problem that
demands forthright national policy backed by national leadership, incentives.
and moral leadership. "O
1. G.C. Thelen, Jr., Associated Press wire copy, June 11, 1971.
2. Michael J. Sniffen, Associated Press wire copy, June 13, 1971.
3. Irwin, op. cit., p. 1.
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Emphasizing certain lines in the President's statement could easily
lead one to a negative interpretation.
A municipality that does not want federally assisted housing
should not have it imposed from Washington by bureaucratic fiat;
this is not a proper Federal role.
A careful review of the legislative (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964) history indicates that the Congress intended that the cutoff
of Federal funds resulting from a violation should apply only to the
particular activity in which the unlawful racial discrimination took
place, and not to all activities undertaken by the violater.
* * *
It is important to remember, however, that the terms "poor" and
'black" are not interchangeable.
By "equal housing opportunity," I mean the achievement of a condition
in which individuals of similar income levels in the same housing market
area have a like range of housing choices available to them regardless
of their race, color, religion or national origin.
What is essential is that all citizens be able to choose among reasonable
locational alternatives within their economic means and that racial non-
discrimination be scrupulously and rigorously enforced.
* * *
We will not seek to impose economic integration upon an existing local
jurisdiction.
If we build federally assisted instant ghettos, we fail both our communities
and the people we are trying to help.
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* * *
If we impact or tip the balance of an established community with a
flood of low-income families, we do a disservice to all concerned.
This administration will not attempt to impose federally assisted
housing upon any community.
* * *
To local officials are entrusted the initial, and often the final,
determinations as to how much low- and moderate-income
housing is to be built, how well it is to be built and where it is
to be built.
Based on these reports it is reasonable to assume suburbia enjoyed the weekend's
wedding festivities feeling no impending treat from President Nixon's announced
housing policy.
Monday, June 14, 1971. Losing in the competition for national attention
with the New York Times' Pentagon Papers, HUD Secretary Romney, Attorney
General Mitchell and GSA Administrator Robert 1. Kunzig announced imple-
menting measures for, and answered questions about the President's housing
statement. Mr. Kunzig presented a memorandum of agreement between HUD and
GSA to implement Executive Order 11512 (see p. ). GSA would seek HUD's
advice on the'bdequacy of accessible housing for Federal employees who will be
working in a new facility. " HUD would not have a veto over locational
1. HUD, "Press conference on Equal Housing Opportunity: Secretary
George Romney, Attorney General John Mitchell, Robert L. Kunzig,"
Wa;hington, D.C., June 14, 1971.
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decisions but would give priority funding for subsidized housing applications
to locations without adequate LMIH where GSA intended to locate new
facilities (funding priority does not apply to already existing facilities).
Attorney General Mitchell announced the Justice Department was filing only
one suit against a municipality -- Black Jack. Secretary Romney presented
new affirmative marketing and housing regulations and community development
project selection criteria.
Thus, only seven months from the time HUD asked the Justice Department
to enjoin Black Jack, Mo. , Attorney General Mitchell filed suit alleging
violation of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the 13th and 14th Amend-
ments. The suit alleges the town's change of zoning was racially motivated.1
The key point is the motivation for, not just the effect of racial exclusion. The
Attorney General speculated that 'there is not any great likelihood that we will
have a great number of these cases. .2
The filing of the Black Jack case was not a great surprise for two reasons:
the President had legal protection and liberal political pressure. In the Supreme
Court's April 5, 1971, denial of certiorari in the Lackawanna case, the court
recognized the illegality of municipal actions which have racial motivations
1. In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
Eastern Division, United States of America, Plaintiff v. City of Black Jack,
Missouri, a municipal corporation, Defendant.
2. HUD, "Press Conference, "op. cit., p. 23.
170.
leading to a racially discriminatory effect. Black Jack is the next stop
down the road from Lackawanna. The President vowed in his housing
statement to enforce the law. Secondly, a member of his cabinet had
already publicly declared Black Jack's action to be a blatant violation
of the Constitution. With the legal protection, the President could move
on Black Jack with some immunity from Conservative outcry. But not to
move, would have incited the liberal press to near riot.
The media, for the most part (The Christian Science Monitor excluded),
headlined and featured the Black Jack suit. Towards the end of the coverage
the diligent reader could find Secretary Romney's positive interpretation of the
President's statement. While the Presidential aides (John Ehrlichman and Leonard
Garment), who "backgrounded" the press the day of the statement, seemed to
stress the limitations of federal power, Secretary Romney emphasized his leverage.
Romney first chastized the President's critics for not reading (or reading carefully)
the statement. He emphasized his "enthusiasm for the President's very positive
statement, because some of the early reports suggested that it was at variance with
my earlier views and actions, and represented a retrenchment of this Department's
policies or activities. " Not so. He pointed out other sentences in the President's
statement:
At the outset, we set three basic requirements for our program
to achieve equal housing opportunity: It must be aimed at correcting
the effects of past discrimination; it must contain safeguards to ensure
against future discrimination; and it must be results-oriented so its
progress toward the overall goal of increasing housing opportunities
can be evaluated.
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The administration is embarked upon this course. It must and will
press forward firmly.
The chief components of such a program include the firm enforcement
of laws relating to equal housing opportunity; the development of
appropriate equal housing opportunity criteria for participation in
programs affecting housing; the development of information programs;
and the development of policies relating to housing marketing.
To qualify for Federal assistance, the law requires a local housing
or community development project to be part of a plan that expands
the supply of low- and moderate-income housing in a racially non-
discriminatory way.
We will carry out our programs in a way that will be as helpful as
possible to communities which are receptive to the expansion of housing
opportunities for all of our people.
We will be vigorous in enforcing both the constitutional mandate and the
statutory requirements that there not be housing discrimination on the
grounds of race. In the more complex and difficult area of providing
subsidized housing in areas where it is needed, we will encourage
communities and local'developers to take into account the broad needs
of the various groups within the community and of the metropolitan area.
Standing in sight of pipe puffing Mitchell, the Secretary made what
appeared to be rather strong statements about the implementation of the President's
policy.
Housing project selection:
" all other factors being equal, projects outside areas of minority
concentration will be given preference."
Community Development project selection and Federal leverage: Force vs. Encourage
Now, the President's statement contains a very careful review of the
statutory requirements. And while the President has made clear and
I have also consistently sought to make clear, that the Federal government
will not force a reluctant community to accept low income housing.
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He has also said: "To qualify for Federal Assistance the law requires
a local housing or community development project to be part of a
plan that expands the supply of low and moderate income housing in
a racially nondiscriminatory way."
Now, that is the policy we have followed, are following and will
follow.
To implement that policy with respect to the water and sewer grant
programs, we have a project selection system which takes into account,
in addition to such factors as public health and financial need, the
accessibility of low and moderate income housing in the area to be
served by the project.
* * *
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the statement that he would not use
Federal leverage, which you just cited--
SECRETARY ROMNEY: The President didn't say he wouldn't use Federal
leverage. The President said he wouldn't use leverage of Federal money
to force communities to accept the subsidized housing. Now that is quite
a different thing from using the leverage of Federal programs to encourage
the acceptance of low or moderate income housing. He made it very clear
that he is going to encourage low and moderate income housing.
QUESTION: Will water and sewer, Mr. Secretary, be considered a part
of community development programs?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: Yes, sir, water and sewers are. If you look at
the requirements and consider the application of the law to water and
sewer grants, you will find that housing is a prerequisite in most water
and sewer cases to being even considered, because they have to conform
with the comprehensive planning requirements of Section 701 and Section
-- and most of these water and sewer projects are financed -- the plans
are financed from money from Section 701 and the Section requires a
housing element even for consideration. Now housing is also one element
in the project selection system.
* * *
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QUESTION: Mr. Romney, back to workable plan, are you saying that
no community will get community development sewer-water renewal
unless they are accepting and building subsidized housing?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: Unless they have a plan for such purpose and we
are convinced it's a meaningful plan, that is correct.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, How does that differ then from forcing them
to accept subsidized housing?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: They have free choice.
QUESTION: They can build their own sewerage or they can be subsidized?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: Sure; they don't have to take it. Now that's
leverage, but that's not forcing. They have complete freedom to do it
or not do it.
* * *
QUESTION: I want to make sure I understand this. If you have two
communities that. refuse to permit low-income housing to be built, then
do I understand that if those -- if applications were to come from those
communities for other projects that might be funded by HUD, such as water
and sewer applications, and so on, those communities would not be
eligible because they did, in effect, take an action that permitted concen-
tration minority pockets?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: If you will take a look at the President's statement,
under Discussion of Statutory Requirements, you will find considerable
development of the housing element requirement, with respect to other
programs as well as just housing. And most of our other programs require
housing elements, as well as the housing program. So, it would affect
the availability of funds for other programs.
QUESTION: In other words, they could not get such funds having taken
that action with respect to low-income housing; is that correct?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: They couldn't meet the requirements, that's correct,
and therefore, they would not be eligible, under the workable program,
for urban renewal grants. They wouldn't be eligible in the case of open
space and water and sewer, unless they had comprehensive planning grants
for such purposes.
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QUESTION: So there is a penalty attached to not having low-income
housing?
SECRETARY ROMNEY: Absolutely, absolutely, absolutely; and there's
real leverage for the programs. And this idea that there is no leverage is
not accurate. There is great leverage, because the leverage is that they
can freely decide whether or not they want to qualify; but if they don't
qualify, they don't get the money.
Romney's subtle distinction between "force" and "encourage" was
lost on at least one Congressman, who had been trying to flush LMIH out of
the sewer program for nearly a year. On the House floor Fletcher Thompson
(R-Ga.) fumed:
Only yesterday, I received a statement of President Nixon relative
to equal housing opportunities. In this statement, the President made it
amply clear that he would not have his administration force upon people
publicly subsidized low-income housing which they did not want in their
area. . . . After reading these statements of President Nixon, I was
astounded to hear on television last night, statements made by Governor
Romney. . . . Governor Romney, in one of the most masterful portrayals
of double talk I have seen, stated that HUD would not withhold funds to
communities that did not have low-income housing as part of their plans,
but would set up criteria whereby, if a community did not include plans
for low income public housing, they could not get any Federal money for
sewers and other projects. . . . It is unconscionable to me that a Presi-
dent would make a statement that he would not force people to accept
taxpayer subsidized low-income housing, and then have an agency of
his administration, such as George Romney's HUD, use blackjack
tactics and stating that if a community does not adopt standards which
include plans for low-income housing paid for by the taxpayers, then
that community will not receive any of its tax dollars back, for sewers
and other grants. And to top it all, Governor Romney has the audacity
and gall to say that Federal funds will not be withhold from communities
that do not want low-income publicly subsidized housing. 2
1. HUD, Press Conference, op. cit., passim.
2. Congressional Record, 92nd Cong. 1 sess. 117:91 (June 15, 1971):
H5199-1H 5200.
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Tuesday, June 15, 1971. Almost unnoticed by the Press
embroiled in First Amendment rights and the Pentagon Papers, Secretary
Romney appeared before the U. S. Civil Rights Canhmission's hearing on
government open-housing enforcement. In his prepared statement Romney
seemed to water down his position of the day before on the leverage of water-
sewer grants.
a The presumed 'enormous leverage' of HUD programs should
also be kept in perspective. For example, the water and sewer program,
which is often cited as a powerful lever, has provided partial assistance
to only about one in ten suburban jurisdictions during the entire five-
year life of the program. Although we do have some leverage HUD
programs are in fact of marginal interest to most well established
suburbs, and it is sheer illustion [sic] to think that HUD can bring
about startling overnight changes in the existing suburban physical
and social landscape by turning federal money on or off.
What the President has said is that the federal government is
not going to create an army of federal zoring officials to march through
thousands of individual suburbs, substituting federal zoning for local
zoning, and thus impose low- and moderate-income housing or 'economic
integration' by 'bureaucratic fiat.'
When the Commissioners pursued the "leverage" point, the Secretary fell back
into a "not wanting to get involved in a semantic argument" position.1 It is
possible the Secretary meant that while vater-sewer grants did not affect many
suburbs (Tuesday), there was great leverage in the ones the program did
affect (Monday).
1. Interview with Martin E. Sloane, Assistant Staff Director, U.S.
Civil Rights Commission, Washington, D.C. , June 28, 1971.
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Aside from the leverage definitional problem, the Associated Press
reported that "ranking members of the Commission . . . said President
Nixon's fair housing policy is unfolding as more activist than at first believed."
Robert L. Carter, President of National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing, said "Either I've missed the full import of the statement or these
principles may not mean what I thought they meant. I'm now adopting a wait
and see attitude."' The Black Jack suit drew praise.
On the same day the U.S. Conference of Mayors, meeting in Philadelphia,
softened a proposed critical resolution. Somewhat re-educated by Secretary
Romney and company, the Mayors modified the resolution from "strongly objects"
to a policy amounting to "a denial of equal opportunity" and demanding fund
cutoffs of all federal funds to communities which exclude LMIH,to the policy
"raises great concern about its potential effectiveness in achieving equal
housing and strongly urged him to promote LMIH in suburban communities. "2
Wednesday, June 16, 1971. When Attorney General Mitchell came
before the USCRC, he was asked to explain a seeming inconsistency in the
President's message and the Attorney General's statements on Monday.
President's Equal Housing Opportunity statement:
When such an action (economic measures) is called into question, we
will study the effect. If the effect of the action is to exclude Americans
1. Associated Press Wire Service, Washington, D.C. 6:40 p.m., June
16, 1971.
2. Michael J. Sniffen, Associated Press wire copy, Philadelphia, 2:06
p.i., June 16, 1971.
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from equal housing opportunity on the basis of their race, religion
or ethnic background, we will vigorously oppose it by whatever means
are most appropriate -- regardless of the rationale which may have
cloaked the discriminatory act.
In such cases, where changes in land use regulations are made for what
turns out to be a racially discriminatory purpose, the Attorney General,
in appropriate circumstances, will also bring legal proceedings.
Attorney General Mitchell in June 16th News Conference:
But where there is a purpose and effect of having racial discrimination,
that is the area which we can move.
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what kind of practices though would
be suspect; for example, large lot zoning, failure to tie in sewer lines,
non-high density zoning, what?
MR. MITCHELL: It is the very intention of the party involved, such as
existed in the Lackawanna case where you had a combination of physical
factors, actual statements and actual actions on the part of the governmental
body that evidenced the racial discrimination. [Emphasis mine.]
The difference between the effect and motivation is obviously important. The
argument against large lot zoning rests on the effect of racial exclusion because
of the high percentage of blacks who are poor. However, the Attorney General
did not give the Commissioners an adequate explanation of passages in question. 1
Wednesday, June 23, 1971. Secretary Romney invited civil rights
leaders to HUD to discuss the policy. He said nothing too new in his presentation,
rereading his news conference and USCRC statements. He definitely belittled
the leverage of water-sewer grants but was strangely excited about the great
leverage of the site selection criteria. The civil rights leaders seemed to accept
1. Sloane, Interview.
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this proposition and for two hours kindly questioned the Secretary and his.'
two black Assistant Secretaries about FHA types' willingness to use the new
criteria.
Just as he was about to leave, Steve Browning of the Lawyers Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law (preprimed by the author) asked the Secretary why
the new criteria for the water-sewer grants deemphasized and no longer required
a community to have housing accessible to LMIH families. The Secretary responded
that the Department had discovered that only 9% of the criteria were based on the
statute, about half on indirect and related statutes and the rest on Administrative
discretion -- now only 18% are on administrative discretion. As the meeting bloke
up, Herbert Franklin, executive associate and director of housing policy for the
Urban Coalition, stopped to thank Steve Browning for pointing the difference in
the two points systems -- he hadn't been aware of it.
As the Secretary belittled the importance of the water-sewer program, action
in the House of Representatives belied this evaluation. Wrapping themselves in an
ecology flag, the Congressmen appropriated $700 million for the program. The
Congress had been having a running battle with the Administration over the amount
of appropriations for nearly a year. In the first five years of the program they had
appropriated one billion dollars. In the fall of 1970 they appropriated $500 million.
The President vetoed the measure. They appropriated $350 million; the Office of
1. U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 92nd Cong. First Sess. 117:97
(June 23, 1971): H5777.
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Management and Budget "froze" $200 million thereby spending the amount
the Administration had originally requested. Now, the House was reappro-
priating the $200 million and $500 million in new money. The Administration
put the program in a proposed Urban Revenue Sharing bill -- S. 1618
To provide Federal revenues to State and local governmeTits and
afford them broad discretion in carrying out community development
activities and to help States and localities improve their decisionmaking
and management capabilities,"
so had not specifically requested any appropriations. The House removed the
program from the revenue sharing proposal (with Administration approval) for
fear the towns could not get the amount of funds needed under the President's
bill.
June 30, 1971. Even with the watered down criteria, another attempt
was made to limit Mr. Romney's ability to use the water-sewer leverage. Rep.
Fletcher Thompson, R-Ga. proposed the following amendment to the 1971 HUD
Appropriation bill:
No part of any appropriations contained in this Act shall be
withheld or denied to any community, otherwise qualified to receive
them, due to failure or refusal of that community to apply for funds
under any other section of this Act.
1. Interviews with Robert E. Malakoff, staff of the U.S. Senate Banking
and Currency Committee, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee, Washington,
D.C., June 24, 1971, Casey Ireland, Minority staff member, H.S. House Banking
and Currency Committee, Housing Subcommittee, Washington, D.C. June 28,
1971, Representative Robert G. Stephens, Jr., D-Ga., Washington, D.C., June
29, 1971. Representative William B. Widnall, R-N.J., Washington, D.C., June
29, 1971.
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The Floor Manager, (Rep. Edward Boland, D-Ma.) "unclear as to what the
amendment would do. . . regretfully" opposed it "at this time. " Mr.
Thompson's amendment lost 87 to 83 on a division and 121 to 118 on a teller
vote.
July 13, 1971. A coalition of public interest and civil rights groups--
now having studied the President's statement and the means of implementation --
praised the President for recognizing a "cancer" but criticized him for prescribing
an "aspirin. " The group included the prominant housing advocates2 plus the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, itself a coalition of 126 strange bedfellows:
League of Women Voters-Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
National Association of Real Estate Brokers, Inc. -- Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workmen, American Civil Liberties Union -- National Beauty
Culturalists' League.
Their major concerns were:
(1) the Administration makes no commitment to overcome the obstacles
to securing decent housing outside the ghetto for people who are poor
and members of minority groups. By creating artificial distinctions between
"racial " and "economic" discrimination, the Administration has handcuffed
itself in efforts to overcome the principal barrier to progress -- exclusionary
land use policies which are ostensibly economic in purpose but which have a
racial impact.
1. U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 92nd Cong. First Sess. 117:101,
(June 30, 1971): H6175.
2. Center for National Policy Review, Housing Opportunities Council,
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing ,
National Urban Coalition, Nonprofit Housing Center, Inc. , Potomac Institute,
Suburban Action, Inc.
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(2) while taking a few steps forward in prohibiting discrimination
by housing developers, the Administration still has not utilized the authority
it possesses to assure that developers, lending institutions and real estate
brokers carry out their obligations under Title Vill of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968.
(3) even with respect to the rules and guidelines it has adopted, the
Administration still has not demonstrated a will to enforce the law
vigorously, e.g., by initiating its own investigations rather than awaiting
complaints.
(4) the Administration's statement fails to recognize that, particularly
on an issue as controversial as housing opportunity for people who are poor
and members of minority groups, the major responsibility for political and
moral leadership rests with the President of the United States. We are
particularly troubled by the denials of Federal leverage and responsibility
and by the failure to deal forthrightly with the prejudices of affluent
white citizens.]
In releasing the statement, Bayard Rustin challenged the Democratic
Presidential aspirants to speak out on the issue. Playing convention not electoral
politics, they all issued (whispered?) housing statements. The vast readership of
the Boston Globe Real Estate Page was told:
by Senator Muskie, the Federal government should 'employ the resources
at its disposal to encourage and initiate policies that will help create
racially and economically integrated neighborhoods.'
by Senator Jackson, he would introduce legislation requiring that all new
towns and major suburban developments have a minimum percentage of
low income housing or be denied eligibility for FHA mortgage insurance.
by Senator Humphrey, 'What our people seek are affirmative, positive
governmental policies and action that encourage the integration of good
1. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al. , "Response by Public
Interest Groups to Administration Pronouncement on Equal Housing Opportunity,"
n.d., pp. 1-2.
I tj r - ---- --.- -11--
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housing for lower and moderate income families . . . and that provide
incentives to plan for multiple forms of decent housing for all income
levels.
Senators Bayh, Kennedy and McGovern were apparently not worth quoting.
J.une and July -- what happened? Syndicated columnist Kevin Phillips
posed an interesting theory:
The major ingredient of President Nixon's new suburban housing
policy appears to be political fakery.
Mr. Nixon is following the same pattern he has followed in his
"defense" of the neighborhood school -- a heavy opening barrage of
conservative rhetoric followed by a subsequent activity in the other
direction. His repetitive statements opposing "forced integration of the
suburbs" are designed to create a strong enough initial impression to
stick in people's minds. Thereafter, Nixon strategiests hope, events
to the contrary will not be identified with the President.
Actually, Nixon officialsknow they will be moving in liberal
directions -- with a zig-zag or two -- from the moment they complete
their calculated conservative public relations buildup. Thus, they
tell civil rights groups to "watch what we do, not what we say." The
administration does not worry too much about the average person in the
South or about suburbia catching on. The procedures and regulations
are complex and Nixon men count on the knee-jerk criticism of liberal
journalists and Urban Coalition-type zealots to reinforce Middle America's
belief that the White House is resisting liberal sociology.
Nixon told a White House press conference that he was against "forced
integration of the suburbs. " He repeated the statement in a television
interview. Then he repeated it again. Liberals howled each time.
Meanwhile, a statement of administration suburban housing policy was
promised.
On June 11, the President issued a 14-page policy statement
superficial enough to have been written in twq weeks. One conceivable
1. "Nixon's housing stand under fire," Boston Globe, July 25, 1971, p. A-41.
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reason for the seven-month delay was public relations: the
President's widely publicized comments opposing "forced
integration" were creating a popular image not very
vulnerable to later policy shifts.
The statement issued on June 11 is deliberately
general in its main sections. Angry suburbanites will never be
able to focus on any specific words of Mr. Nixon. That is the idea,
of course.I
The impact of the housing statement as filtered through the media leads one to
agree with Mr. Phillips that suburbia does not feel threatened by Mr. Nixon.
Also, the alleged effort to detach the President's image from Secretary Romney's
statements and actions has some plausibility. In an interview with the Congress-
man who introduced the amendment to raise water-sewer funding to $700 (Rep.
Stephens, D-Ga.), he said
I have not read anything except excerpts from his message
but the gist of what I gather from that, and comments that I heard, he
is not urging the same thing that HUD is urging. He is opposed to the
economic factor of integration. 2
President Nixon is really not able to follow the same scenario he
followed in the school desegregation-bussing episode. Recent Supreme Court
decisions do not give the President the political protection in the housing area
they did in the "bussing. " As Mr. Phillips points out, Nixon did give his
"defense" of neighborhood schools, but as he neglects to recall, the President




was able "to move in other directions" because he could plead "oath of
office to enforce the law of the land. " The bussing decision, well covered
by the media, is firmly attached to the Court, not the Administration.
The Lackawanna decision gives the President some protection for "Black
Jacks" and obviously blatant acts of racial discrimination when racial motiva-
tion is provable. But the decision (denial of certiorari) was not well publicized
-- indeed the President is its chief publicist. The Valtierra decision, fairly
well publicized -- certainly better than the Lackawanna case -- leaves the
President unprotected -in the area of economic integration.
Mr. Phillips' conclusion "President'Nixon's assurances notwithstanding,
the administration's suburban housing program seems to be moving once again
in the direction of HUD's 1969-1970 planning" is problematic. It appears to
be based on Mr. Romney's rhetoric, not on the published means to turn the
rhetoric into reality. To wit:
Affirmative Marketing Guidelines --
The guidelines are an attempt to help inform minority citizens of housing
opportunities in FHA sponsored projects of 25 unitsor more. HUD must approve
the sponsor's publicity plan. Also, HUD annoured it would provide lists on
requests of all covered projects on which commitments had been made'in the last
30 days.
The coverage of these guidelines is minimal -- one million new units per
year in a housing stock of over 60 million. Without covering existing housing
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or real estate brokers, Mr. Nixon's policy standard "must be aimed at
correcting the effects of past discrimination" is not met. Although heralded as
a new program, the "lists of projects" have been available since the issuance of
Executive Order 11063 in November, 1962.
The affirmative marketing guidelines are a mere shadow of the tenant
selection criteria drafted in the summer of 1970:
it shall be the goal of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
to achieve racial balance in housing assisted by the department.
With respect to housing assisted by FHA programs and consistent
with this goal (only the FHA subsidy programs are included and not
FHA insurance programs), each sponsor shall adopt an affirmative fair
housing marketing plan for selection and assignments of eligible tenants
and purchasers designed to achieve and retain racial balance and shall
select and assign eligible tenants and purchasers in accordance with
this plan. 2
In October, 1970, The National Journal reported that no major revisions were
expected.3
The importance of the tenant selection -procedures was highlighted
by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission investigation of the 235 program in Little
Rock and Denver. Announced 1 day before the President's statement, the
Commission found that the new "235" homes located in the suburbs were being
1. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
2. HUD draft by William C. Whitbeck quoted on Lilley, "Romney,"
op. cit., p.2260.
3. In an interview shortly after publication of the National Journal article,
William B. Dockser, then Assistant Commissioner for Subsidized Housing, still
stunned by the article's publication before the mid-term elections, said the drafts
were not final.
purchased by whites while the rehabilitated houses in the city were sold to
Blacks.
Project Selection Criteria --
Secretary Romney said ". . . all other factors being equal, projects
outside areas of minority concentration will be given preference. "2 The new
project or site selection procedures rate applications "superior," "adequate,"
"poor" in eight categories. It is problematic that the criteria actually favor
suburban applications. One criteria
EFFECT OF PROPOSED HOUSING UPON NEIGHBORHOOD ENVIRONMENT
(a) Compatibility of the land use concept and Architectural design of
the proposed housing with existing Neighborhood
(b) Ability of Project to uphold or improve Existing Property Values
(c) Compatibility of Density Levels of the proposed housing with existing
and projected plans for the Neighborhood. 3
seems to limit the chances of multifamily projects in a single family neighborhood.
Although this is one of two criteria in which an "adequate" is not required, its
1. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Home Ownership for Lower Income
Families (Washington D.C.: G.P.O. June 1971).
2. Romney, "News Conference," op. cit.,p. 5.
3. HUD, FHA Form No. 3126a & 25 0 0 a Evaluation of Request for
Reservation of Contract Authority for Rent Supplement and Section 236 Projects.
presence is enough to make "everything being equal" somewhat disingeruous.
The great leverage Mr. Romney claimed for these new criteria is not at
all evident. It seems counterintuitive to assume a community not wanting LMIH
would want it because it might get a project if it applied. This procedure does
nothing to make land more available. The complete draft of the Summer 1.970 criteria
is not available, making it difficult to determine the difference between the
two. A portion quoted in the National Journal suggests slightly more activism:
[area offices are to] seek out and give priority to sponsors who will
build low and moderate income housing in areas other than those
of minority racial concentration so as to provide each user group
with options for residence throughout the locality.1
Water Sewer Project Selection Criteria --
The attempt to send subsidized housing to suburbia through the water-sewer
program is backing up. Unlike the subsidized housing, the water-sewer program
does give the HUD economic integration leverage with suburbia as discussed
earlier (see p. ). Furthermore, almost all of the suburbs serviced by the pro-
gram have had more whites, higher income, more rich and more sound housing than
2
the national average. Also unlike the previous policy implementation
1. Whitbeck, quoted in Lilly, op. cit., p. 2260.
2. Francine F. Rabinovitz, "The Role of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in Suburban and Metropolitan Development, " in U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, Papers Submitted to Subcommittee
on Housing Panels on Housing Production, Housing Demand, and Developing A
Suitable Living Environment (Washington, D.C.: G.P. O. , June, 1971), p. 762.
This is based on a sample of grants given from August, 1968 through 1970. "Rich"
is defined as those over $10,000 using 1960 Census data.
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pronouncements discussed, the new water-sewer program selection criteria
replaced an already operational criteria designed to implement the "Open
Communities" policy.
The "points system" instituted in October, 1970, required the applicant
to score a minimum of 25 points of which 9 were to be from the "Housing
Consideration" category. Furthermore, the applicant could score 9 points
1. HUD, "Project Evaluation System," Circular MPD 6220.2, pp. 3-4.
Ill. Housing Consideration
(The value of this category is the sum of the values earned under (a) through
(c))
(a) Assisted Housing Activities
(value is sum of items)
(1) During the past three years assisted housing has been provided
in the community through:
a. new construction ------------------------------- 2
b. rehabilitation ------------------------------- 1
(2) Applications have been filed for assisted housing under any of
the following programs
a. 235 --------------------------------------- 2
b. 236----------------------------------------- 1
c. Public and or other assisted housing --------------- 1
(b) Quality of Housing Stock
The project will in part provide services to areas in which there
is housing that is less than decent, safe and sanitary -------- 5
(c) Accessibility
Percent of housing in project area that will be accessible to
families and individuals with low and moderate incomes.
(1) 91 - 100 -------------- ----------------- 13
(2) 81 -90--------------------------- 12.
(3) 71 -80 ------------------------------------- 10
(4) 61 -70 ------------------------------------- 10
(5) 51 -60 -------------------------------------- 9
(6) 41 -50-------------------------------------- 8
(7) 31 - 40--------------------------------------- 6
(8) 21 -30 ------------------------------------- 4
(9) 11 -2---- --------------------------- 2
(10) 10% or less----------------------------------- 0
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of the 13 required in the "Growth and Development Concerns" by agreeing
to the "housing goals and objectives statement of the areawide planning
organization. "I Of the total points (100) in the evaluation system, 34%
concerned housing, predominantly LMIH.
The Housing Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Committee
found this system "not acceptable. "2rThe National Association of Counties
3
organized an effort to lessen the emphasis on subsidized housing. At NACO's
request, twelve of New Jersey's fourteen Congressmen -- including the
Ranking Minority Member of the Banking and Currency Committee -- urged
Secretary Romney to suspend the regulations and re-study the matter. The
National Service to Regional Councils also urged HUD to reconsider. 4
The original sponsor of the program and ranking minority member of the
Banking and Currency Committee put it succinctly:
There are a lot of places where the original point system would have
prevented the approval of a sane, sound, and worthwhile application. . .
The need for water and sewers should be primary.
1. Ibid., p. 2.
2. Rep. Stephens, Interview.
3. Interview with Margret Seeley, Lobbyist of the National Association
of Counties, Washington, D.C., June 23, 24, 1971. She emphasized that the
NACO was in favor of LMIH in the suburbs but that the points system overemphasized
the subject and that LM1H should not be defined as subsidized housing -- Levitt &
Sons, Inc., for example, was building LMIH but this private housing was not credited
to the applicant.
4. Interview with James Dowden, Assistant Director, National Service to
Regional Councils, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
5. Rep. Widnall, Interview.
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Indeed HUD found the points system did not "reflect the Intent of
Congress."
HUD's new points system is the result of this Congressional mothering.
Housing concerns are down to 17% (from 34%). A minimum number of housing
points is no longer required. Points are no longer given for recent activity in
state or federal housing programs. As Herbert Franklin, Executive Associate of
the National Urban Coalition remarked, "Black Jack could come in under the
new guidelines. "
The point system aside, Secretary Romney emphasized the President's
statement, "To qualify for Federal assistance the law requires . . . a community
development [water-sewer] project to be part of a plan that expands the supply
of low and moderate-income housing. . . ." Although this statement and
Secretary Romney's news conference answers (see p. ) sound emphatic, the
Administration's efforts toward decentralization and state-local control will
muffle it.
The "law" is the "housing element" of the 701 comprehensive planning
program added in 1968. This law is operative IF Congress does nct continue
.2
the suspension of the planning requirements for water-sewer grants and IF
1. Interview with Herbert Franklin, Executive Associate of the
National Urban Coalition, Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
2. HUD, "Notice CPM 71-1 To: All Areawide Planning Organizations
Subject: Extension of Statutory Planning Requirements Deadline," n.d.
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the locality uses 701 money to do the planning. Although HUD uses the
Dayton Plan as an example to emulate there is nothing in the legislation
or the current handbook (MD 6041.1)1 that requires distributing the metro-
politan need for subsidized housing among the suburbs. Only two or three
areas are approaching the Dayton concept. 2 The Boston area 701 adminis-
trator describes the housing element as "checklist" not a requirement for a
housing "plan. " 3
An internal HUD working paper evaluates a sample of the "housing
element" work completed thus far as only "fair. " As for the future?
There is a good possibility that unless counter measures are taken
the housing element of the future will get worse rather than better.
While HUD did not offer much guidance to planning agencies
beginning their housing work, we did make it clear that we expected
them to devote a substantial share of their effort to housing. In FY
1970 housing (including support for Operation Breakthrough) was one
of five program objectives and an attachment to the allocation memo-
randum listed several priority housing activities. The funding target
for the housing element in FY 1970 was 30 percent of the funds allo-
cated to the Regional Offices. The establishment of a funding target
had the unfortunate effect of encouraging too much rigidity in some
Regional Offices but it did have the positive effect of placing considerable
emphasis on a new element of the 701 Program. In contrast the funding
1. HUD, Comprehensive Planning Assistance Handbook I, Guidelines
Leading to a Grant, Washington, D.C.: G. P.O. , March, 1969.
2. Dowden, Interview.
3. Interview with Arthur Tonini, Urban Planner, Boston Area Office,
HUD, July 8, 1971.
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memorandum for FY 1971, while continuing housing support as one of
the objectives, does not earmark funds by types of work and does not
contain any information on priority housing work. In addition the new
draft Handbook for the Comprehensive Planning Assistance program
is even more general and offers less in the way of requirements or guide-
lines to assure quality housing element work. The amount of staff time
devoted to housing in the Central Office has declined.
Under these circumstances, it is very likely that many planning agencies
will stretch their work programs over longer periods of time and drop
entirely some of their work with the most potential for controversy. The
Columbia Region Association of Governments, one of the agencies reviewed
in depth , has the impression that HUD emphasis on the housing element
has been reduced and next year will spend only five percent of its budget
on housing.
One obvious answer to this situation would be to earmark substantial
money for housing and put some tough specific requirements in the new
Handbook, but this would be against the general direction of Adminis-
tration policy, which emphasizes flexibility and State and local control.
We should realize, however, that the absence of specific requirements
will make the task of assuring quality housing work much more difficult.
When faced with controversy, planning staffs would find Federal require-
ments a useful crutch. [Emphasis mine.]
If the proposed Nixon Special Urban Revenue Sharing is indicative,
"counter measures" will not be forthcoming. Indeed there is concern about the
future of metropolitan or areawide planning organizations themselves:
Policy enunciations by top Administration officials, including HUD
Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Management, Samuel
C. Jackson, before the 1971 National Service to Regional Councils
Conference, clearly indicate modification of a strong direct federal role.
He emphasized that areawide agencies were no longer to benefit from a
federal shield of protectivism and stimulation. Rather, they are being
dealt with as instruments of state and local government. They will
survive and expand solely because of their relevancy to state and local
constituency requirements. The Administration seems quite prepared to
let areawide agencies wither by the wayside if governors -and local elected
1. HUD, "701 Working Paper: Housing Element Evaluation," unpublished,
n.d.
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officials cannot somehow find the balance between areawide
perspective and narrow local pressure. It should be noted that even
with the federal shield of areawide planning requirements as a
requisite or prerequisite for certain categorical grant-in-aids
the areawide movement has been slow in developing real strength
to influence state and local government public investment decisions.
Areawides have also experienced difficulty in maintaining the integrity
of such recuirements to help guide federal grant-in-aids for public
facilities.
A caveat. The decentralization effort reduces the Washington
Federal Bully but it may send little bullies across the country in the
persons of HUD Area Directors. Although the requirements from Washington are
less stringent, they are also more vague and ambiguous. It is the area directors
who will "interpret" (or make up?) the rules in the process of distributing the
HUD largesse to competing applicants.2 The quintessence of regulation writing
is complete ambiguity in order to give the administration maximum discretion. 3
But questions remain: are the area directors, many FHA retreads, committed to
using water-sewer monies for economic integration leverage? If so, are they
bureaucratically and politically skillful enough? Is the area director a big
enough 'bully" to protect local politidans when their constituents perceive
the President in a benign role? Problematic.
1. Nicholas P. Thomas, "Revenue -Sharing: What Will Be Its Impact on
Planning?" AIP Newsletter, 6:6 (June, 1971): 9.
2. Interview with Daniel Richardson, Boston Area Director, HUD, Boston,
Mass., July 8, 1971.
3. Robert C. Wood, former Under Secretary of HUD, 1965-68, recurring
theme, 1968-71.
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TOO EXPENSIVE: The Costs of a Dispersal Policy
The demise of this or any overt Adrninistration dispersal policy is inevitable.
We can understand this by examining the relationship of the goal of dispersal
to the primary goals of the White House and HUD. Is dispersal a necessity, a
convenience ,.or a luxury? How much will dispersal cost in terms of other
goals? When is the payment due?
We have noted that the goal of dispersal was conceptually acceptable
in both the White House and HUD. But do they need to implement the concept?
Considering the nature of each institution's primary function or goal, the
dispersal objective was obviously a higher priority for HUD. Dispersal was
alleged to be necessary to reach HUD's primary goal. if production of six
million units is the primary goal and if one assumes that all six million cannot
physically be constructed in 233 central cities, then dispersal is a necessity.
However, the overriding goal, purpose, function of the White House -- the
non-attainment of which makes all other goals irrelevant -- is the perpetuation
of the party in power. Unless dispersal - economic and racial integration
can be sold to the United States electorate as THE domestic panacea -- or at
least the critical ingredient of the panacea -pursual of that policy will not
be an ingredient in the President's elixir of political life. If the policy could
be sold, it would be only a convenience but since -- as three cases seem to
indicate -- it cannot be sold, the policy of dispersal is a costly luxury.
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Suburban resistance distributes the costs most heavily on the White
House. The direct electoral political costs (at the polls every two years)
certainly outweigh the gains. If we can assume that The Emerging Republican
Ma jority is the manifesto of the Republican party, then irritation of suburbia,
especially new suburbia, is not advisable. Kevin Phillips writes:
A new suburbia is being built across America by many
millions of blue-collar and middle-level white-collar
families in their twenties and thirties. This is the new
young America on the move and from Southem Califomia
to Richmond, Virginia to Long Island's Suffolk County,
the movement is conservative....
Because the Republicans are little dependent on the liberal
Establishment or urban Negroes - the two groups most
intimately, though dissimilarly, concemed with present
urban and welfare policies - they have the political freedom
to disregard the multitude of vested interests which have
throttled national urban policy. 2
Now it is Richard Nixon's tum to build a new era on the
immense middle-class impetus of Sun Belt and suburbia.
Thus, it is appropriate that much of the emerging Republican
majority lies in the top growth states (Califomia, Arizona,
Texas and Florida) or new suburbia, while Democratic
trends correlate with stability and decay (New England, New
York City, Michigan, West Virginia and San Francisco-
Berkeley). 3
While irritation of the suburbs will do Nixon great harm on election
day, aiding the central city itself or dispersing the poor will do him no
electoral good.
1. Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle,
N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970), p. 184.
2. Ibid., pp. 472-3.
3. Ibid., p. 474.
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The tools available to the Administration increase the political
costs, so that even minimal effort has heavy political costs. To wit - if
the President could just order the suburbs economically and racially
integrated at his inaugural, have it completed by the spring, then four
years later the suburbs might see it was not the trauma anticipated and
other political issues would have intervened. But. the tools available to
the Federal government described earlier in the chapter make implementation
a long, long process -a chronic irritation. If there were a payoff --
domestic tranquility -it would be in the far future. Political costs and
benefits are calculated in the short run. The tools have a second problem
for the President. The levers have political spill-over costs but few spill-
1
over dispersal benefits. To wit -the Administration may have irritated
Stoughton voters with the water-sewer lever but HUD did get LMIH constructed.
That irritation with the Administration's use of POWER probably spilled over
into the surrounding communities (with the help of the press, the entire country)
which were not accessible to Federal leverage at the time. Therefore, the 104
units of LMIH in Stoughton had a very high per unit political cost.
Besides the biennial electoral political costs, the dispersal implementation
is likely to have immediate Congressional political costs. Congressmen and
1. Dayton is a possible example of positive dispersal spill-over.
A
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Senators not appreciating the policy -especially applied to suburbs
in their districts -- are capable and likely to express this sentiment by
sabotaging other Ad-inistration programs and policies. So, programs and
policies which might offset the dispersal costs at the polls (if any are even
imaginable) are endangered by immediate Congressional backlash to
dispersal. Congressmen are, after all, hired to protect their constituents
from unwanted, and therefore unwarranted, Federal interference, and to
procure Federal money.
Does this White House cost argument solely apply to Republicans?
Is the solution to lack of "political bullet biting" to return the Democrats
to the White House? One possible indication of their future performance
is the fact that the Democratic Administration did not pursue a dispersal
policy during the eight years they controlled both the White House and the
Congress. However, one could argue that: 1) the dispersal idea was not
in good currency -gilding the ghetto was; 2) they did not have the subsidized
volume to disperse - 116,000 units for all eight years while Romney had
2198,000 in 1969 alone; 3) a certified Workable Program was required,
1. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969 HUD
Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 30,
FHA Table 5 (The 221 (d)(3) program).
2. HUD Challenge (July/August, 1970):30 (The 235 & 236 programs).
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which towns used to avoid the question of subsidized housing altogether;
4) they did not have the lever of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Actually
HUD, under Robert C. Weaver, did try a novel proposal which indicated
to them how far a dispersal policy might progress. The 1966 proposed
model cities (Demonstration Cities Act) bill authorized funds to bus school
children out of the neighborhood - i.e., to the "good schools in the suburbs.
This became rather controversial and the Administration's version of the metro-
politan development section of the bill was a casualty. Nothing further along
1this line was attempted. Furthermore, the Democratic administration did
not recommend anything resembling a dispersal policy in a confidential task
force report submitted to the incoming Republican Administration.
Consider the electoral implications of a dispersal policy pursued by
Democrats. The Democrats do have a constituency of urban Blacks and liberal
intellectuals. There is no consensus in the Black community on this issue. The
NAACP and National Committee against Discrimination in Housing have been
active in the legal fight to end exclusionary zoning. On the other hand the
National Tenants Organization and the National Welfare Rights Organization,
predominantly Black and central city poor groups2 agree with the Black Mayor
1. Interview with Robert C. Wood, former Under Secretary of HUD,
1965-68, Boston, Mass., May 4, 1971.
2. Lilley, "Housing," op. cit., p. 2252.
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of Newark, Kenneth Gibson, that ".. . the problems should be solved
where the problems are. We don't want to live in the suburbs.
Liberal intellectuals likewise divide between those advocating dispersal or
integration and those considering integration passe and following sections
of the Black community toward community control. 2
But, Presidential politics is the battle for the center. If the
Democrats are to remain the majority party, they too must look to suburbia.
The Democrats appeared to be gaining in the atypical silk-stocking suburban
counties but this gain was dwarfed by the conservative gains in the middle
class suburbs in the 1968 election. 3 (As we have seen in the Boston suburbs,
the silk-stocking suburbs do not seem to like this dispersal policy any better
than the Warren, Michigans.) The New Deal Democrats' locational base
4is the old central city which is steadily casting fewer votes. The Democrats
must hold the blue-collar and working class types who are moving to the
suburbs to escape, for one thing, the blacks and ptoblems of the city. A
dispersal policy will not keep their hearts and votes.
1. Mayor Kenneth Gibson of Newark, New Jersey, response to
question posed by author, Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center for Urban Studies
lunch, April 27, 1971.
2. Bayard Rustin, "The Failure of Black Separation," Harpers
240:1436 (January 1970): 32.
3. Phillips, Emerging, o p. 467.
4. lbid., p. 466.
200.
HUD's attempted implementation of a dispersal policy would
conflict with the primary goal of either a Republican or Democratic
Administration. But the implementation raises goal conflicts within
HUD also. If HUD's only goal were LMIH housing production and, if
dispersal were absolutely necessary for the attainment of that goal, there
is no conflict. However, HUD does have other programs, therefore other
constituencies, besides the National Association of Home Builders, NCDH,
NAACP, and Suburban Action. The implementation of dispersal requires
risking the dis- or underuse or elimination of those programs. HUD's
constituencies - especially large cities -must be minimally satisfied.
We noted before how the scattered site housing requirement was becoming
a source difficulty between the two. Furthermore, dispersal impliedfrom
a 'epublican view, that funds would be diverted from the central cities to
the suburbs - Richard K. Cook, Chief White House liaison aide to the House
of Representatives, said:
many existing center-city programs are tantamount to
federal support for further impaction. If Romney can
just slow that down, then that's something in itself.
And if he can cut the federal dollars which further
impaction, then he will have achieved more than any other
HUD Secretary.I
Furthermore, left-over funds in a program are an embarrassment and liability
when going before the Appropriations Committees for more money. It is a
1. Lilley, "Housing," op. cit., p. 2263.
bureaucratic rule of thumb that you "put out" all your yearly appropriations
-- if you have to throw it away. If, on the other hand, dispersal is not
absolutely necessary to the production of the LMIH , there is a very serious
conflict between pursuit of integration or moving the poor near newer job
markets and the production of housing, sewers, parks, etc. Milton P.
Semer, a member of the Presidential Task Force on Low-income Housing and
legal counsel for National Homes Corporation, questioned the possibility
of having both dispersal and housing production.
"If places like Warren (Mich.) and Chicago (where
public housing construction has come to a halt because
the courts have ordered new public housing to be built
on scattered sites in white areas) are signs of the times,
then we are in a period of stalemate," said Semer.
"And no local developer is going to be able to bribe
his way past the specter of racial and economic integration.
Most bribes in the past have been to get planning regulations
knocked down; thus you can bribe a cbmmunity with single-
family, detached houses to accept a cluster housing project
by promising a new park for the Little League, i.e., more
community amenities, or by promising savings on utilities and
services, i.e., lower taxes. But the building industry doesn't
have the money to bribe community sentiment on any change
in the community's social compositions. "2
It is not clear to the author that the central cities and some receptive suburbs
could not physically accept the production of LMIH for several years to come.
1. Wood, interview,
2. Lilley, "Housing," op. cit., p. 2255.
The Congress has four perfectly legitimate means to chastise the Depart-
ment per se. They can revoke the authority of administrators and circumscribe
their future actions. We noted the House action in the water sewer grants.
The Congress can regulate the appropriations. For example, most of the
leverage from the water sewer program (especially with the new points system)
is a result of the high supply-demand imbalance. The Congress appropriated
much more than the Administration requested for FY71. The Administration
budget request: $150 million; appropriated: .$350 million (a cut of $150 million
from bilI vetoed August 11, 1970). At the same time the Administration requested
$11.3 million for the Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity Section -- the Congress
appropriated $8 million.I Third, the Congress may not approve a nomination and
fourth, they may launch investigations. 2
DISPERSING THE COST: To the Congress????
Given the inadequate implementation vehicle and the Congressional and
electoral political potholes, how might the policy of dispersal move beyond the "all
money is green" proposition without killing the driver? The President could go very
light on the pedal. Implement the policy in New Communities --
'The Rouse people [developer James W. Rouse of the new town
of Columbia, Maryland] have been very persuasive
1. "Fiscal 1971 HUD Appropriations, " Congressional Quarterly 28:52
(December 18, 1970): 3000.
2. Newman and Keaton, "Congress and the Faithful Execution of the
Laws -- Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?" 41 California Law Review
(1953) cited in Frank 1. Michelman and Terrance Sandalow, Government in Urban
Areas (St. Paul: West Publishing Co. , 1970), pp. 1128-91
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with the White House about their success, in a newly
emerging community, at integrating it, both racially
and economically,' said one [White House] official. 1
But if the speed is to be increased the costs must be moved either to the Congress
or the courts.
The Congress seems to be an unlikely recipient considering the behavior
described in the chapter thus far. One fact to remember -- only one-fourth of
the Congressmen are from central city districts and a very small fraction are in
positions of influence on the key committees. The Congressional leadership in
this field can be measured to some degree later this year when the Congress is
confronted by the Housing Subcommittee's (of House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee) "Housing Block Grants to State and Metropolitan Housing Agencies" and
Senator Abraham Ribicoff's (D-Conn.) "Government Facilities Location Act of
1971" (S.1283).
The Housing Subcommittee is drafting legislation which will encourage the
creation of metropolitan and state housing agencies to essentially re-create
"Dayton-type" plans across the country. 2 If a community does not participate3
it will not be eligible for any HUD funds. Although this just makes explicit what
it appeared HUD wanted to do, the Subcommittee adds a monetary incentive: up
to $3,000 per unit paid over a ten-year period to partially defray public service costs.
1. Lilley, "Housing," op. cit., p. 2262.
2. Interview with George Gross, Counsel, Subcommittee on Housing, House
Committee on Banking and Currency, Washington, D.C. , June 30, 1971.
3. "Participate" does not necessarily mean that a suburb will have to take
subsidized housing. Indeed the report lists several reasons why a community might
not be assigned housing: "many communities simply do not need the housing, do
not employ persons who would be eligible for housing subsidies or do not have land
f04.
Senator Ribicoff's measure is similar to the. Commission on Civil Rights
recommendation (described earlier in the chapter) but also includes Federal
government contractors --
SEC. 501. The plan shall: . . . b)Provide that at-
least one unit of middle and lower income housing is
available in the community for every prospective middle
and lower income employee of the local government
agency or Federal contractor; . . . (c) Provide assurances
that the community has taken the necessary steps to permit
operation of all housing 7rograms authorized under Federal
housing legislation. . .
Why might the Congress move when the Administration finds it too costly?
Because some Congressmen are dispersalist in more ways than one. As Representa-
tive Hanna (D-Cal.) explained:
The politics suggests that the House, even more so than the
Senate -- they'seem to be less inclined to get involved with
mundane aspects of problems -- could initiate when the Presi-
dent cannot just from the fact it isn't going to be too popular
and going to take an awful lot of heat to be able to move
these things in a way to be effective. When you've got heat
any engineer will tell you to disperse it. If one man had to
take all the heat then it's concentrated and would probably
bum him. But we can take it and spread it out and disperse
it to the point that you just can't bring that much heat in bll
those sections of the country that we represent. So we can
handle it. The truth of it is that this is the only way you are
Footnote from preceding page (continued): available for housing. And . . . the
location of low- and moderate-income housing in certain areas would simply
represent an unsound and improper application of land use and development
planning principles. " U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Housing and the Urban Environment, Report and Recommendations of Three Study Panels,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., June, 1971, p. 30.
1. U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 117:36
(March 16, 1971): S.3254-5.
205.
going to solve some of these tough problems particularly
with the metropolitan cities. Because the decisions are
too hot to handle for the mayor and as you can see in New
York they are even too hot to handle for the state legis-
lature. But disperse that around the country so that the guy
down in Alabama, and Arkansas, and New Mexico can
blame it on someone else. You can disperse that heat and
still get something that would not be done or politically
acceptable. 1
It is well to note that hese proposals have been suggested by Democrats and
if passed would be passed by Democratic Congresses. However, the laws would
be administered by a Republican President. The President is going to absorb
some heat from just administering the laws. But a Republican President could
transfer much heat back to the Democratic Congress. Should a Democrat be
elected in 1972, he would be less able to transfer the heat and could be
scorched, if not burned.
Will Congress buy these dispersal theories? If reaction to Ribicoff's
proposal is indicative, probably not. They prefer to. disperse the problem to
another branch - "Let the-Courts take care of it. "2
1. Rep. Hanna, Interview.
2. Interview with Theodore M. Leary, Jr., Special Assistant to Senator
Abraham Ribicoff, Washington, D.C. , April 9, 1971.
CONCLUSION
The two points are completely garbled. The questions should
be these: Is any man 's dollar as good as any other man's
and should there be economic integration? Should the poor
be permitted and invited and subsidized to live where the
rich live? Now the bulk of the blacks are poor but not all
the black are poor. If we at the moment concentrate on
racial integration-on making one man's dollar as good as
any other man's-then we have a case. But economic
integration, cheek and jowl the rich and the poor- that's
tougher than race and it's hardening the lines against
middle-class blacks who have made it. Now these are two
substantially different struggles. I think we can win on one.
I don't think we can win the second one.
-- George Sternlieb
The prospects for political action to hasten the dispersal of subsidized
housing in the suburbs and economic integration appear bleak. The structure of
local politics-scarcity of issues, intensity of feeling, immediacy of effect, etc.-
leaves the politico much too vulnerable to expect legislative action on this level.
The state politico suffers less from the structural afflictions of the local but there
are few signs of the acceptance of the concept. In a recent conversation with
Representative Martin Linsky, original sponsor of the Massachusetts anti-snob
zoning legislation, he noted that the "anti-774 " members still expect to win
this one. Suburban pressure on the Massachusetts legislature should be stronger
now that one case has been decided against a suburb by the state board.
1.. Ken Hamett, "Suburbs fight HUD invasion," The Kansas City Star ,
November 7, 1970, p. 14c.
r
One of the members of the planning board of the overruled suburb has forme? 0 7.
a state-wide organization which included the Newton Land and Civic
Association to work for repeal of Chapter 774 as well as fight the Governor's
urban development corporation proposal. The organization is called ZIP,
Zoning in Peril. The federal level case indicated that even if there is
the will there are not too many administrative or political ways to
implement the concept. The President is too vulnerable.
What does this leave? The courts. Eventually Supreme Court decisions
may give the politicians the protection they need to act. Meanwhile there
may be other paths through the political process. Subsidized housing might
be made available by a strategy recently used in Fairfax County, Virginia.
Builders are required to provide fifteen percent of their units for low and
moderate income families. Opposition to the proposal came from builders
but as the proposal applied to undeveloped land and no specific sites were
in question forceful resident opposition did not materialize. This will be an
interesting trend to watch. On the state level the progress of the New
York Urban Development Corporation should be monitored. Will it really
use its zoning override, if so, will the state legislature repeal the power?
But the most important development to evaluate will be the Congressional
reaction to its own Housing Subcommittee's metropolitan housing plan
proposal.
Whether or not poor people should or should not live in the suburbs for
social or economic reasons, they should not have their freedom of
movement circumscribed by government. If the political system cannot




APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL SUBURBS
THE UNIVERSAL SUBURB
Little Boxes on the hillside,
Little Boxes made of ticky tacky,
Little Boxes on the hillside,
Little Boxes all the same.
There's a green one and a pink one
And a blue one and a yellow one
And they're all made out of ticky tacky
And they all look just the same.
And the people in the boxes
All went to the university
Where they were put in boxes
And they came out all ihe same,
And there's doctors and there's lawyers
And there's business executives,
And they're all made out of ticky tacky
And they all look just the same.
And they all play on the golf course
And drink their martinis dry,
And they all have pretty children,
And the children go to school,"
And the children go to summer camp
And then to the university,
Where they are put in boxes
And they come out just the same.
-- Malvina Reynolds, 1963
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INCOME: A Sea of Affluence
While the difference is not striking, the median family income in the
suburbs was $7,772 in 1964 -- 16% higher than that of the central cities. The gap
appears to be widening.1 Poor families, those with incomes of $3,000 or less in 1959,
constitute a higher proportion of the central city population than the suburban popu-
lation - 15% to 10%. However, the proportion of the suburban population who are
2poor decreases as the size of the SMSA increases. Looking at the scene from
another angle, we see that in 1959 the suburbs housed 40% of the metropolitan popu-
3lation of poor families. Not all SMSAs follow this pattern. The suburbs of 64
SMSAs, Boston included (as well as 16 other large (500,000] areas) house more of the
metropolitan poor families than do their central cities. Finally the suburban poor
families are less visible by being more scattered than their central city counterparts.
About 25% of the suburban poor live in "poverty areas" compared with 58% of the
central city poor.
1. Central city median family income was 89% in 1959 but in 1964, it
was 86% of suburban median family income.
2. Poor in suburbs are 9% of the suburban population in SMSAs over three
million but 20% in SMSAs under 250,000.
3. The Task Force notes that "If suburbs are defined in terms of "urban
fringe' rather than by 'outside central city,' then the suburbs contained 27% of the
urban poor in 1959, since the rural areas within the metropolitan areas contained a
high proportion of poor." The President's Task Force on Suburban Problems, Final
Report, Statistical Papers: Profile of the Suburbs, Dec. 2, 1968, p. 53.
4. Ibid., p. 55. 'The slefinition of poor families in this paragraph
(sentence) differs1rom that in the rest of this section by relating income to size of
family; a non-farm family with 15 members is defined as poor if its income is under
(continued)
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The central city populations of Massachusetts also have proportionally
more poor families (13.4%) than those of the suburbs (8%) but numerically less.
But over half (53.5%) of the metropolitan poor families lived in the suburbs in
1967 as compared to just a third in 1950. Even in 1960, the suburbanization of the
Boston SMSA poor was more pronounced than the last state figure: 36.8% Boston
-- 63.2% suburbs. To be realistic it must be noted that 90% of the Boston SMSA
suburban poor are concentrated in slightly less than half the suburban communities.2
Finally, the Massachusetts poor are 95% white and 40% elderly (65 and over). 3
RACE: White Suburban Noose
Although there are "lily white suburbs," suburbia is not lily white. In
1968 the U.S. Census estimated that 3.3.million blacks lived in suburbia -- 5% of
the suburban population. At the same point, the black proportion of the central
(Footnote 4 continued) $7,850. A poverty area is defined in terms of the percentage
of families with a 1959 income below $3,000, the percentage of children under 18
years old not living with both parents, the percentage of persons at least 25 years
old with less than eight years of school completed, the percentage of unskilled males
in the employed civilian labor force, and the percentage of housing units dilapidated
or lacking some or all plumbing facilities."
1. David L. Birch and Eugene L. Saenger, Jr., 'The Poor in Massachusetts,"
in Samuel Beer and Richard Barringer, eds. , The State and the Poor (Cambridge, Mass.:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc. , 1970), p. 41. These are estimates for 1967, adjusting the
1960 $3,000 cut off for inflation.
2. Ibid., p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 34.
4. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Reports, Trends in Social and Economic Conditions in Metropolitan Areas, Series P-23,
No. 27, February, 1969.
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cities reached 20%. The black suburban population proportion has remained constant
since 1960 while the central cities' rose from 16% to 20%. The constant 5% can be
translated into an increase of 900,000 blacks in subur'a in eight years. The 4%
increase in the central cities may be attributable to white out-migration and an
absolute decline in central city population as well as to black in-migration and
natural increase. An examination of the 1970 census must be made to determine the
relative significance of the various possibilities. A closer examination of the 1960-68
data indicates a considerable increase in the black suburban growth rate and a decrease
in the black central city growth rate in the 1966-68 period.
CHANGE IN WHITE AND BLACK POPULATIONS OF URBAN AREAS:
1960-1966 AND 1966-1968
Mean Annual Percentage Change






There is no random distribution of blacks among the suburbs. A recent
national survey and a 1967 U.S. Census trial run in New Haven, Conn., show a
definite tendency for blacks to move to pre-existing black neighborhoods -- similar
to previous ethnic migration patterns. Blacks have moved into three main types of
1. David L. Birch, The Economic Future of City and Suburb (New York:
Committee for Economic Development, 1970), p. 31.
2. The survey was done by the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan and cited with the census dated in Birch, p. 34.
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suburbs: old and densely settled suburbs near employment centers; poor enclaves in
the suburban fringe areas; new developments -some of which are expressly built
1for blacks. Changing the pespective from suburbs to neighborhoods in suburbia,
a study in the Joumal of Business estimates that 83.6% of all suburban families live
2in segregated neighborhoods compared with 71.8% in the central cities. The study
also confirms the clumping tendency of black households in suburbia - more blacks
(87.3%) live in segregated areas than whites (83.4%).
In 1960, blacks constituted 11% of the U.S. population but only 2.4%
of the Massachusetts population. Blacks were even more concentrated in the central
city population relative to the suburban population (5.2% of central city population
to .9% of suburban population) than the national average (noted above - 16% to
5%/). The black proportion of the Boston population increased from 9% to 15% in
1. Reynolds Farley, "The Emergence of Black Suburbs," American Journal
of Sociology, 75:4 (January, 1970): p. 525.
2. Seymour Sudman, Norman M. Bradbum, and Galen Gockel, "The
Extent and Character of Racially Integrated Housing in the United States," The
Journal of Business of the University of Chicago (January, 1969): pp. 50-92. A
"neighborhood" in their study "may be considered more of a housing market concept
than a sociological one" (p. 51). An "integrated neighborhood" is defined as an area
in which both blacks and whites can and are moving in (p. 52).
3. Ibid. , p. 62. Note: 89. 1/o of black households in central cities are in
segregated areas.
4. Birch and Saenger, op. cit., p. 46.
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in the period from 1960 to 1967. While there is no recent census data, the black
suburban growth can be inferred from school enrollment statistics. From 1965 to
1968 the black pupils in the Boston suburban systems rose from 1.4% to 1.9%.
They seem to concentrate in just a few suburbs. 2
EDUCATION: All Went to the University
The distribution of college graduates in all SMSAs in 1960 was fairly
evenly divided between the central cities (2.7 million) and the suburbs (2.9
million).3 However, the central cities in SMSAs under 500,000 had more college
graduates than their suburbs, while suburbs in SMSAs of 1-3 million had twice the
number of college graduates as their central cities. A 1967 educational census
indicates the city-suburban gap had increased. The suburbs had 4.6 million and the
central cities, 3.2 million.
The figures for median school years completed (1960) show the central
cities with 9.7 and the suburbs 11. Massachusetts residents were better educated
and the state had a larger gap between city and suburb - 10.1 to 11 .9. The city of
Boston had yet a higher level, 11.2, and was closer to its suburbs (12.0 high density,
1.U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "The Social and Economic Status of
Negroes in the United States in 1969," BLS Report #375 and Current Population
Report, Series P-23, No. 29, p. 9.
2. Birch and Saenger, op. cit., pp. 48-50.
3. Task Force, Profiles of Suburbs, pp. 93-95.
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1 212.5 low density) than the rest of the state's central cities.
TYPE: Communities of Bedrooms
It is alleged that a suburb seeks companies that employ only Ph.D.s and
produce a widget that is hauled away once a year in a station wagon. However, a
3
study of the 900 major suburbs indicates this has not worked out.
Indeed, 34% are manufacturing centers; 24% are retailing centers;
28% are diversified industrial and retailing centers; 14% are specialized and "indus-
trial." There is a strong variation by region. The Northeast and North Central tend
to be manufacturing centers and the West and South, retailing centers.
The suburbs can be sorted by function-- in which there is significant em-
pbyment -- and dormitory. Of the 900 suburbs, only 42% can be classified as dormitory
1. To analyze the Boston SMSA more closely, David Birch divided the sub-
urban towns by their median density (1875) and grouped them as follows: High Density
-- Arlington, Belmont, Beverly, Braintree, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Dedham,
Everett, Hull, Lynn, Maiden, Marblehead, Medford, Melrose, Milton, Nahant,
Natick, Needham, Newton, Norwood, Peabody, Quincy, Reading, Revere, Salem,
Saugus, Somerville, Swampscott, Wakefield, Waltham, Watertown, Wellesley, Wey-
mouth, Winchester, Winthrop, Woburn; Low Density - Ashland, Bedford, Burlington,
Canton, Cohasset, Concord, Danvers, Dover, Dusbury, Framingham, Hamilton,
Hanover, Hingham, Holbrook, Lexington, Lincoln, Lynnfield, Manchester, Marsh-
field, Medfield, Middleton, Millis, Norfolk, North Reading, Norwell, Pembroke,
Randolph, Rockland, Scituate, Sharon, Sherborn, Sudbury, Topsfield, Walpole, Way-
land, Waltham, Weston, Westwood, Wilmington. Birch and Saenger, op. cit., p. 32.
2. lbid. , p. 46.
3. Richard L. Forstall, "Economic Classification of Places Over 10,000,
1960-1963," The Municipal Year Book 1967 (Chicago: The International City
Managers' Association, 1967), pp. 30-65, cited in Task Force, Statistical Papers, pp.
43-66. Alleged by Robert C. Wood, a noted suburbanite.
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suburbs - a suburb that "has at least 50% more employed persons living in the
community than there are people employed within the community. Within the
"dormitory" classification suburbs tend to specialize more in retailing (42%) than
non-dormitory suburbs (11%) and less in manufacturing (14% cf. 48%).








The detached single family house with lawn mower is a predominantly
suburban phenomenon (78% of the suburban housing units). But central cities have
a significant percentage (43%) of the housing stock in "little boxes. " Massachusetts
and the Boston SMSA are better examples of the stereotype than the national picture.
Massachusetts central cities have only 28.4% of their stock in one-housing unit
stnuctures compared with 65.4% in the suburbs. The city of Boston is very low with
only 16.4%.4 Its high density suburbs have approximately 63% single family units
1. Task Force, Profile of the Suburbs, o p. 39.
2. Task Force, Statistical Papers, op. cit., p. 53.
3. Task Force, Profile of the Suburbs, op.jc., P. 68.
4. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census 1960,
State and Small Areas, 23-4, Fable 1.
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and low density suburbs, 91%.
Along with homemade apple pie, this single family house may become a
thing of the past. 81% of the privately-owned non-farm housing units started in
1959 were single family units. By 1969, the proportion was down to 53%2
A sample of seven SMSAs (Chicago, Illinois; San Bernardino, California;
Newark, New Jersey; Birmingham, Alabama; Kansas City, Missouri; South Bend,
Indiana; Johnstown, Pennsylvania) during the period 1960-1966 seems to indicate
that an increasing proportion of multi4amily units are being built in the suburbs.
Chicago, San Bernardino, Newark and Kansas City suburbs contain over half the
multi4amily (usually garden type apartments) starts in their SMSAs. 3 Massachusetts
is ahead of the national trend toward multi-family units. In 1968, only 43.4% of
the building permits issued were for single family units. Of the multi-family units
being constructed in the state, only 36% were to be in the central cities. Boston
had 39% of the SMSA multi-family units while 51% were in high density suburbs
and 10% in low density suburbs. 4
1.Birch and Saenger, op. cit., p. 45.
2. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1969 HUD
Statistical Yearbook (Washington: Government Printing Office), GS Table 81,
p. 365.
3. Task Force, Statistical Papers, op. cit., pp. 142-149.
4. Derived from Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor
and Industries, Division of Statistics, "Summary of Building Permit Activity for the
Year 1968.
~1.
While homeownership, the panacea for the poor and alienated, was
more prevalent in suburban families (72.7%), the majority of central city families
in every section except the Northeast were homeowners in 1960. In the Northeast,
homeownership is twice as prevalent in the suburbs as in the cities (72%:35%).1
Massachusetts suburbs were somewhat lower (66%) and the central cities slightly
higher (37.8%) than the surrounding states. Homeownership in the Boston SMSA
trails the average for the state -- 27.3% in Boston and 57% in the suburbs. 2
While homeownership has been increasing among the general population, it is
decreasing among the low income and elderly in the SMSA. 3
Central city housing often brings forth the image of acres of slums.
However, using the U.S. Census measurement (standard =sound and all plumbing),
the housing in the suburbs is not significantly much better -- 84.4% standard to
79.6% in central cities for 1960. (The estimate for 1968 is even closer; 96.5% to
95.4%.J The general statement follows for Massachusetts - 89.9% suburbs cf. 84.2%
central cities - and the Boston SMSA -91.2% suburbs cf. 87.7% Boston. 5 The
central cities' substandard housing is much more visible because of the greater density
and concentration in certain areas.
1. Task Force, Statistical Papers, op. cit., p. 128.
2. U.S. Census, 1960, State and Small Areas, 23-4 and 23-16.
3. Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Housing Metropolitan Boston,
Volume 1, Housing Demand and the Housing Supply 1950to 1980 (Boston: MAPC,
1969), p. 40.
4. HUD, op. cit., p. 47, Table 67.
5. Birch and Saenger, op. cit., p. 45.
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LMIH: Pruitt Igoe in Black Jack
Since the central issue concerning this thesis is the provision of LMIH
in the suburbs, an accurate picture of the present location of these units would be
valuable in determining the dimensions of the problem - what types of suburbs do
and do not accept LMIH. Unfortunately, information is sketchy on public housing
and unavailable for Section 236 -even HUD does not know.
On a national basis the popularity of federal low rent public housing
wanes as the size of the locality decreases. All of the cities over 250,000 in
population, three-quarters of the cities between 50,000 and 250,000, and about
half of the places under 50,000 have some public housing. The large and medium-
size areas have a greater concentration of public housing units relative to their
populations than the small areas: large areas -44% of public housing (1968) and
22% of population (1960); medium areas - 23%/14.2%; small areas - 33%/63.8%
(or 33.7% of urban population). The public housing has been concentrated in the
areas that the majority of the poor are found - 60% (poor families) in the 289 central
cities. These figures can only give.an impressionistic picture. A close-up of
Massachusetts which has both federal and state public housing programs gives a graphic
view of the central city-suburban split. 2
1. U.S., Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity,
Equal Educational Opportunity, Part 5 De Facto Segregation and Housing Discrimination
91st Cong., 2d. sess., August 25, 26, 27, and September 1, 1970p.27 8 95. 27% or
153 of 563 221 (d)(3) projects (not units) were located in "suburban areas "' on Nov.1 ,1968.
2. Statistics derived from U.S. Dept. Housing and Urban Development,
1968 Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office), p. 11,
Table 2 and p. 247, Table 2.
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Suburban acceptance of public housing across the metropolitan areas of
Massachusetts is uneven. The city of Boston and its suburbs have about an equal
number of units. Approximately two-hirds of the Boston suburbs have some units.
The remaining onedhird are virtually all low-density suburbs. By contrast, the
suburbs in the remaining nine SMSAs have only 17% of their metropolitan area's public
housing units. Across the state, central cities have responded better in terms of
need, also. Using $4,000 (1959) as a cut-off point for "housing poor, " the central
cities had built roughly one unit for every four poor families in their jurisdiction
by 1968, while the suburbs had constructed one for every six.
Public housing has been on the scene for thirty-three years. Suburban
acceptance of some of the federal housing programs offered in the 1960's -- rent
supplements, 221(d)(3), and 221 (h) -has been less than overwhelming. An
internal HUD study last summer estimated that only 10% of the un its under these
programs are located in the suburbs. 2
1. These figures were tabulated by the author in 1969 from a survey
conducted by the Department of Communify Affairs, The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
2. HUD study cited in Debbie Fiedler, "'Open Communities' and
NCDF: Search for a Suburban Solution for Low Income Housing Needs,"
September, 1970, Harvard Law School, unpublished.
APPENDIX B: PILLARS OF POLICY
DISPERSAL RATIONALE:
THE SUBURBANIZATION OF EMPLOYMENT
"The jobs are in the suburbs." This statement, now conventional wisdom,
is almost always used to support a suburban low-moderate income housing strate-
gy. The statement often implies that not only are the jobs in the suburs but
also the workers to fill those jobs are trapped in the central cities. If it is a
fact that jobs are in the suburbs - the situation can be viewed from two per-
spectives: the employer and the employee/potential employee.
Logically, the employer should favor a suburban housing strategy. Be-
cause there is a lack of low and moderate income housing near his plant as
well as non-existent or inadequate public transportation from the central city, he
is plagued with vacancies, absenteeism and tardiness.~ All causing economic
inefficiencies -costing money. The employee also has an economic stake in a
housing strategy. By not living as close to the job as other workers, he cuts his
pay per hour relative to theirs by the extra time, energy and monetary costs of
commuting. More income is lost by the unreliability of the transportation system
he must use. The potential employee in the central city would, of course, have
1. The chief popularizers of this argument are John F. Kain in
"Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 82:1 (February 1968) and "Alternatives for the
Gilded Ghetto," Public Interest 14 (Winter, 1969) and Paul Davidoff and Neil
Gold, Suburban Action, Inc. in "Suburban Action: Advocate Planning for an
Open Society," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 36:1 (January, 1970):
12-21 and "Exclusionary Zoning," Yale Review of Law and Social Action 1:2 (Spring,
1971): 57-63.
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the same problem but he rarely hears about the job vacancies in the suburbs.
Thus an artificial barrier - the lack of LMIH in the suburbs -- keeps supply
from reaching demand in this capitalistic economy. What is good for General
Motors may in this instance really be good for the country. So goes the job
argument.
JOBS IN THE SUBURBS: Clearly Growing
Jobs are growing in the suburbs. This much seems to be generally true.
An elaboration is necessary before regarding it as a pillar of policy. The plight
of New York City is most often cited. Of the million new jobs created in the
region between 1959 and 1967 only 25% were in the central city. New York
City lost 50,000 manufacturing jobs while the suburbs gained 140,000. By
1985, the suburbs are expected to gain 122,700 new factory jobs.
The "fact" is true of New York, but with statistics of New York City
one can prove almost any (bad) thing. A broad study of the conventional
wisdom by David Birch -The Economic Future of City and Suburb2-- covers 73
SMSAs3 and four job categories -manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade,
1. National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Jobs and
Housing Interim Report (New York: NCDH, March 1970), pp. 3-4.
2. David Birch, The Economic Future of City and Suburb (New York:
C. E.D., 1970).
3. The sample includes the fifty largest SMS&.s as of 1960 and the twenty
largest SMSAs in each of three age categories: those that were SMSA before 1900,
between 1900 and 1930 and those that have become SMS4s since 1930, p. 40.
,-~b'A
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and selected services. The sample includes 75% of the U. S. metropolitan
population and 55% of the metropolitan employment in the 1958-1963
period. Based on this examination and augmented by other studies and
miscellaneous statistics we will try to determine if a nationwide thrust
for suburban low-moderate income housing could be supported on this premise.
The suburban growth rates are consistently higher in every job category
























Using a smaller sample of SMSAs, twelve3
-- all payroll employment (except governmentand
but a wider job classification
self-employed) -- and a later
1. These categories do not include resource-based industries such as
mining, forestry and agriculture; construction, transportation, public utilities;
services such as financial, legal, medical, educational, plus insurance and
real estate; government.
2. Birch, op. cit. , p. 7, figure I and page 10, figure 4. Boston
figures from Roger Noll, "Central City -Suburban Employment Distribution,"
The President's Task Force on Suburban Problems, Final Report: Statistical
Papers, Charles Haar, Chairman, December 2, 1968.
3. Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dayton, Detroit, Indianapolis,
New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington.
...................... 
-
period, 1959 to 1965, the percentage change in the SMSAs was +12%.
The percentage change in the suburbs was +30%. The total Boston SMSA
grew 9% and the suburbs, 14%.
Another indication of the continuing trend is noticeable in the central
city-suburban distribution of the value of building permits from 1960-1965(7?).
2A sample of 14 SMSAs found 62% of the total value of industrial buildings
and 52% of commercial buildings were constructed outside the central cities.
The actual proportion of jobs the figures indicate is underestimated because
the construction costs are typically lower in the suburbs. The Boston suburbs
had a substantially larger proportion than the group average - 81% of
industrial, 74% of commercial as well as 52% of the office compared with 25%
for the total sample. 3
Besides losing growth rate competition, some central cities are
experiencing an absolute decline in the number of jobs. Using the four job
categories over the 1954-1963 period, Chicago lost 150,000 jobs and the
suburbs gained 200,000. Detroit lost 140,000 while the suburbs gained 50,000.
4Boston (1958-1963) lost 11 ,000 and the suburbs gained 40,000.-. A survey of 24
1. Dorothy K. Newman, "The Decentralization of Jobs," Monthly
Labor Review 90:5 (May, 1967): 11. The Boston breakdown in all categories is:
Manufacturing, city -24%/suburbs -2%; Retail Trade, 14/24; Wholesale Trade,
7/37; Construction, 27/31; Transportation and public utilities, -1/18; Finance,
insurance, and real estate, 12/3; Services, 32/42.
2. The twelve cited above plus Indianapolis and Los Angeles.
3. Newman, op. cit., p. 10 table 2.
4. Noll, op cit.,p. 180.
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of the largest metropolitan areas -all with populations over one million -
showed a loss of 500,000 jobs in the central cities and a gain of 1,500,000
1
in the suburbs. Manufacturing jobs led the. parade out of the central
cities with 605,000 and into the suburbs with 442,000.2
SKILL LEVEL OF GROWTH JOBS: Uncertain
The suburban growth of jobs per se does not argue persuasively for
the proposed policy. The growing job opportunities need to be ones that
the present generation of lower skilled and disadvantaged workers can
handle. Two facts indicate that this is possible. More than 60% of all
central city heads of household were employed in the four job categories
3
in 1964. Also, 60% of those unemployed for fifteen we.ek$ or more in
early 1967 listed previou's employment in one of the four categories. The
1960 job breakdown of Massachusetts poor families is illustrative: 27.9/o
manufacturing; 18.6% retail trade; 14.7% services; 8.8% construction; 2.3%
1. Kanwit and Eckartt, "Supplement to Paper on Transportation
Implications of Employment Trends in Central Cities and Suburbs," Highway
Research Record 187, Appendix Table 2, cited in U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Federal Installations and Equal Housing Opportunity (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1970), p. 3.
2. Ibid., table 6.
3. Mollie Orshansky, "The Poor in City and Suburb, 1964," Social
Security Bulletin 29:12 (December, 1966): 31.
4. Newman, op. cit., p. 9.
public administration; 34.7% other. Davidoff & Gold make the general
statement "nearly 100 percent of the new production worker jobs, created
in the nation's large metropolitan areas have been located in their suburban
2
ring. " However, the picture is not clear. Roger G. Noll, in a study of
30. of the 35 largest SMSAs from 1958-1963, notes that the lure of the suburbs
has not been as strong in the services category as the other three -- close to
an equal number of new jobs were created in the central cities as in the suburbs.
He states that "This is a particularly important fact, for service occupations are
prime candidates for immediate entrance by disadvantaged workers."3
SUBURBAN SUPPLY-DEMAND IMBALANCE: Indeterminable
So, some undetermined number of the jobs which are growing in the suburbs
could be performed by wor<ers now living in the central city. Still, to support a
job linkage strategy, let alone a tactic of moving workers' residences to the
suburban jobs, a present or future supply-demand imbalance must be demonstrated.
The city-suburban growth figures and rhetoric gives the impression that most if not
all low skill jobs are in suburbia. We do not'know how the low and unskilled
jobs divide between city and suburb, but the mcjrity of all jobs in the Boston
SMSA are indeed in the suburbs. In 1965, the suburbs had 61% of the payroll
1. Beer, op..cit., p. 34.
2. Davidoff & Gold, "Exclusionary Zoning," op. it. p. 57.
3. Noll, . cit.,p. 188.
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employment in the Boston SMSA. Birch shows the breakdown in 1963 as
follows: Retail trade, 63.68%; Wholesale trade, 48.78%; Manufacturing,
71.86%; Selected services, 47.86%.2 But the central cities in the rest of
Massachusetts hold the majority of jobs in all four categories -- Retail trade,
67.68%; Wholesale trade, 79.99%; Manufacturing, 68.27%; Selected Services,
72.06%.3 This latter fact is more characteristic of the SMS4s across the
country, at the moment.
The Central City's Cha ging Share of Urban Employment: 1948-19634
73 SMSAs
1948 1954 1958 1963
Retail Trade 78.9% 77.6% 72.4% 64.0%
Wholesale Trade 87.3 86.4 82.4 78.5
Manufacturing 65.9 64.4 60.8 57.6
Selected Services 88.6 83.1 79.5 75.0
Government employment, not included in either the four categories or the payroll
employment figure, is a sector which can accept some lower skilled workers. A
study of the eight largest cities for which govemment employment data are available
1. Newman, op. cit., p. 9, payroll employment excludes government
workers and self-employed.
2. David L. Birch & Eugene Saenger, Jr., "The Poor in Massachusetts,"
in Samuel Beer & Richard Barringer, The State and the Poor (Cambridge, Mass.:
Winthrop Publishers, 1970), p. 43.
3. Ibid.
4. bid , p. -11,'figure 5
shows that the increase in that sector offset the loss in the other sectors
during the 1957-1962 period.
Birch projects average annual growth rates of 4.2% for state and local
government employment in the centharI city for the 1962 to 1975 period. While
these figures do not give a satisfying answer to the supply-demand imbalance
question, we can conclude that the majority of the jobs were still in the
central cities as were the majority of the poor in 1960 and 1963.2 Furthermore,
an estimate of the ratio of poor families ($3,000, 1959) to the number of jobs
in the four categories (as of 1958) was app-oximately 1:6 in both city and
suburb.3
Presumably, a logical indication of a supply-demand imbalance would
be'lignificantly" lower rates of unemployment in the suburbs than in the central
cities. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has been keeping data on the central
cities and suburbs of only the 20 largest SMSAs for only the last four years. The
rates of unemployment have been lower in the suburbs: 1967--3.3% to 4.7%;
1. Benjamin I. Cohen and Roger G. Noll, "Employment Trends in Central
Cities, " unpublished manuscript, p. 20, cited in Bernard J. Frieden, "Blacks in
Suburbia: The Myth of Better Opportunities," unpublished manuscript, p. 8.
The cities are Baltimore, Denver, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St.
Louis, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
2. One half of the white poor and 80% of nonwhite poor [Social Security
Administration Index, 19641, Newman, op. cit., p. 9.
3. Noll, op. cit., estimated from PTF, SP P. 198 & PS p. 59.
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1968 --2.9% to 4.1%; 1969 -3.0% to 3.9%.1 This is encouraging evidence
until it is examined more closely. In 1967, the unemployment for white males
over twenty years of age was "significantly" lower in the suburbs -*1.7 to
2.8. But the rate could be lower for a combination of several factors besides
a supply-demand imbalance in the skill level under discussion.. Such factors
are: 1. the suburbs have a higher educated and more professionalized work
force -- normally the professional-managerial types have a very low unemploy-
ment rate; 2. the suburbs have a lower proportion of migrants from outside the
SMSA who are lower skilled; 3. the suburbs have a lower proportion of their
work force over 55 years of age -a group in which unemployment is higher
than average. 2 The assumed supply-demand imbalance does not appear to be
sharp enough to counter race and sex discrimination. The difference between
central city-suburban rates was not significant for Black males (4.9/o/4.4%) or
women (4.3%/3.8%).-3 White women unemployment was even higher in the
suburbs than the city -3.6 to 3.5%.!ince much, if not most, of the Jobs
argument is aimed at increasing the employment of the ghetto-bound Blacks, we
1. Paul Flaim and Paul M. Schwab, "Employment and Unemployment
Developments in 1969, " Monthly Labor Review 93:2 (February, 1970): 52.
2. Ibid.
3. Paul 0. Flaim, "Jobless Trends in 20 Large Metropolitan Areas,"
Monthly Labor Review 91:5 (May, 1968): 20-22.
4. Ibid. Black women 6.3% suburbs and 6.6 central city.
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should examine non-white data more closely. An analysis by Bennett Harrison
of 0. E.O., Surveys of Economic Opportunity 1966 and 1967 in 12 SMSAs
amplifies the unemployment data mentioned above.
In terms of average economic opportunity, . .
for weekly earnings, annual unemployment, and oc-
. cupational status among males -- the white levels
improve monotonically with "distance" from the core, while
nonwhite opportunity increases somewhat with the "move"
from the ghetto to the nonpoverty central city, but falls
again with the further "move" out to the suburban ring.
(When 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed
around these means or medians, comparisons remain just
as dramatic as in these figures.) For whites, employment
opportunity definitely rises (or at least does not fall) as we
move from the innermost to the outermost sample areas.
For nonwhites, however, the three descriptors of employment
opportunity show relatively little sensitivity to intrametro-
politan residential location. Nonwhite eamings are signi-
ficantly higher outside the ghetto than inside, but, once
"outside," there is no significant difference between the
median levels associated with central-vity as against sub-
urban residence. Nonwhite unemployment rates in the ghetto
and in the suburbs are not statistically different from one another,
and may be only slightly lower in the nonpoverty central city.
Finally, the indicator of occupational status for nonwhite men is
totally insensitive to residential location.
But my findings suggest that there is probably little to be gained
from policies designed to rearrange the intrametropolitan spatial
configuration of minority residences. In no part of the American
city does the labor market "work" adequately for nonwhites. In
particular, there is no evidence to support the assertion that
nonwhite economic opportunity in the suburbs is greater than in
the ghetto.1
1. Bennett Harrison, "Education and Underemployment in the Urban
Ghetto," in Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective, David M.
Gordon, ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1971), pp. 187-9.
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While all this evidence is discouraging for Blacks, it does not tell us if there
are vacancies in the lower skill areas which may be going unfilled due to
racial discrimination or possibly suburban Blacks still not being accessible to
suburban jobs. Data on job vacancies in the skill levels which cannot be
filled by the existing supply of labor in the suburbs,and would benefit the
unemployed and underemployed in the central citieswould really sharpen the
argument.
As life would have it, evidence of actual lower skilled job vacancies
in the suburbs is impressionistic or intuitive. The data in this form is not
collected by governments. A piece of fragmentary evidence is exemplified
by a recent study by the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing
in which it compared two industrial parks on Long Island, New York. One was
located within easy access to the labor markets of Manhattan, Queens and
Brooklyn. This park had a vacancy rate of 4.7%. Only 9% of the vacancies
were in the operative skill category. The other industrial park was located 28
miles from Manhattan. Its vacancy rate was 6.6% with 70% of the vacancies
in the blue-collar category -- most in unskilled operative occupations. Also
indicative of a supply-demand imbalance was the fact that the wages paid the
blue collar workers were considerably higher than the wages offered for the same
jobs in New York City. The conclusion being that the extra monetary incentive
was necessary to have workers travel the long distance to the plant.
1. N.C.D.H.,op. cit., pp. 17-23.
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NATIONAL APPLICABILITY: City Life Cycle Theory
So, a supply-demand imbalance seems difficult to document. The
evidence of the low growth rates in the central cities and high rates in the suburbs
is clearcut, however. Even if this evidence is deemed enough to make the case,
there still remains the question of national applicability. Is this growth evidence
true of all types of SMSAs? Birch attempts to answer this question by dividing his
sample of 73 SMSAs by size ("smaller" SMSAs have a population of less than
500,000 and "large" SMSAs, over 500,000) and by age ("old" SMSAs qualified
as SMSAs before 1900; "middle-aged" after 1900 but before 1930; "young," after
1930).




























































1. Birch, cit., p. 12, figure 6.
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Growth of Central City Employment by Size and Age of SMSA: 1948-1963
(continued)
Middle-
Old aged Young Average
SMSAs SMSAs SMSAs SMSAs
SELECTED SERVICES
Large (31.5%) (56.6%) (162.1%) (50.6%)
Smaller (21.2%) (37.8%) (67.8%) (54.3%)
Average (30.9%) (47.2%) (90.2%) (52.0%)
In every job category the smaller cities were less affected by sluggish growth than
the large areas. More significant, Birch argues, is the fact that the Young SMSAs,
regardless of size, outgrew the Old and Middle-aged in every category. Thus, he
concludes that the sluggish or declining central city growth is a life-cycle problem
for cities - every city will eventually follow the trend. If the life-cycle explana-
tion is correct, then one could institute a national job-linkage program based on
the evidence from older-larger cities to remedy those imbalances and prevent
future supply-demand imbalances as the younger cities age into the problem.
ALTERNATIVES TO DISPERSAL: Economically Inefficient
Assume now that it is reasonable to believe with some assurance if not total
conviction that there will be an increasing need for lower skilled workers -- who are
living in the cities -- to perform jobs in the subudbs. Conversely, there are fewer
1. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
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lower skilled jobs to be performed in the central cities. There are two methods
besides housing lower skilled workers in the suburbs which could link worker and
job: keep and increase lower skilled jobs in the central cities; transport the
central city resident worker to and from the suburban job. However, from a
purely economic standpoint, both alternatives seem inefficient.
Gilding the Ghetto & Reverse Commuting
As seen from the growth trends noted above, gilding-the-economic/racial-
ghetto strategy would have a difficult time treading water. Government subsidies
would be necessary to defray the extra costs of locating in the central city. These
include the costs of purchasing lard, demolishing and constructing building in
densely populated areas plus higher operating costs which are now driving business
out. Noll points out the economic problems to other than business: "the economic
irrationality of placing the poor in areas where living expenses are highest, the
congestion and pollution created by high-density living, which in turn is a con-
sequence of high central city living costs, and the inequitable distribution among
local governments of the needs for public services -- which are highest among the
poor -- and the tax base to pay for them -which is greatest in high-income commu-
2
nities -- resulting from concentrating the poor in the central city."
1. Richard W. Epps, "Suburban Jobs and Black Workers," Philadelphia
FederaI Reserve Business Review 10 (Oct., 1969): 10.
2. Noll, op. cit., p. 204.
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A transportation strategy must be accompaniediby an improved commu-
nication system about job openings. Several studies have indicated that formal
channels -- public and private employment agencies - are secondary to informal
verbal communication - living near the plant and/or having friends and neighbors
1
who would know about openings. Once the knowledge of the job is available,
the strategy imposes extra (?) costs on government, worker and employer.
Reliable private transportation is not available to many lower income
families. Whil 80% of the American households own a car and 85% of the commuters
use the automobile, only 57% of the families with incomes under $5,000 (1967)
own a car. Three-fourths of the cars of those poorer families are over five years
2
old. A H.U.D. survey of the Watts area of Los Angeles found that slightly
less than half the men questioned had access to a car of which almost half were
uninsured and 20% unreliable on the freeway.3 Many workers, therefore, must
rely on car pooling or mass transit.
1. Epps, op. cit., p. 7. The latest evidence does not indicate that
"job seeking behavior of poverty residents has been ineffective, and thus a major
cause of their economic problems. " Harvey J. Hilaski, "How Poverty Area Resi-
dents Look for Work," Monthly Labor Review 94:3 (March, 1971): 48.
2. In Eastern Massachusetts, 35% of the families with incomes under
$4,000 own cars, Birch & Saenger, op. cit. , p. 178; Bureau of the Census,
Consumer Buying Indicators, Special Report on Household Ownership and Purchases
of Automobiles and selected Household Durables, 1960-1967, Series P-65 No. 18,
Table 1 (1967), cited in U.S.C.C.R., . cIt, p. 4.
3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,Progress Report No.
6, South Central and Ecst Los Angeles Transportation Employment Project, (1967)
p. 36, cited in U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., p. 5.
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User charges cover highway construction and maintenance costs (excluding
social costs) but fares rarely cover the costs of operating a mass transit system -
note the $57 million fiscal '71 deficit for the MBTA. These systems which are
already subsidized are oriented to bring suburbanites to the CBD. Suburban job
locations are dispersed and oriented to the highway system. Reverse commuters
spend more time and money on the trip than do those commuting from suburbs to
1
the city. For a time example, in 1968 the trip from Washington, D.C. to jobs
in Montgomery County took from 43-72 minutes while the suburbanite cut 12-27
minutes from the running time. The systems are also oriented to a day-time
schedule, leaving lucrative night shift work unaccessible. Even to bring the
out-bound public transit systems up to the same level of inefficiency enjoyed by
the inbound commuter will be difficult and costly in terms of government subsidy.
The cost to the worker who must make the trip under current conditiors
is high in terms of time and money. Defunct pilot reverse-commuter programs have
cited worker time and expense as reasons for low participation of the poor.3 For
1. John B. Lansing, Residential Location and Urban Mobility: The Second
Wave of Interviews (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1966),
cited in Newman, op. cit., p. 10.
2. Bain: Improving Transportation in the Washington Metropolitan Area -
Number 1, "Reverse-Flow Express Bus Service; A Proposal for Improved Transit
Service Between Inner-City Residential Areas of Washington, D.C. and Suburban
Employment Centers in Montgomery County, Maryland," (Washington, D.C.:
Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1968) Table 3, cited in U. S.C.C.R.,
op. cit., p. 5.
3. NCDH, op. cit., pp. 25-6
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example, the Traffic Commission of New York City esti mates it would cost
$40 per month for a resident of Harlem to work in Farmingdale (L. I.) or
Yonkers (Westchester) or Staten Island. The costs of commuting continue to
rise. With the exception of medical care, the rate of increase is greater
than the rate for any other group of services or commodities measured by the
1
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index. Actually, the worker who
has no option to live near his employment and must make the long, expensive
trip, is receiving less compensation per hour than the worker doing the same
work but living a reasonable distance from the plant.
The long trips cost the employer by increasing turnover, absenteeism
and tardiness. In the Long Island study mentioned earlier, the turnover
2in the closer area was 22% compared with 27% in the more distant area. With
many workers relying on car pools, the absence, lay-off or termination of the
driver offects several workers. Adverse weather conditions play havoc with both
auto and public transit.
SUMMARY
Where the jobs are -- a review. We found that the growth rates in the
four categories and payroll employment were higher in the suburbs; that the major
1. Newman, op. cit., p. 12.
2. NCDH, o it.,p. 20.
239.
proportion of new in'dustrial and commercial construction was in the suburbs;
that large central cities sustained an absolute loss of jobs; that the job categories
are ones in which the lower ski lied are employable. But we were unable to find
evidence in the ratio of jobs to worker or unemployment rates to convince us of
a substantial supply-demand imbalance without the unavailable vacancy data.
On the basis of growth rates we went on to find thct the situation is particularly
acute in the older central cities suggesting a life-cycle and a basis for a
nation-wide policy. Granting that a job-link policy in some degree is warranted
by the evidence, we found a gilding-the-ghetto and transportation strategy eco-
nomically inefficient for government, employer and employee.
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECT: Black Rebuttle
While this economic efficiency argument may or may not eventually
stand in face of more complete economic data, a Black economist, Peter Labrie,
has criticized the argument for two sociological deficiencies regarding its appli-
cation to the Black community - "neglect of voluntary forces of segregation and
atomistic misconceptions of ghetto residents."
First the process of black urban settlement has typically
been presented in a one-sided fashion. Kain, for example,
tends to see black urban settlement as simply a product of
segregation policies: i.e., racial covenants and zoning,
collusion by realtors, banks, and mortgage lenders, etc.
While such policies play a significant part and should not
be underrated, separate communities have not been simply
the results of discriminatory practices. Black urban settlement,
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like that of any common ethnic or economic group, is the*
result of both compulsory and voluntary forces. . .
Like any newcomers to the city the mases of black people
wished to be among friends and relatives during a period
of new social adjustment. Furthermore, their similar rural
background and levels of economic skills tended to give
their communities a further socio-economic cohesion.
. If the compulsory practices were eliminated,
the black population in the central cities would un-
doubtedly disperse throughout more parts of the city.
But almost certainly this dispersal would not be absolute,
fitting into the pattern of complete integration used in the
quantitative analysis of Kain, a pattern in which black and
white households are distributed equally throughout the
metropolis. As long as blacks remain a distinct ethnic
minority with a distinct set of religious, fraternal and
commercial institutions they will retain a distinct locational base
for these institutions. ...
Related to the above misconceptions is the view of ghetto
blacks as merely atomized individuals who are shunted from the
economic opportunities offered by the rest of the metropolis.
This view runs throughout the ghetto dispersal studies. Popula-
tion redistribution is advocated with little regard for the
attachments which residents have to their communities. Yet
most blacks, who are surrounded by an indifferent, if not
hostile, white environment probably have greater attachments
to their living areas than most other population groups in the
country. . . . To ignore these vital geo-social ties is to neglect
the very fabric of black urban life.I
Labrie also highlights the Blacks' characteristic position in the job market --
concentrated in the lower rungs of industries most sensitive to business cycles,
and prone to automation -- and ties it to evidence of Blacks' reluctance to
1. Peter Labrie, "Black Central Cities: Dispersal or Rebuilding," Review
of Black Political Economy 1:2 (Autumn, 1970): 17-18.
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reduce transportation costs and difficulties by following jobs to the
suburbs when housing is available.
Moreover, when the employment instability and
irregularity of many black workers are considered
it is doubtful that they would be prone to leave their
central city residences where public welfare and
employment assistance services are still highly con-
centrated for jobs that do not promise ernloyment
permanence and occupational mobility.
1. Ibid., p. 23.
I
DISPERSAL RATIONALE:
THE PANACEA OF GOOD EDUCATION
Often said in the same breath with "The jobs are in the suburbs"
is "The good schools are in the suburbs." The latter is pregnant with promise.
The jobs can alleviate a critical situation for the present adult population.
But the schools can eliminate the chronic problem of poverty for the future
generations as well as match our egalitarian rhetoric with social reality.
The United States Task Force on Urban Education eloquently describes
how investment in education will ultimately lower taxes, increase the GNP and
finally retire J. Edgar Hoover.
The problem of an inadequate education which faces an
inner-city child and his parents is the problem of the nation.
We believe that the Federal Government must assume a role
in solving that problem. The inequities of the education of
impoverished urban students exact a disastrous toll. They
cripple the individual youngster's chance for success, happi-
ness, and usefulness. In their wake, his family, community,
city and nation are denied his potential contribution.
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From a completely practical standpoint -- idealism
aside, Federal investment in education can be an extremely
profitable venture, in that money that was formerly spent
for programs, such as welfare, stronger police forces, and
other preventive or stop-gap measures could be freed for
spending in other areas, since educational programs create
revenue and jobs. The costs of not educating people to
take responsible positions in society are striking.
Expenditures in education could have the direct effect of
lowering welfare costs, by educating people, getting them
off the welfare rolls and into the occupational structure.
Aside from the financial benefits of such action, it is impossible
to measure the saving in terms of the effects on the individual
lives involved and the ultimate reduction in human conflict.
And in the end, this prosperity that is created by the intro-
duction of such programs can also be shared by the local
citizen;' for, as spending and employment increase, so will
the GNP, and tax revenue and Federal grants will be available
for use on other essential programs.
Education is an investment in the future of the individual and
in the future of the country. He will, in all probability, be
adequately employed, and thus a financial asset through his
payment of income taxes. In terms of job training programs,
the majority of which are designed for high school dropouts,
the government will spend another 3.5 billion dollars in 1970
(Federal Manpower Programs, 1969, p. 135). In terms of
prison costs and rehabilitation, the government pays $3,760 a
year per adult in a reformatory and another $1,200 to train
him. A high school graduate may be expected to earn an average
of $7,494 a year; a college graduate, $11,135 (U.S. Office of
Education, 1968, p. 15). Together they will pay back to the
government in Federal taxes approximately $90,000 during their
working lives. Education is the key to the chance for an individual
to become a $25,000 welfare liability, or to become a $90,000
taxpaying asset. We cannot afford the cost of failing to meet our
obligation. 1
1. U.S. Task Force on Urban Education, The Urban Education Task Force
Report; Final Report to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare:
Wilson C. Riles, Chairman, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity, Racial Imbalance in Urban Schools, Part 6, 15 &
22 September, 1970, pp. 3323-3.
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"Horatio Alger" is a featured character in the American ideological
drama. The probability that an individual's socio-economic status can rise
(or fall) based on his inate ability rather than the circumstances of birth is
the principle theme of a fluid society. The social system which allows inter-
generational mobility rewards the able individual with social, economic and
psychological goods, and benefits the society as a whole by allowing the most
capable to lead. To most Americans, intergenerational mobility means having
a better job -- white collar over blue collar -and/or a higher income than
one's father. Television, radio and bus advertisements express the generally
perceived means to a rise in status: "If you want a good job, get a good
education -- if you are in school, stay there. " The American society relies on
the free and compulsory educational institution to cut the umbilical cord
holding Horatio Algers -able individuals - to their socio-economic environ-
ments.
If the educational institution is to perform these two functions, it
must at least expose equal educational opportunities to all children. The quality
of educational opportunity must be independent of the surrounding socio-economic
environment. But does this independence exist? Are the pupils of the central
city schools exposed to the same educational opportunities as the pupils of the
surrounding suburban schools? From education studies and parent behavior, the
answer is, apparently not.
Like most roles, equal educational opportunity has various interpretations.
Although all versions portray suburban schools "more equal," the significant
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difference is the part residential redistribution can or must play as an
equalizer. The interpretations can be divided "input" and "output"
oriented. The input interpreters equate input -usually defined as financial
resources - with equal educational opportunity. The output proponents
attempt to determine which components of the educational system affect the
desired result -- a productive member of society - and concentrate on those.
INPUT ARGUMENT: Quantity of Money
The input argument is easily documented by expenditure per pupil data.
A study comparing the thirty-seven largest metropolitan areas' suburban and
central cities 1964 and 1965 expenditure data found the suburbs averaged
$572 per pupil to the central cities' $451. Another study indicated this as ,
a growing disparity. The primarily locally-based financing of education
underlies the reasons for the expenditure gap. The central city tax base, from
which localities derive about 90% of their local revenue, appears to be
1. Seymour Sachs and David C. Ranney, "Suburban Education: A
Fiscal Analysis," in Educating an Urban Population, ed. Marilyn Gittell
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. ), p. 64, cited in Alan K. Camp-
bell, "Providing Educational and Welfare Services in Metropolitan Areas,"
Task Force, Policy and Program Papers, p. 75.
2. In 1957 suburbs spent $303 per pupil and the central cities $312;
1962, suburbs $438, central cities $376. Seymour Sachs and Alan K. Campbell,
Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems (New York:
Free Press, 1967), p. 20, cited in Campbell, ibid.
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1.declining in some cities and growing at a considerably slower rate than the
total SMSAs in other cities. 2 There can be great differences between the
assessed valuation on a per pupil basis. Boston has $14,000/pupil from
which to derive income compared with suburban Brookline's $54,000.
While Brookline spends more per pupil ($1375) than Boston ($983), the Boston
3taxpayers are ultimately making a greater educational financing effort. 3
Furthermore, central city residents generally pay a higher proportion of their
4personal income (7.6%), for local taxes than do suburbanites (5.6%).
With this diminishing revenue source, the central cities have increasing
demands from their less than affluent population for non-educational services.
In 1962, the central cities spent $161.70 per capita for non-educational functions
compared with suburbia's $126.94.5 With a more affluent population and the
completion of the suburban physical plants in the 1950's and early 1960's, the
1. A study of a recent five year period of seven cities' taxable
assessed valuation: Baltimore - 10. 5%; Boston - 1.2%; Buffalo - 1%;
Detroit -2%; St. Louis -+1.1%; Philadelphia -+2.8%; Cleveland - 3.4%.
Campbell, ibid., p. 77.
2. U.S. Task Force on Urban Education, op 't., p. 3236.
3. Phyllis Meyers, "Boston's METCO: What to do until the solution
arrives," City 5:1 (Jan/Feb. 1971): 81.
4. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance
in the American Federal System, Volume 2, Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities
(Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1967), p. 5.
5. Campbell, . cit., p. 77.
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suburbs were able to devote 53% of their budget to education compared with
the central cities' 31%. With the higher costs of land, construction,
insurance, maintenance, a central city tax dollar purchases fewer facilities
than a suburban dollar.2 And the plot thickens. Recently, the pupil pro-
portion of the central city population has risen as the total population
has declined. Parochial school closings are contributing factors. But in the
3suburbs, of course, the pupil to population ratio is now declining. Even
state aid to education has been found to fund the suburbs disproportionately. 4
Moving some of the less than affluent central city residents to the
suburbs would help balance supply and demand, thereby equalizing educa-
tional opportunity by the input definition.
I. U.S. Task Force on Urban Education, op. cit., p. 3243.
2. Example: in 21 largest cities the average per acre site cost is
$68,156 cf. $3,074 in other districts. George B. Brain, "Pressures on the
Urban School," in Alvin Toffler, ed., The Schoolhouse in the City (New
York: Praeger, 1968), p. 41, cited in Committee for Economic Development,
Education for the Urban Disadvantaged from Preschool to Employment (New
York: CED, 1971), p. 69.
3. Campbell, cit., p. 75.
4. $124.92/student in central city to $165.54/student in suburbia.
Ibid., p. 78.
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OUTPUT ARGUMENT: Quality of Student
The proponents of "output" equality argue for schools which "equip
a student at the end of school to compete on an equal basis with others,
whatever his social origins. Operationally defined, this goal seems more
plausible. As a recent Comrmittee on Economic Development policy states,
. . . the equality that the schools can and must achieve
is the equality which is obtained when minimum standards
are met. Certain skills and capabilities are so indispensable
in our society that without them a person cannot satisfactorily
meet the challenges of life. 2
These skills are reading, writing, and computation (formerly called
"arithmetic"). In 1965 a nationwide survey of students' verbal/reading and
analytical/mathematical skills was taken as part of a study of equal educa-
tional opportunity authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Sec. 402). To
no one's surprise, Equality of Educational Opportunity (better known as the
Coleman Report) indicated that suburban students scored higher than central
3
city ghetto students. The objective quantities and qualities -- per pupil
1. James S. Coleman, "Equal Schools or Equal Students" The Public
Interest, 4 (summer, 1966): 71-2.
2. Committee on Economic Development, op. cit., p. 37.
3. James S. Coleman, and others, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).
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expenditure, age of buildings, accreditation, curriculum, number of
books in the library -were also surveyed. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the differences between white or minority schools were not very
different. More importantly, the objective criteria of quality did not seem
to affect student achievement significantly. The key variables Coleman found
were first, the economic and educational background of the student's family,
second, the socio-economic status of his classmates or peer group, and third,
the quality (as measured by a vocabulary test) of his teachers. The education
institution cannot change the family background. Schools can offset some of
the negative effects of a disadvantaged home environment by exposing the
students to predominantly middle class students and teachers. The importance
of the peer group's socio-economic background in reinforcing or undermining
parental values has long been recognized by middle class parents. Homogeneous
neighborhoods and homogeneous neighborhood schools tend to follow from this
parental priority for a "proper" environment. According to "output" proponents,
judicious distribution of low and moderate income families in suburban school
districts could maintain middle class dominance and allow the education institu-
tion to make its maximum impact on the disadvantaged student.
ASSUMPTIONS: Invalid or Problematic
The argument is: the even distribution of low and moderate income
families in the metropolitan areas will improve the educational institution's
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capacity to eliminate poverty and to promote a fluid society. Evaluating
this argument is like opening a bag of boa constrictors.
First, the alleged capability of the educational institution to turn
$25,000 liabilities into $90,000 assets is somewhat inflated. The suggestion
seems to be based on assumptions which are either invalid or problematic.
Causes of Poverty . . . Goals of Society
The statement assumes structural unemployment is the major cause of
poverty, to wit - jobs are waiting but people do not have the right skills.
It assumes that schools can give people the required skills; that the students
are capable of learning the skills; that the schools can change the class
culture to conform to the routine of a "good" job; that the jobs will pay a
living wage; that most people in poverty -specifically on welfare - are
physically able to work. It assumes people commit crime because they are
destitute.
Second, America's social rhetoric is egalitarian: its social system is
stratified. In a purely egalitarian system each member gives according to
ability and receives according to need. * The equality of educational oppor-
tunity objective, if achieved, would maintain a stratified society. The tactic
proposes to redistribute wealth and prestige according to the individual's
genetic makeup. The society would move from an alleged aristocracy to a
meritocracy. It is not clear that the less endowed with the "proper" genes will
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fair as well as those presently less endowed with the "proper" lineage.
What society might gain in efficiency it could lose in humaneness and would
lose in "pluralism of social values. "2 The benefits of exerting great effort
to institute social Darwinism or Robert Audrey's Social Contract are
problematic.
Current Status of Mobility -- Uncertain
Nevertheless, if movement toward a nouveau Social Contract is
desired, then we need to know about the mobility in American society.
The assumption is American society is fairly rigid and is becoming more rigid
because the schools are failing to pinch the umbilical cord.
With the closing-of the frontier and aging of institutions, social
stratificationists hypothesized that the society would become decidedly less
fluid -- that an individual's lineage would be the determining factor of his
ultimate social status. The degree of rigidity of a society is difficult to
document. As on most social subjects, there is no firm consensus among the
experts. However, mo3t do concur that the degree of intergeneration occupa-
tional mobility is the best available measure. In 1962, the U.S. Census Bureau
1. See Michael Young, Rise of the MeritocracyLondon: Thomas and
Hudson, 1961).
2. S.M. Miller and Pamela Roby, The Future of Inequality (New York:
Basic Books, 1970), p. 129.
surveyed the "Occupational Changes in a Generation. " One "most encourag-
ing " analysis of that data -- by Blau and Duncan1 - seems to indicate "...that
the relative socioeconomic status of the father has only a small influence on the
relative socioeconomic status of the son, and that this influence is not increasing.
Of the men surveyed, the correlation coefficient of the fathes'and the sons!
occupational scores was .40. That is, 16% of the variation in occupational
3
scores can be explained by the fathers' occupational status.
Looking at the same data, other analysts stress all is not so sanguine.
Racial discrimination is a formidable barrier. Sons of white non-manual workers
have five times the chance to become white collar workers as do the sons of
black manual workers . The sons of white manual workers have twice the chance. 4
Differential access to a college education is cited as an increasingly important
barrier. S.M. Miller argues that the critical status cleavage in a technical
society will be "between those in professional and managerial capacities and the
rest of society. "5 Assuming relationship between college/non-college and
1. Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, The American Occupational
Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967).
2. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Toward a
Social Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 19.
3. Ibid., p. 17.
4. Miller and Roby, op i.,p. 133.
5. Ibid. , p. 135.
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professional/non-professional, then William Spady's analysis of the Census
survey portends increasing rigidity. His analysis indicated "the differences
between men from high and low educational status origins in reaching and
completing college appear to be increasing over time in both actual and
conditional probabilities. "
So, the American society is fluid to some undetermined degree and
may or may not become less fluid. But what of schooling and mobility? Is
schooling really the elevator individuals board and ride to the desired datus?
Despite the public's pervasive faith, sociologists confess, "We do not know too
much about the distribution of occupations and earnings around a given level
of educational achievement and ability. 2 The Blau-Duncan Census survey
analysis suggests that the individual must ride something besides education
and/or family background to reach a given occupational status. Differing
education accounted for only 18.4% of the sources of variation in occupational
achievement. Education, family background and the overlap between the two
account for only 40%. It appears the individual must leap a rather large
air shaft to reach a given status.
1. William G. Spady, "Educational Mobility and Access: Growth
and Paradoxes," American Journal of Sociology 73:3 (1bvember, 1967): 277,
cited in Miller and Roby, op. cit., p. 133.
2. Martin Rein and Peter Marris, "Stratification and Social Policy,"
paper for an American Academy of Arts and Sciences publication, 1970, p. 3.
3. H EW, op. cit., p. 22.
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Power of the Educational System
The final assumption is that given the correct tools, the educational
institution is able to cut the child from the effects of his disadvantaged
family environment. The two factors are intertwined. Apparently the
child's S-E background significantly affects his ability to utilize schools.
In 1960 37% of the children of lower income families ($3,000 and under)
fell a grade below the model for their age contrasted with only 4% of the
upper income children ($10,000).1 Low income children slip before they reach
school age. A study tested the l.Q.'s of children of middle class parents and
children of welfare mothers both Negro and Caucasian. With both races,the
l.Q. remained the same until the 18-24th month when the welfare child began
.2
to test significantly lower. HEW estimates a disadvantaged child needs 1.43
3
years of schooling for every one year of a middle class child to keep pace.
But in secondary school parental income and education level also seems to
affect the participation rates. In the upper half of the ability group, low
income children have a drop-out rate five times higher than upper income
children. 4 When income is held constant the educational level of the parents
1. Rein and Marris, p i.,p. 22.
2. Mark Golden and others, "Social Class Differentiation in Cognitive
Development: A Longitudinal Study," 1969, cited in Educational Research
Information Center 5:3 (March, 1970): 72.
3. Mcrris and Rein, op.ct. p. 22.
4. Ibid., p. 23.
F
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is significant in college attendance. For example, at the $5,000 and
under income level (1960), 52% of the college age youths whose fathers
attended universities were themselves enrolled in higher education. Only
14% of the college age yodths whose fathers had not finished high school
were enrolled in college. What then is the school's cutting tool?
As noted above, Coleman's analysis of the 1965 HEW Survey indicated
that a middle class dominated school environment would most sharpen the
school's beneficial effect on the disadvantaged child's achievement. Yet,
the most recent re-analysis of the data suggests that only 12% of the child's
achievement can be related to this peer group class factor. A puncture,
not a cut.
The input proponents are really of two varieties. Martin Trow divides
them "liberal" and "radical. , The liberals, who believe that intelligence is
a genetic given , can have Equal Educational Opportunity by definition; to
wit, distribute funds equally. This will do little to squeeze the umbilical
cord but much to promote the illusion of an egalitarian society -- by most
Americans'.perception. The radicals feel intelligence is achieved and that
it is the school's responsibility to develop it. They would re-direct educa-
tional resources, i.e. money and good teachers, from the suburbs to the cities --
1. Ibid.,
2. Martin Trow, "Two Problems in American Education," in Howard
S. Becker, ed., Social Problems (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 80.
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Compensatory Education. Unfortunately the HEW re-analysis suggests
that teacher and physical school characteristics may account for only 6%
1
of student achievement. All evaluations of compensatory education have
2
revealed their minimal effect. And the estimated cost for one decade -
$100-160 billion.3 As Senator Mondale queried, "How are you going to
sell a program costing $190 [sic] billion a decade in order to improve the
reading skills of disadvantaged children a month every two years? " 3
If it is true that the educational institution can do little to minimize
the detrimental effects of a deprived family environment there remains a
logical "possibility." Remove the children from the culturally deprived
family before 18 months. Edward Banfield suggests this as one of his "feasible"
4
but "unacceptable" problem solutions. Even educator Professor Coleman
suggests what he deems a "modest yet radical proposal."
1. Rein and Marris, op. cit., p. 23.
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, Part 1A - Equality of Educational Opportunity, an Introduction,
91st Cong., 2nd sess., Apri l 20, 21, 27, 29; May 5 and 12, 1970, pp. 92-6.
3. David K. Cohen, "Compensation and Integration," in Eq ua
Educational Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) 1p. 112.
4. Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City (Boston: Little Brown,
1970), p. 246.
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For those children whose family and neighborhood are
educationally disadvantaged, it is important to replace
this family environment as much as possible with an
educational environment -by starting school at an
earlier age, and by having a school which begins very early
in the day and ends very late.
This may be the direction towards which we must move. However,
transplanting poor families to the suburbs will not be a significant factor
in instituting the proposal. Perhaps not even a requisite step.
THE SOLUTION: Waiting for Godot
In intellectual terms schooling is not the panacea for all of America's
social problems and inequities. But we wait for Godot. The general public
still keeps the faith. The institution has its own lobby. In political terms
education is an acceptable potential solution. Therefore, education and the
suburban LMIH proposal must be seriously explored.
ALTERNATIVES TO DISPERSAL: Bussing and Educational Parks
The proposal to disperse LMIH into the suburbs may satisfy the input/
output proponents but the proposal would cause some educational difficulties.
The neighborhood school concept would be preserved. Therefore, each
school would have to be equipped to handle a variety of needs (be all things
to all students - the college bound/high school terminating, gifted/retarded,
1. Coleman, "Equal Schools, or Equal Students," op. cit., p. 74.
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etc.). This is economically inefficient and probably impossible from a
personnel viewpoint. Secondly, while good schools are in the suburbs,
all suburbs do not necessarily have good schools. In fact there is con-
siderable variation in per-pupil expenditure among suburban schools. 2
Dispersal is not an obvious solution to either input or output
objections to the present system. The alternatives while not easy to
implement politically, are not as difficult as dispersal appears to be.
The input objection can be satisfied by changing revenue-raising patterns
from the local to a larger jurisdiction. The output - middle class
dominance - can be satisfied by either bussing or, better yet, by large edu-
cational parks. The financing change must cope with the issue of community
control without community financing. The educational park proposal faces
the killing of the sacred neighborhood schools. Bussing has logistic and
neighborhood school-type objections. When contrasted with residential
dispersal resistance, the objections appear more politically palatable.
Furthermore, educational parks seem educationally superior for both middle
class dominance and compensatory strategies over socioeconomic dispersal
into neighborhoods.
1. Miller and Roby, t., p. 125.
2. Campbell, op. cit., p. 76.
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SUMMARY
To summarize. We stated the argument: by freeing the
individual from the effects of his deprived background education will
free American society from poverty, crime and social rigidity. The
educational institution is not functioning properly because financial
resources are not distributed equally (properly) and/or the schools are
socially stratified. These faults can be corrected by distributing poor
families.in the suburbs. We evaluated the argument. Equal Educational
Opportunity leads toward a meritocracy, not necessarily an egalitarian
society. The degree and direction of social rigidity is difficult to determine.
The best study to date indicates that education and background account for
40% of the occupational status. We noted the interfwined character of
education and background, and question whether or not education could
minimize the detrimental effects of a deprived home environment. The
answer -- whether for compensatory education or social balance -- was not
encouraging. Removing the very young child from his detrimental environ-
ment appeared to be"a feasible but unacceptable answer. Although educa-
tion does not seem to be The Solution after all, it still has public faith and
a nationwide lobby. Therefore, we looked at the problems of the dispersal
solution and seemingly less drastic alternatives. The relative attractiveness
of the alternatives - especially educational parks -- undermines the strength
of an educational pillar of policy which might support LMIH in suburbia.
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON
FEDERAL POLICIES RELATIVE TO EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY
Of all the services, facilities and other amenities a community provides, few
matter more to the individual and his family than the kind of housing he lives
in -- and the kind of neighborhood of which that housing is a part. Through the
ages, men have fought to defend their homes; they have struggled, and often
dared the wilderness, in order to secure better homes.
It is not surprising, therefore, that public policies affecting the kind and location
of homes available should be the subject of intense and widespread interest, and
also of intense, farranging and sometimes passionate debate.
One of the achievements of this administration of which I am most proud has been
the dramatic progress we have made in increasing the supply of housing, including
particularly low- and moderate-income housing, so as to expand the range of housing
opportunities for Americans in search of a decent home. Housing starts are currently
at the highest levels in 20 years. While our primary emphasis is on stimulating private
construction, the number of federally assisted low- and moderate-income housing
starts planned for fiscal year 1972 will be more than four times what it was as recently
as fiscal 1968 -- an increase from some 150,000 to some 650,000. The remaining
needs are still enormous. But this represents a giant step toward fulfilling the goal
set forth in the Housing Act of 1949, of "a decent home and a suitable living environ-
ment for every American family. "
The very fact that so much progress is being made, however, has sharpened the focus
on what has come to be called "fair housing" -- a term employed, but not defined,
in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and to which many persons and groups have ascribed
their own often widely varied meanings.
In this statement, I shall set forth the policies, as they have been developed in this
administration, that will guide our efforts to eliminate racial discrimination in housing,
to enlarge housing opportunities for all Americans and to assist in stable and orderly
community development. It is important to understand the laws that govern those
policies, the limits within which they operate, the complexities they seek to address,
and the goals they seek to achieve.
My purpose is not to announce new policies, but to define and explain the policies
we have -- setting forth what we will do and what we will not. The factors determining
patterns of housing and community development are immensely complex and intricately
balanced, many are uniquely local in nature, and the Federal Government operates in
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important but limited ways and under limited authorities. Within those limits,
we intend to continue to move vigorously -- not to restrict free choice, but to
expand and protect it.
Underlying our housing policies -- and embodied in our laws and our Constitu-
tion -- are certain basic principles:
- Denial of equal housing opportunity to a person because of race is wrong,
and will not be tolerated.
- Such denial will not be tolerated whether practiced directly and overtly, or
under cover of subterfuges, or indirectly through such practices as price and
credit discrimination.
- To qualify for Federal assistance, the law requires a local housing or community
development project to be part of a plan that expands the supply of low- and
moderate-income housing in a racially nondiscriminatory way.
- in terms 6f site selection for a housing development, the Federal role is one of
agreeing or not agreeing to provide Federal subsidies for projects proposed by
local authorities or other developers.
- A municipality that does not want federally assisted housing should not have it
imposed from Washington by bureaucratic fiat; this is not a proper Federal role.
- Local communities should be encouraged in their own voluntary efforts to make
more housing more widely available, and to reduce the extent of racial concentra-
tion.
-- Putting an end to racial discrimination, and building toward the goal of free and
open communities, is a responsibility shared by Federal, State and local govern-
ments, by business and private institutions, by civic leaders and by individual
people everywhere.
A HISTORY OF HARDSHIP
The history of racial discrimination in housing in America runs deep; but, to the Nation's
credit, so do efforts to correct it.
In earlier years, some local ordinances actually forbade minority group members to
purchase property in blocks where they did not constitute a majority. Such ordinances
were invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1917.
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Covenants running with the land were widely used to restrict minority citizens
in their access to housing. The efficacy of these covenants rested on their
possible enforcement by courts and the awarding of damages for their breach.
Judicial enforcement was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1948.
Federal policy itself, quite unsurprisingly, in past eras reflected what then
were widespread public attitudes. Policies which governed FHA mortgage
insurance activities for more than a decade between the middle thirties and
the late forties recognized and accepted restrictive covenants designed to
maintain the racial homogeneity of neighborhoods.
Compounding the plight of minority Americans, locked as many of them were
in deteriorating central cities, was the Federal urban renewal program. It was
designed to help clear out blighted areas and rejuvenate urban neighborhoods.
All too often, it cleared out but did not replace housing which, although
substandard, was the only housing available to minorities. Thus it typically
left minorities even more ill-housed and crowded than before.
Historically, then, the Federal Government was not blameless in contributing
to housing shortages and to the impairment of equal housing opportunity for
minority Americans. Much has been done to remedy past shortcomings of Federal
policy, and active opposition to discrimination is now solidly established in
Federal law. But despite the efforts and emphasis of recent years, widespread
patterns of residential separation by race and of unequal housing opportunity persist.
RACIAL CONCENTRATION TODAY
In terms of racial concentration, the facts on housing occupancy revealed by the
1970 Census are compelling. In our 66 largest metropolitan areas, accounting for
more than half the U.S. population -- of which 49 are in the North and West --
the central city white population declined during the decade of the sixties by about
2 million (5%) -- while the black population increased almost 3 million (35%). This
meant overall black population in central cities increased from 18% in 1960 to 24%
in 1970.
In the suburban areas of these cities, however, the story was different. White popula-
tion increased by 12.5 million (30%) and black population increased by less than 1
million (44%). The result was that the total black proportion of suburban population
increased only from 4.2% in 1960 to 4.5% in 1970.
In city after city the figures tell the same story. In New York City the white popula-
tion declined by 617,000 while the black population rose by 579,000. In St. Louis
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whites declined by 169,000; blacks rose by 40,000. Thus the central cities
grow ever more black, while the surrounding areas, for the most part, remain
overwhelmingly white.
It is important to remember, of course, that simple divisions into "central city"
and "suburban" can be misleading in this context. It makes a great deal of dif-
ference how large the city is, and what the patterns of distribution within the
metropolitan area are in terms not only of housing, but of business, industry,
recreational facilities, transportation, and all the many factors that enter into
its internal dynamics as a functioning community.
One thing this points to is that no single'set of rigid criteria can be laid down
that will fit a wide variety of local situations. To speak of "opening up the
suburbs, " for example, may have widely differing implications in different metro-
politan areas, just as the term "central city" means something quite different in
New York or Chicago than it does in New Haven or Fresno.
To some extent, the persistence of racially separate housing patterns reflects
the free choice of individuals and families in both the majority and minority com-
munities. Economic factors have also played a part, since average income levels
-- even though the disparity is being narrowed -- remain lower for minority Ameri-
cans than for the Caucasian majority.
It also is inescapable, however, that continuing, often covert housing discrimination
is thwarting or discouraging the efforts of many minority citizens to find better
housing in better neighborhoods. This is wrong, constitutionally indefensible, and
pragmatically unwise.
THE COSTS OF RACIAL SEPARATION
Separation of the races, particularly when it is involuntary, has damaging conse-
quences. One is racial isolation -- the social isolation of the races from each
other -- an estrangement that all too readily engenders unwarranted mistrust,
hostility and fear.
Another consequence of involuntary racial separation is the waste of human resources
through the denial of human opportunity. No nation is rich enough and strong enough
to afford the price which dehumanizing living environments extract in the form of
wasted human potential and stunted human lives -- and many of those living environ-
ments in which black and other minority Americans are trapped are dehumanizing.
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Another price of racial segregation is being paid each day in dollars: in
wages lost because minority Americans are unable to find housing near the
suburban jobs for which they could qualify. Industry and jobs are leaving
central cities for the surrounding areas. Unless minority workers can move
along with the jobs, the jobs that go to the suburbs will be denied to the
minorities -- and more persons who want to work will be added to the cities'
unemployment and welfare rolls.
Clearly, both outright racial discrimination and persisting patterns of racial
concentration combine to create a serious set of problems that public policy
must seek to meet. These problems are human, they are economic, they are
social -- and they pose a challenge of the first magnitude to the community of
the metropolitan area that tries to meet them in a way most nearly fair to all
those affected. It is encouraging that many communities are meeting this challenge,
and meeting it successfully.
THE FEDERAL ROLE
The Law
The Federal Government's responsibilities for eliminating racial discrimination
in housing derive partly from the Constitution, partly from the Government's own
extensive involvement in housing and community development programs, and partly
from a number of statutes and Executive orders.
The broad outlines of the law are contained in our Constitution, which in its 5th,
13th and 14th amendments guarantees basic civil rights, including the right to seek
shelter free from any racial discrimination fostered by Federal, State or local
governments.
Executive Order 11063, issued in 1962, expressly states that housing discrimination
and segregation prevent the Nation from attaining the housing goals declared by the
1949 Housing Act. It further directs all Federal departments and agencies "to take
all action necessary and appropriate to prevent discrimination" as to race, color,
religion or national origin in federally assisted housing and related projects.
Congress followed up this initiative two years later with the Civil Rights Act of
1964. A critical provision of that law, Title VI, provides that no person shall,
"on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. " As a penalty for such discrimina-
tion, it provides for a cutoff of Federal funds to the program in which the discrimination
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occurs. The clear intent of the, Congress in enacting this legislation was to insure
that no program utilizing Federal financial aid should be tainted by racial, ethnic,
or religious discrimination. A carefull review of the legislative history indicates
that the Congress intended that the cutoff of Federal funds resulting from a viola-
tion should apply only to the particular activity in which the unlawful racial
discrimination took place, and not to all activities undertaken by the violater.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Congress declared that "It is the policy of the
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."
Title VIII of the 1968 act goes beyond the previous statutes (which in terms of
housing, had dealt only with that which was federally assisted) to prohibit discrimina-
tion on account of race, color, religion or national origin in most private real
estate actions, whether sale or rental and regardless of whether Federal assistance
is involved or not. In addition, this title also makes it the responsibility of "all
executive departments and agencies" and the specific responsibility of the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development; to "administer their programs and activities
relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the
purpose of this title."
Antidiscrimination Enforcement
The provisions of the law aimed at barring racial discrimination in housing are
administered primarily by the Departments of Justice and of Housing and Urban
Development.
HUD's role under Title VI in the 1964 act is to guard against racial discrimination
in any program or activity to which HUD gives financial assistance. Title VIII of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act requires HUD to investigate complaints of housing discrimi-
nation and, where appropriate, to attempt to resolve such complaints through per-
suasion or conciliation. In calendar year 1970, HUD completed processing of 169
complaints; in 89 of these cases conciliation was successful. In the same year, HUD
referred 19 of these cases where conciliation failed to the Department of Justice.
Under the terms of Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the Attorney General is
empowered to bring suits in Federal court where he finds that racial discrimination
in housing constitutes a "pattern or practice, " or where housing discrimination cases
raise issues of general public importance. Since January 1969, the Attorney General
has brought or participated in 85 such suits against more than 250 defendants in 22
States and the District of Columbia. In addition, the Justice Department has
negotiated out of court with several hundred other persons and companies and brought
them into voluntary compliance.
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These cases have involved not only outright racial discrimination in the sale or
rental of homes, but also such practices as discriminatory real estate advertising
and exclusion of minorities from multiple listing services. Several of the suits
have been against municipal authorities. Several others have been against
major companies controlling tens of thousands of dwelling units, and have re-
sulted in orders that they take dramatic remedial efforts to attract minority
families into buildings from which they have previously been barred or discouraged.
Not only have these suits directly opened to nonwhites a great deal of housing
previously available only to whites; they also have had a significant wider impact
in stimulating others to come into voluntary compliance with the antidiscrimination
laws. This vigorous enforcement as required by law will continue.
Unlawful racial discrimination in housing extends beyond the barring of individuals
from particular buildings or r:sighborhoods because of race. The courts have also
held that, when its reasons for doing so are racial, a community may not rezone in
order to exclude a federally assisted housing development. In such cases, where
changes in land use regulations are made for what turns out to be a racially discrimina-
tory purpose, the Attorney General, in appropriate circumstances, will also bring
legal proceedings.
How Federal Programs Operate
In order to understand the way in which the broad "fair housing" mandates translate
into specific actions, it is important to understand what some of the Federal housing
programs are and how they operate.
HUD provides direct financial assistance in three broad areas:
-- Housing for low- and moderate-income families. This includes the
Home Ownership and Rental Housing Assistance subsidy programs
("Section 235" and "Section 236" housing, respectively), the rent
supplement program enacted in 1965, and assistance to low-rent
public housing.
-- Grants for State, areawide and local planning.
-- Aid for community development activities, such as urban renewal and
water and sewer grants.
In addition, of corse, HUD plays a major role in providing mortgage insurance
and in facilitating the overall flow of mortgage funds.
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in each of these areas, the Federal program role - as the governing statutes
make clear -- is essentially one of responding to local or private initiatives,
rather than one of imposing its programs on State and local governments.
In none of HUD's grant programs does the Department act directly. The De-
partment builds no housing, develops no land use plans, clears no slums and
constructs no sewers. Instead, HUD provides, within its statutory and regula-
tory framework, financial assistance to local developers and agencies, both
public and private, who build and manage housing, and engage in planning
and community development activities.
The extent to which HUD program activity is dependent on local initiative
and execution is frequently overlooked, but is an important element in considering
policy issues. Sites for HUD-assisted housing must be selected and acquired by
local sponsors -- public or private -- and housing developed on those sites must
conform to local zoning and local building codes. Planning performed with HUD
assistance is done by State and local governmental bodies. Community development
activities -- urban renewal, water and sewer, or open space projects, for example
-- are initiated and executed by local government.
In short, HUD's role in the location of assisted housing is one not of site selection,
but of ultimate site approval. It does not initiate local housing projects. With
more applications than it can fund, it must select those for funding which it de-
termines most fully satisfy the purposes of the enabling legislation -- and in doing
so it says "yes" or "no" to local requests for financial assistance for:projects that
have been locally planned and will be locally executed.
In responding to local and private initiatives, of course, the Department must
follow the statutory mandates. For example:
-- As noted earlier, HUD may not make a grant under any of its programs
if the recipient will discriminate or otherwise deny the benefits of the assisted
activity or project to persons on account of race.
-- Where the "workable program" requirement -- imposed on local
communities by the Housing Act of 1949, as amended in 1954, in connection
with urban renewal and related programs -- is a condition of eligibility, HUD
may not make a grant in the absence of a HUD-certified workable program for
community improvement. The program must make reasonable provision for low-
and moderate-income housing, which must of course be available on a non-
discriminatory basis.
-- Where comprehensive planning is supported by a Federal grant under
the 1954 Housing Act, as amended in 1968, the plan must include a "housing
element" to insure that "the housing needs of both the region and the local
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communities studied in the planning will be adequately covered in terms of
existing and prospective in-migrant population growth. " This provision has
broad application, since such planning grants are often used to prepare the
areawide plans which are a prerequisite for Federal financial assistance
under the water and sewer, open space, and new communities programs.
Similarly, the statutory requirement of "fair housing" applies in the area of
private housing construction, where the Federal role is substantial. The
Federal Government provides billions of dollars in assistance and guarantees
of mortgage credit for housing financing. The Federal Government sets standards
widely used by industry, such as minimum property standards, credit standards,
appraisal standards, and construction standards. The Federal Government makes
market analyses which materially influence the private sector. The Federal
Government approves mortgagees, builders, developers and brokers with respect
to their doing business with HUD. Local government and private initiative and
Federal standards work together to produce new housing. And under the law, that
new housing -- like all the Nation 's housing stock -- must be open equally to all
Americans regardless of race, religion or national origin.
In approaching questions of "fair housing " for low- and moderate-income persons,
it is important to remember that we are dealing with a rather imprecise term and
with two separate matters.
One is the elimination of racial discrimination in housing. On this, the Consti-
tution and the laws are clear and unequivocal: racial discrimination in housing
will hot be tolerated.
In public discussions of "fair housing " or "open housing," however, another issue
has often become confused with that of racial discrimination. This is sometimes
referred to as "economic integration. " Frequently it arises in debates over whether
subsidized low-rent public housing should be placed in the suburbs as a means of
moving poor people out of the inner city and, if so, where, to what extent, and by
what means.
One of the arguments frequently advanced is that poor people are often disadvantaged
by living in low-income neighborhoods; that poverty thus perpetuates itself; and that
the remedy therefore is to scatter the poor among the more affluent. Another argu-
ment often heard is that blacks and other minorities tend to be disproportionately
poor, and that "economic segregation" is therefore equivalent to racial segregation.
It is important to remember, however, that the terms 'poor" and "black" are not
interchangeable. A higher percentage of blacks than of whites lives below the
poverty line -- but there are far more poor whites in America than there are poor
blacks. Much of the Nation's most dismally inadequate housing is occupied by
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blacks; much of it is occupied by whites. Many of the worst slums are black;
many are white. And by the same token, the skilled tra'des, the businesses and
professions increasingly are populated by affluent blacks whose children go to
the best schools and colleges and who themselves have taken their deserved
place in the leadership, not simply of inner-city neighborhoods, but of urban,
suburban and rural communities all across America.
To cite only one statistic, a recent special census study showed that in the North
and West, black husband-wife families headed by persons under 25 had a median
income equal to that of their white contemporaries. Although the income dis-
parities among other ages and categories is still far too wide, this is one measure
of how far we have come; also, because these young families represent the future,
it is an indication of where we are heading. To equate "poor" with "black" does
a disservice to the truth, and it blinks the fact -- fundamental to anything so
intensely personal as housing -- that we are dealing with the needs not of an
undifferentiated mass, but of millions of individual human beings, each separate
and unique.
In many cases -- when dealing with poor people who happen to be members of a
racial minority -- questions of where to locate housing for poor people and where
to locate housing for members of the minority are related. But the issues involved
are separate, and those who would treat effectively with race and poverty must
take care to maintain the distinction. What is true of blacks in this regard is also
true of Mexican-Americans, Indians and members of other minorities.
When predominantly poor members of a racial minority are concentrated heavily
in one particular area of a central city, the question of where to build housing
designed to accommodate some but not all of them is often not easily answered.
On the one hand, for example, concentrating the subsidized housing in the pre-
dominantly black area could have the effect of reinforcing the racial separation
that already exists. On the other hand, failure to build at least a portion of it
there could be unfair to the people who choose to live there, as well as reinforcing
the housing blight that often prevails in such areas. Quite apart from racial con-
siderations, residents of outlying areas may and often do object to the building in
their communities of subsidized housing which they fear may have the effect of
lowering property values and bringing in large numbers of persons who will con-
tribute less in taxes than they consume in services. Beyond this, and whether
rightly or wrongly, as they view the social conditions of urban slum life many
residents of the outlying areas are fearful that moving large numbers of persons --
of whatever race -- from the slums to their communities would bring a contagion
of crime, violence, drugs, and the other conditions from which so many of those
who are trapped in the slums themselves want to escape.
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In many other respects, the balances to be struck are often close and the
considerations complex: for example, how are the interests of one part of a metro-
politan area to be weighed against those of the area as a whole? What other
housing opportunities are available? How do transportation patterns, job
patterns, school locations, enter into the choice? What related efforts are
being made to expand opportunity and end racial discrimination? And how and
by whom are the determinations to be made?
By establishing "fair housing" as a policy but leaving the term undefined, Title
Vill of the 1968 act added a complexity of its own: a lively debate about just
what it means, and especially about the meaning of its requirement that Federal
officiaIs take "affirmative action" to promote it.
This and the other laws make abundantly clear that the Federal Government has
an active, affirmative role to play in eliminating racial discrimination in either
the sale or rental of housing. They also make it clear that those communities
which seek Federal assistance for most hous'ing and community development pro-
grams must work honestly and constructively to meet the housing needs of their
low- and moderate-income families. The debate has arisen over the extent to
which Federal agencies are either required or avthorized to go beyond anti-
discrimination efforts, and to use their program money leverage as a means of requiring
local communities to subordinate their land use policies to the goal either of
breaking up racial concentrations or of promoting "economic integration."
POLICIES OF THIS ADMINISTRATION
It will be the firm purpose of this administration to carry out all the requirements
of the law fully and fairly.
Racial discrimination in housing is illegal, and will not be tolerated. In order to
fulfill their responsibility for eliminating this discrimination, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the Justice Department have been developing
and elaborating a wide-ranging program aimed at creating equal housing opportunity.
By "equal housing opportunity," I mean the achievement of a condition in which
individuals of similar income levels in the same housing market area have a like
range of housing choices available to them regardless of their race, color, religion
or national origin.
At the outset, we set three basic requirer'nents for our program to achieve equal
housing opportunity: It must be aimed at correcting the effects of past discrimina-
tion; it must contain safeguards to ensure against future discrimination; and it
must be results-oriented so its progress toward the overall goal of increasing housing
opportunities can be evaluated.
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The administration is embarked upon this course. It must and will press
forward firmly.
The chief components of such a program include the firm enforcement of
laws relating to equal housing opportunity; the development of appropriate
equal housing opportunity criteria for participation in programs affecting
housing; the development of information programs; and the development of
policies relating to housing marketing practices.
It is obvious that not all individuals will exercise the full range of choices
made available to them. Those are matters for individual decision.
What is essential is that all citizens be able to choose among reasonable
locational alternatives within their economic means, and that racial non-
discrimination be scrupulously and rigorously enforced.
We will not seek to impose economic integration upon an existing local
jurisdiction; at the same time, we will not countenance any use of economic
measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination.
When such an action is called into question, we will study its effect. If the
effect of the action is to exclude Americans from equal housing opportunity on
the basis of their race, religion or ethnic background, we will vigorously oppose
it by whatever means are most appropriate -- regardless of the rationale which
may have cloaked the discriminatory act.
Access to federally assisted housing, like access to all housing, must be non-
discriminatory as to race. But simply to apply this principle will not answer
all the practical problems raised by our national commitment to expanded and
equal housing opportunity.
Pressures for the construction of new housing and the rehabilitation of existing.
housing are growing all across the Nation -- in central cities, in suburbs, in
small towns, in rural America. Demand for housing at all income levels is in-
creasing dramatically.
As a major part of our national effort to meet these housing needs -- an effort
which is both private and governmental -- federally assisted housing is being built
at a rate approaching 3/4 of a million units a year. These units are needed. They
are being built. And they must be built someplace. The question is where.
If all the federally assisted units are packed together in one type of community
or one kind of location, we will only exacerbate the social and, in all probability,
the racial isolation of our people from each other.
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If we build federally assisted instant ghettos, we fail both our communities
and the people we are trying to help.
If we impact or tip the balance of an established community with a flood
of low-income families, we do a disservice to all concerned.
The answers to these practical considerations are not simple -- but they are
of great importance.
Based on a careful review of the legislative history of the 1964 and 1968
Civil Rights Acts, and also of the program context within which the law has
developed, I interpret the "affirmative action" mandate of the 1968 act to
mean that the administrator of a housing program should include, among the
various criteria by which applications for assistance are judged, the extent
to which a proposed project, or the overall development plan of which it is
a part, will in fact open up new, nonsegregated housing opportunities that
will contribute to decreasing the effects of past housing discrimination. This
does not mean that no federally assisted low- and moderate-income housing
may be built within areas of minority concentration. It does not mean that
housing officials in Federal agencies should dictate local land use policies.
It does mean that in choosing among the various applications for Federal aid,
consideration should be given to their impact on patterns of racial concentration.
In furtherance of this policy, not only the Department of Housing and Urban
Development but also the other departments and agencies administering housing
programs -- the Veterans Administration, the Farmers Home Administration and
the Department of Defense -- will administer their programs in a way which will
advance equal housing opportunity for people of all income levels on a metropolitan
areawide basis.
This administration will not attempt to impose federally assisted housing upon any
community.
We will encourage communities to discharge their responsibility for helping to
provide decent housing opportunities to the Americans of low- and moderate-
income who live or work within their boundaries.
We will encourage communities to seek and accept well-conceived, well-designed,
well-managed housing developments -- always within the community's capacity to
assimilate the families who will live in them.
We will carry out our programs in a way that will be as helpful as possible to
communities which are receptive to the expansion of housing opportunities for
all of our people.
In these efforts we will be aided by a change that already is taking place in the
way subsidized low- and moderate-income housing is planned, built and
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managed: in terms of new construction, the old-style, massively concentrated
high-rise public housing "project" is largely a thing of the past; the trend now
is strongly toward low-rise dwellings, many of them one-, two-, three- or four-
family, on scattered sites, so that they can blend in with the community without
detracting from nearby properties. Under the newer Federal programs of
financial assistance to low- and moderate-income housing of other sorts, the
pattern has been one of variety, enabling the community to fit the development
to its own needs.
By approaching local questions of land-use planning in a creative and sophisticated
manner, local authorities should in most cases be able to work out site-selection
problems in ways that provide adequate housing opportunities for those who need
them without disrupting the community.
In other ways as well, we are and will be working to promote better and more
open housing opportunities. For example:
-- By Executive Order 11512, issued in February 1970, I ordered that
in the selection of sites for Federal facilities consideration should be given to the
availability of adequate low- and moderate-income housing -- and I have ordered
that all agencies take specifically into account whether this housing is in fact
available on a nondiscriminatory basis.
-- Guidelines have recently been issued by the Office of Management
and Budget under the provisions of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1970, to assure that adequate housing is provided on a nondiscriminatory basis
and within the financial means of persons displaced by federally financed projects.
-- The Department of Housing and Urban Development has been actively
pressing the major Federal agencies regulating lending institutions to establish
effective, affirmative measures against racial discrimination in home mortgage
financing. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which regulates savings and
loan institutions, has been the first to undertake the development of new rles
and procedural safeguards. The Board is also working closely with industry
leaders to improve financial services offered to members of minority groups.
-- HUD also engages in a number of other Title Vill activities intended
to eliminate racial discrimination in housing. It publishes advisory guidelines
to aid those subject to the jurisdiction of the law in understanding their responsi-
bilities; it undertakes studies of housing practices and collects racial data on all
of its housing programs in order to determine areas of noncompliance; it conducts
continuing community education programs to inform individuals of their rights
under law; it encourages national, State and local private organizations in
undertaking programs designed to expand housing options for minority group and
low-income individuals; it works closely with State and local agencies having
fair housing laws substantially equivalent to Title Vill and refers complaints to
these agencies.
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A FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY
On March 24, 1970, 1 issued a statement setting forth in detail the administration's
policies on school desegregation. In a portion of that statement that applies equally
to housing, I said the goal of this administration is "a free and open society" -- and
I added:
In saying this, I use the words "free" and "open" quite precisely.
Freedom has two essential elements: the right to choose, and the
ability to choose. The right to move out of a mid-city slum, for
example, means little without the means of doing so. The right to
apply for a good job means little without access to the skills that
make it attainable. By the same token, those skills are of little use
if arbitrary policies exclude the person who has them because of race
or other distinction.
Similarly, an "open" society is one of open choices -- and one in
which the individual has the mobility to take advantage of those choices.
In speaking of "desegregation " or "integration , " we often lose sight
of what these mean within the context of a free, open, pluralistic
society. We cannot be free, and at the same time be required to fit
our lives into prescribed places on a racial grid -- whether segregated
or integrated, and whether by some mathematical formula or by auto-
matic assignment. Neither can we be free, and at the same time be
denied -- because of race -- the right to associate with our fellow-
citizens on a basis of human equality.
An open society does not have to be homogeneous, or even fully
integrated. There is room within it for many communities. Especially
in a nation like America, it is natural that people with a common
heritage retain special ties; it is natural and right that we have Italian
or Irish or Negro or Norwegian neighborhoods; it is natural and right
that members of those communities feel a sense of group identity and group
pride. In terms of an open society, what matters is mobility: the right
and the ability of each person to decide for himself where and how he
wants to live, whether as part of the ethnic enclave or as part of the
larger society -- or, as many do, share the life of both.
We are richer for our cultural diversity; mobility is what allows us
to enjoy it.
Economic, educational, social mobility -- all these, too, are
essential elements of the open society. When we speak of equal opportunity
we mean just that: that each person should have an equal chance
at the starting line, and an equal chance to go just as high and as
far cs his talents and energies will take him.
The Federal Government bears an important share of responsibility for achieving
fair housing for all Americans. But fair housing is not the responsibility of the
Federal Government alone, and not of government alone. Its achievement depends
on all of us -- on the States and localities, on business and industry, on civic
and professional leadership, and on each of us in his daily life.
For its part, the Federal Government will discharge fully its own particular respon-
sibilities and offer example and leadership for others in the discharge of their
responsibilities. We will be vigorous in enforcing both the constitutional mandate
and the statutory requirements that there not be housing discrimination on grounds
of race. In the more complex and difficult area of providing subsidized housing in
areas where it is needed, we will encourage communities and local developers to
take into account the broad needs of the various groups within the community and
of the metropolitan area.
But we all must recognize that the kinds of land use questions involved in housing
site selection are essentially local in nature: they represent the kind of basic
choices about the future shape of a community, or of a metropolitan area, that should
be chiefly for the people of that community or that area to determine. The challenge
of how to provide fair, open and adequate housing is one that they must meet; and
they must live with their success or failure.
To local officials are entrusted the initial, and often the final, determinations as to
how much low- and moderate-income housing is to be built, how well it is to be
built and where it is to be built. They operate under the same antidiscrimination
strictures that apply to Federal officials. And in terms of site selection and residential
zoning -- both sensitive and complex matters, and yet both central to the goal of
truly open housing in truly open communities -- they operate in an area little charted
by the Supreme Court but increasingly being navigated by the lower courts, as land use
restrictions come under mounting challenge on constitutional grounds.
Two recent court cases suggest the boundaries within which other courts will be
wrestling with these questions in the months and years just ahead. In one of these
cases (James v. Valtierra), the U. S. Supreme Court decided that, absent any
evidence of racialy dcriminatory intent, a State law requiring prior approval of
low-rent housing projects by community referendum does not, on its face, violate
the Constitution. Noting California's long tradition of using referenda on a wide
range of issues of public policy and the factual finding in the lower courts that legi-
timate economic considerations were involved in the referendum in question, the
court concluded that there was no factual basis for a claim that the California law
was "aimed at a racial minority. " On the other hand, in another case presenting
sharply contrasting circumstances (Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of
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Lackawanna, N.Y.), a Circuit Court of Appeals recently held illegal certain
zoning and other municipal restrictions used to block a subsidized low-income housing
development in an all-white neighborhood. In that case the municipal practices
were determined to be subterfuges and part of a pattern of racially motivated dis-
crimination by municipal officials; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. In short,
the one case did not present evidence of racially discriminatory intent; the other
did.
If these cases define the outer limits, they also indicate the broad range within
which cases will be pressed in the courts by those who would seek the mandate
of judicial decree in setting aside local restrictions to achieve social purposes:
for example, the right of a community to impose large-lot zoning, even in the
absence of any racial discrimination, has lately been under court challenge.
If the infinitely varied individual questions that arise as our thousands of local
governments hammer out their individual local land use policies are not appropriate
for Federal determination -- and they are not -- neither would it be wise to allow
a situation to develop in which they have to be hammered out in the courts. But
they no doubt will end up in the courts if they are not satisfactorily dealt with
outside the courts through timely and enlightened local action.
.This administration will offer leadership in encouraging local and State governments
and housing authorities to address this question creatively and imaginatively, and
to address it with a keen understanding of the needs of those persons for whom the
housing is being provided as well as the needs of the community at large.
Local and State authorities, for their part, should continue to respond constructively,
pressing forward with innovative and positive approaches of their own. For it is
they -- and beyond them, it is millions of Americans individually -- with whom the
challenge primarily rests. We are dealing here in a realm in which Federal authority,
while substantial in terms of enforcement, is very limited in terms of the many
choices that must be made in each community.
There are some who assume that the Federal Government has the power to do anything
it wants -- or that they want. But we have maintained our freedom for nearly two
centuries by insisting that the Federal Government's exercise of power not exceed
its authority.
I believe in that principle. And because the authority of the Federal agencies is -
limited -- quite properly, I believe -- with respect to the essentially local and
individual choices involved in local community planning, their power will be used
in only limited ways.
This does not reduce the challenge to the States, the localities and the people; it
heightens it. For the task of making our communities livagle, not for some but for
all -- of achieving our goals of decent homes and of open communities in a free and
open society -- this task summons the best that is in each and every one of us, in a
cause that touches our soul as a Nation. We cannot afford' to fail. I believe that




Babcock, Richard F. The Zoning Game. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1966.
Banfield, Edward C., and Wilson, James Q. City Politics. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963.
Banfield, Edward C. The Unheavenly Cty. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970.
Becker, lbward S. (ed.). Social Problems. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966.
Beer, Samuel, and Barringer, Richard (eds.). The State and the Poor. Cambridge:
Winthrop Publishers, 1970.
Birch, David L. The Economic Future of City and Suburb. New York: Committee
for Economic Development, 1970.
Blau, Peter M., and Duncan, Otis D. The American Occupational Structure.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.
Bolner, James. Civil Rights in the Political Process: An Analysis of the
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Law of 1965. Bureau of Government
Research, University of Massachusetts, 1967.
Brooks, Mary E. Exclusionary Zoning. Chicago: ASPO, 1970.
Campbell, Alan K. (ed.) The States and the Urban Crisis. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970.
Clark, Terry N. (ed.). Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative
Analysis. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968.
Coleman, James S. Community Conflict. New York: The Free Press, 1957.
Committee for Economic Development. Education for the Urban Disadvantaged
from Preschool to Employment. New York: C tD, 1971.
Congressional Quarterly. Candidates 1968. Washington, D. C., January, 1968.
Derthick, Martha. The Influence of Federal Grants. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970.
Green, Robert (ed.). Racial Crisis in America. Chicago: Follett, 1969.
I279.
Gittell, Marilyn (ed.). Educating an Urban Populatin. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications.
Gordan, David M. (ed.) Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Prespective.
Lexington, Mass.: Heath & Co. , 1971.
Heller, Walter. New Dimensions of Political Economy. New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1966.
Interfaith Housing. The Suburban Noose. Boston: Interfaith Housing Corp.,
December, 1969.
Lansing, John B. Residential Location and Urban Mobility: The Second Wave
of Interviews. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center,
1966.
Martin, Roscoe C. The Cities and the Federal System. New York: Atherton
Press, 1965.
Michelman, Frank I., and Sandalow, Terrance. Government in Urban Areas.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970.
Miller, S.M., and Roby, Pamela. The Future of Inequality. New York: Basic
Books, 1970.
Moynihan, Daniel P. (ed.). Toward a National Urban Policy. New York:
Basic Books, 1970.
Municipal Yearbook 1967. Chicago: The International City Manager's Association,
1967.
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing. Jobs and Housing
Interim Report. New York: NCDH, March, 1970.
Phillips, Kevin. The Emerging Republican Majority. New Rochelle, N.Y.:
Arlington House, 1970.
Sachs, Seymour; and Campbell, Alan K. Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns
and Governmental Systems. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
Toffler, Alvin (ed.) The School House in the City. New York: Praeger, 1968.
Toll, Seymour 1. Zoned American. New York: Grossman, 1969.
Wood, Robert C. Suburia: Its People and Their Politics.' Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1958.
2u0.
Williams, Oliver P.; Hummer, Harold; Liebman, Charles S.; and Dye, Thomas.
Suburban Differences and Metropolitan Policies: A Philadelphia Story.
Philadelphia: Universt.y of Pennsylvania, 1965.
ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS
-_______.__* "Fiscal 1971 HUD Appropriations. " Congressional Quarterly,
28, (December 18, 1970).
. "House Approves 2.4 Billion for Housing Programs. " Congressional
Quarterly, 28 (December 11, 1970).
. "Partial Text of Nixon's January 4 Television Interview."
Congressional Quarterly, 29 (January 8, 1971).
. "Text of President Nixon's December 10 News Conference."
Congressional Quarterly, 28 (December 18, 1970).
. "Liberalism in the Suburbs. " Newsweek, 76 (July 6, 1970).
Aiken, Michael, and Alford, Robert. "Community Structure and Innovation: The
Case cf Public Housing." American Political Science Review, 64 (December,
1970).
Aloi, Frank, and Goldberg, Arthur. "Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning:
The Beginning of the End?" Urban Law Annual, 9 (1971).
Americans for Democratic Action, Massachusetts Chapter of. "Legislative
Supplement: Bay State Citizen." (1965-1969).
Babcock, Richard. "The CourtsEnter the Land Development Market Place."
City, 5 (January/February, 1971).
Bertsch, Dale, and Shafor, Ann M. "A Regional Housing Plan: The Miami
Valley Regional Planning Commission Experience." Planners Notebook, 1
(April, 1971).
Birch, David L. , and Saenger, Jr., Engene L. "The Poor in Massachusetts."
The State and the Poor. Edited by Samuel Beer and Richard Barringer.
Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1970.
Boyd, William J.D. "Suburbia Takes Over. " National Civic Review, 55
(June, 1966).
Berger, B. "Suburbia and the American Dream." The Public Interest, Winter, 1966.
281.
Brain, George B. "Pressures on the Urban school." The Schoolhouse in
the City. Edited by Alvin Toffler. New York: Praeger, 1968.
Clark, Terry N. "Community Structure and Decision-Making. " Community
Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analyses. Edited By
Terry N. Clark. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968.
. "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures,
and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities. " American Sociological
Review, 33 (August, 1968).
Cohen, David K. "Compensation and Integration. " Equal Educational
Opportunity. Cambridge- Harvard University Press, 1969.
Coleman, James S. "Equal Schools or Equal Students." The Public Interest, 4
(Summer, 1966).
Crain, Robert L., and Rosenthal, Donald B. "Community Status as a Dimension
of Local Decision-Making. " American Sociological Review, 32
(December, 1967).
Davidoff, Paul, and Gold, Neil. "Suburban Action: Advocate Planning for
an Open Society. " Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 36
January, 1970).
"Exclusionary Zoning. " Yale Review of Law and Social Action, 1
($pring, 1971).
Dye, Thomas R. "Urban School Segregation: A Comparative Analysis." Urban
Affairs Quarterly, 4 (December 1968).
Epps, Richard W. "Suburban Jobs and Black Workers." Philadelphia Federal
Reserve Business Review, 1 0 (October, 1969).
Farley, Reynolds. "The Emergence of Black Suburbs." American Journal of
Sociology, 75 (January, 1970).
Flaim, Paul 0. "Jobless Trends in 20 Large Metropolitan Areas." Monthly
Labor Review, 91 (May, 1968).
, and Schwab, Paul M. "Employment and Unemployment Developments
in 1969. "Monthly Labor Review, 93 (February, 1970).
202.
Forstall, Richard L. "Economic Classification of Places over 10, 000, 1960-
1963. " The Municipal Year Book 1967. CRcago: The International
City Managers' Association, 1967.
Gamson, William A. "Rancorous Conflict in Community Politics. " American
Sociological Review, 31 (February, 1966).
Gans, Herbert J. "The Balanced Community: Homogeneity or Heterogeneity
in Residential Areas. " Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 27
(August, 1961).
Golden, Mark, and others. "Social Class Differentiation in Cognitive Devel-
opment: A Longitudinal Study. " Educational Research Information Center, 5
(March, 1970).
Harrison, Bennett. "Education and Underemployment in the Urban Ghetto."
Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective. Edited by David
M. Gordon. Lexington, Mass.- Heath & Co., 1971.
Hawley, Amos M. "Community Power Structure and Urban Renewal Success."
American Journal of Sociology, 68 (January, 1963).
Hilaski, Harvey J. "How Poverty Area Residents Look for Work. " Monthly
Labor Review, 94 (March 1971).
Hoffenbert, Richard. "The Relationship Between Public Policy and Some
Structural Environmental Variables in the American States. " American
Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966).
Kain, John F. "Alternatives for the Gilded Ghetto. " Public Interest, 14
(Winter, 1969).
. "H ousing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan
Decentralization. " Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82 (February, 1968).
Klain, Ambrose. "Zoning in Suburbia: Keep it, Reject It or Replace It?"
Council of Planning Librarians Exchange Bibliographies (March, 1971).
Labrie, Peter. "Black Central Cities: Dispersal or Rebuilding." Review of
Black Political Economy, 1 (Autumn, 1970).
Lawson, Simpson. "Open Communities: Frozen Federal Levers." Ci, 5
(January/February, 1971).
203.
. "Senator Ribicoff Joins the Issue of 'Forced Integration'"
City, 5 (March/April, 1971).
Lilley IlIl, William. "Housing Report/Romney Faces Political Perils with
Plan to Integrate Suburbs.," National Journal, 2 (October 17, 1970).
. "HUD Start to Limit Local Zoning Powers." Nbtional Journal,
3 (March 20, 1971).
Massachusetts Department of Commerce and the Urban and Regional Studies
Section of M. I. T. "The Effects of Large Lot Zoning on Residential
Development. " Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin (July, 1958).
Meyers, Phyllis. "Boston's METCO: What to Do Until the Solution Arrives."
City, 5 (January/February, 1971).
Miller, S. M. and Roby, Pam. "Education and Redistribution. " Racial Crisis
in America. Edited by Robert Green. Chicago: Follett, 1969.
Newman, Dorothy K. "The Decentralization of Jobs." Monthfl Labor Review,
90 (May, 1967).
Newman and Keaton. "Congress and the Faithful Execution of the Laws --
Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?" California Law Review,
41 (1953).
Pinard, Maurice. "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban
Politics: A Case of a Fluoridation Referendum. " American Journal of
Sociology, 68 (March, 1963).
Pinkerton, James. "City-Suburban Residential Patterns by Socdal Class."
Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6 (June, 1969).
Plager, Sheldon J. "Judicial Review 1970 Policy, Planning and the Courts."
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 37 (May, 1971).
Portnoy, Barry M. "Membership in the Club: Denizens of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives. " Harvard Journal of Legislation, 6 (January,
1969).
Reichley, James A. "The Political Containment of the Cities. " The States
and the Urban Crisis. Edited by Alan K. Campbell. Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1970.
284.
Rustin, Bayard. "The Failure of Black Separation." Harpers, 240 (January,
1970).
Sachs, Seymour, and Raoney, David C. "Suburban Education: A Fiscal Analysis."
Educating an Urban Population. Edited by Marilyn Gittell. Berverly Hills:
Sage Publications, Inc.
Sherer, Samuel. "Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New
Jersey. " Harvard Journal of Legislation (January, 1970).
Spady, William G. "Educational Mobility and Access: Growth and Paradoxes."
American Journal of Sociology, 73 (November, 1967).
Sudman, Seymour; Bradburn, Norman M.; and Gockel, Galen. "The Extent
and Character of Racially Integrated Housing in the United States." The
Journal of Business of the University of Chicago (January, 1969).
Thomas, Nicholas P. "Revenue Sharing: What will Be Its Impact on Planning?"
AIP Newsletter, 6 (June, 1971)
Trow, Martin. "Two Problems in American Education. " Social Problems. Edited
by Howard S. Becker. New York:. John Wiley & Sons, 1966.
Walker, Jack. "Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States. " American
Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969).
Weston, Martin V. B. "Tales of the Suburbs: Warren Keeps Most of Its
Castle Intact." City, 5 (January/February, 1970).
Wilson, James Q. and Banfield, Edward C. "Public-Regardingness as a
Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review,
58 (December, 1964).
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
Coleman, James S., and others. Equality of Educational Opportunity.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966.
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rel-itions. Fiscal Balance
in the American Federal System, Volume 2, Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October, 1967.
2C.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Federal Installations and Equal Housing
Opportunity. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March, 1970.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Home Ownership for Lower Income Families.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June, 1971.
U.S. Commission on Urban Housing. A Decent Home. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1969.
U.S. Congress, Congressional Record. 92nd Congress, Ist Session, 1971.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency. Housing and the
Urban Environment, Report and Recommendation of Three Study Panels.
92nd Corgress, Ist Session, June, 1971.
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency. Papers
Submitted to Subcommittee on Housing Panels on Housing Production,
Housing Derm nd, and Developing a Suitable Living Environment.
92nd Congress, Ist Session, June, 1971.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal EducatioralI Opportunity.
Equality of Educational Opportunity, Part IA, An Introduction. 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, April 20, 21, 27, 29; May 5 and 12, 1970.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity.
Equality of Educational Opportunity, Part 5, De Facto Segregation and
Housing Discrimination. 91st Congress, 2nd Session, August 25, 26, 27;
September 1, 1970.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity.
Equality of Educational Opportunity, Part 6, Racial Imbalance
in Urban Schools-. 91st Congress, 2nd Session, September 15 and 22, 1970.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Consumer Buying
Indicators, Special Report on Household Ownership and Purchases of
Automobiles and Selected Household Durables, 1960-1967. Series P-65,
No. 19, 1967.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current Population
Reports, Trends in Social and Economic Conditions in Metropolitan Areas.
Series P-23, No. 27, February, 1969.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. V.,
Local Governments in Metropolitan Areas. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, October, 1964.
2o6,
U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Census, 1960, State and Small Areas.
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Toward A social
Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. U. S. Task Force on
Urban Education. The Urban Education Task Force Report; Final Report
to the Department of Hea Ith, Education and Welfare. Wilson C. Riles,
Chairman, 1970.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developnent., HUD Challenge. July/
August, 1970.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. HUD Comprehensive
Planning Assistance Handbook I, Guidelines Leading to a Grant.
Washington, D.C.: G. P.O., March, 1969.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Equal Opportunity.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. n.d.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. FHA Form No. 3126a &
2500a Evaluation of Request for Reservation of Contract Authority for Rent
Supplement and Section 236 Projects. n. d.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Notice C PM 71-1
To: All Areawide Planning Organizations Subject: Extension of
Statutory Planning Requirements Deadline." n.d.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Developme nt. Progress Report No. 6,
south Central and East Los Angeles Transportation Employment Project.
|967.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Project Evaluation System."
Circular MPD 6220. 2.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. "701 Working Paper
Housing Element Evaluation. " unpublished, n.d.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1968 Statistical Yearbook.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1969 HUD statistical
Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: .Government Printing Office.
201.
U. S. Np artment of Housing and Urban Development. Summary of the
Community Development Water and Sewer Program Activity Cumulative
as of April 30, 1971. Washington, D. C.: G. P.O., 1971.
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. "The Social and
Economic Status of Negroes in the United States in 1969. " BLS Report,
No. 375.
U.S. Department of Labor, Orshansky, Mollie. "The Poor in City and
Suburb, 1964. " Social Security Bulletin. 29, (December, 1966)-.
U.S. National Commission on Urban Problems. Building the American City.
Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1969.
U. S. National Commission on Urban Problems. Zoning Controversies in the Sub-
urbs: Three Case Studies, Research Report 11, Raymond and May
Associates. Washington, D.C.: G. P.O., 1968.
U. S. President's Task Force on Low Income Housing. Report of President's
Task Force on Low Income Housing. R. J. Saulnier, Chairman, 1970.
U. S. President's Task Force on Urban Renewal. Report of President's Task
Force on Urban Renewal. M. L. Colean, Chairman, 1970.
U. S. President's Task Force on Suburban Problems. Report of President's Task
Force on Suburban Problems. Charles Hoar, Chairman, December 98,
MUNICIPAL AND STATE DOCUMENTS
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Labor and Industries, Division
of Statistics. "Summary of Building Permit Activity for the Year 1968."
Massachusetts. Report of the Legislative Research Council Relative to Reducing
the Zoning Power to City and County Government. Mass. S. 1133, June,
1968.
Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Housing Metropolitan Boston, Vol. 1,
Housing Demand and the Housing Supp y 950 to 1980. Boston: MAPC,
1969.
Newton Board of Aldermen. "Resolution. " City of Newton in Board of
Aldermen, December 15, 1969, No. 1037-69.
Subcommittee on Low Income Housing. Report to Newton Board of Aldermen.
Edward C. Uehlein, Chairman, Newton, Mass. 1967.
Newton Democratic City Committee. "Statement of the Newton Democratic
City Committee in Support of Low and Moderate Income Housing."
May 7, 1969.
Newton Planning Department.. Apartment Study, 1971. Newton, Mass.
Planning Department, 1971.
Newt6n Planning Department. Newton, Massachusetts, Economic Base Study,
An Element of the Comprehensive Plan. Newton, Mass. Planning
Department, 1967.
Newton Planning Department. Low-Moderate Income Housing Study, 1968.
Newton, Mass. Planning Department, 1968.
Newton Republican City Committee. Policy Statement on Low and Moderate
Income Housing in Newton. April 9, 1969.
Rubin, Mrs. Lawrence, and Sharf, H. "Conference on Newton's Need for
Low and Moderate Income Housing, May 7, 1969: A Follow-Up Report."
n.d.
COURT DECISIONS
Douglas v. California 372 U.S. 353 361, 1963.
James v. Valtierra U.S. Report, Case 154, April 6, 1971, 905 Ct. 1873
(1970) rev. G. 313, F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Kennedy Park Homes Assn. , Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D. New York 1970).
U.S. v. City of Black Jack, Missouri, a municipal corporation, Defendant. In
he U.S. Dstrict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.




ire Service. Washington, D.C. 6:40 p.m., June 16, 1971.
J. Associated Press wire copy, June 13, 1971.
Associated Press wire copy, Philadelphia, 2:06 p.m.,
June 16, 1971.
Thelen, Jr., G. C. Associated Press wire copy, June 11, 1971.
Boston Globe
. "Nixon's Housing Stand under Fire. " July 25, 1971.
. "Zoning Discriminates, Paul Douglas Claims." May 14, 1968.
Ellis, David R. "Prorogation Fever Rising on the Hill." July 25, 1969.
. "Sargent Names Two Zoning Men." August 7, 1971.
Keene, Evelyn. "Anti-snob Zoning Law Fails but Succeeds." January 3, 1971.
1971._ . "Housing Leaders Deplore Policy as 'Regressive'" June 12,
1971.
Micciche, S. J. "Nixon Vows Fight for Open Housing."




Rabinovits, Barbara. "Snob Zoning Fails, Serves as Catalyst. " November 8,
1970.
209.
Boston Record American 290.
Associated Press. "Nixon Urges - But Won't Force - Open Housing in U.S.
Suburbs. " June 12, 1971.
Christian Science Monitor
Carnegie, Christa. "Romney Housing Plans Come Tumbling Down. " June 12, 1971.
Sheldon, Courtney R. "Open Housing - What Next?" June 12, 1971.
Kansas City Star
Associated Press. "Nixon's Housing Stand. " June 12, 1971.
Harnett, Ken. "Suburbs Fight HUD 'Invasion'." November 7, 1970.
Los Angeles Times
Irwin, Don, and Ostrow, Ronald J. "Nixon says He will not Force Low Rent
Housing on Suburbs." June 12, 1971.
New York Times
Flint, Jerry M. "Blue Collar Workers of Warren, A'Detroit Suburb, Fight to
Keep Negroes Out. " August 17, 1970.
. "Suburb Rejects Housing Program. " November 8, 1970.
Herbers, John. "Change Foreseen." April, 1971.
. "Federal Housing Projects Stir Strong Opposition Across the U.S."
July 14, 1970.
. "Housing Struggle in Suburbs. " April 30, 1971.
. "How Do You Break the Ring Around the City?" January 10, 1971.
. "Mitchell Is Said to Advise Romney to Take New Post."
November 22, 1970.
. "Suburbs Accept Poor in Ohio Housing Plan. " December 21, 1970.
. "Romney Asks Ban on Rules Curbing Housing for Poor. " June 3, 1970.
Semple, Robert B., Jr. "Nixon to Enforce Rights Measures for U.S. Housing."
June 12, 1971.
Shipler, David K. "Agnew, in Suburbs Speech, Borrowed from Memo.
March 19, 1970.
Weaver, Warren, Jr. "Agnew Advocates a Suburban Drive to Aid the Slums."
March 8, 1970.
The Newton Graphic, Newton Villages and Transcript, and the News Tribune.
Articles concerning NCDF, housing, and Newton politics, 1969-1971.
San Francisco Chronicle
N.Y. Times Service. "Nixon's Policy on Housing Segregation." June 12, 1971.
Washington Post
Editorial. "Mrs. Martin, Mr. Comer and Mr. Romney." April 30, 1971.
Hardy, David W. "Court Halts Watkins Glen Lease Plan. " April 2, 1971.
Phillips, Kevin. "HUD Turns to Sewers." November 6, 1970.
. "Squeezing the Suburbs." June 22, 1971.
UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS
Arden, Celest. "The Problems of Moderate Income Housing in the Suburbs and
the 221d3 Program in Boston Metropolitan Area." MIT, May 14, 1969.
Basbas, Monte G. Mayor. Letter to Mr. Robert C. Casselman, Chairman,
Newton Community Developmen t Foundation, November 21, 1969.
Cohen, Benjamin I., and Noll, Roger G. "Employment Trends in Central
Cities.
Fiedler, Deborah. "Open Communities and NCDF: Search for a Suburban
Solution to Low Income Housing Needs." Harvard Law School, September,
1970.
Frieden, Bernard J. "Blacks in Suburbia: The Myth of Better Opportunities."
Draft, n.d.
Green, Susan. "Increasing the Supply of Low and Moderate Income Housing in
Newton, Massachusetts: The Housing Controversy at.the Local Level."
Wellesley College, May 25, 1971.
. "Newton Community Development Foundation: The Analysis
of an Interest Group as a Social System. " Wellesle'y College, January
11, 1971.
Howard, John T. Letter to Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs.
June 20, 1969.
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al. "Response by Public Interest
Groups to Administration Pronouncement on Equal Housing Opportunity." n.d.
Linsky, Martin, and Turner, John. 'Watch Out Suburbs - Here Come the
Cities." Draft, Fall, 1969.
Mann, Frank. "Civil Defense in Newton: A Case Study in Administrative
Frustration. " Senior Thesis, Harvard University, 1955.
Power, Margaret. "Getting Together: State Coalitions for Metropolitan
Change. " Fb rthcoming Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of -Political
Science, MIT.
Rabinovitz, Francine F. "Toward a National Suburban Policy. " Draft of
Chapter in forthcoming book, 1971.
Rein, Martin, and Marris, Peter. "Stratification and Social Policy. " Paper
for an American Academy of Arts and Sciences publication, 1970.
Schneider, Karen. "Innovation in State Legislation: The Massachusetts
Suburban Zoning Act. " Senior Thesis, Radcliffe College, March, 1970.
Steele, Julian. Commissioner of Department of Community Affairs. Letter
to Ways and Means Committee of the Massachusetts House of Represen -
tatives. July 8, 1969.
Sisitsky, Alan D. "The'Anti-Snob' Zoning Act of 1969." Seminar paper,
Harvard University, Government 247, April 27, 1970.
Williams, Norman, Jr. , and Norman, Thomas. "Exclusionary Land Use Con-
trols: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey." n.d.
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS
Anonymous Newton Politicians and Participants in the NCDF Controversy
Blackman, Rev. Ed. United Church of Christ, Boston, Mass. December 9,
1969.
Browning, Steve, and Skiles, James. Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under
Law, Washington, D.C., June 23, July 22, 1971.
Celia, Alexander, Assistant to Massachusetts Senate President Maurice
Donahue, December 9, 1969.
Dockser, William B., Assistant Commissioner for Subsidized Housing, Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Was h ington, D. C. , October 26, 29, 1970.
Donahue, Maurice, Former President, Massachusetts Senate, Cambridge, Mass.
April 16, 1971.
Dowden, James, Assistant Director, National Service to Regional Councils,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
Eller, John, Assistant to Speaker David Bartley of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, November 25, 1969.
Finnegan, William, Staff member of Massachusetts House Ways and Means
Committee, November 25, 1969.
Franklin, Herbert, Executive Associate of the National Urban Coalition,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
Gibson, Kenneth, Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, Harvard - MIT Joint
Center for Urban Studies , Lunch at Harvard Faculty Club, Cambridge,
Mass. Apri l 27, 1971.
Gross, George, Counsel, Subcommittee on Housing, House Committee on
Banking and Currency, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1971.
Ireland, Casey, Minority staff member, Housing Subcommittee of the House
Banking and Currency Committee, Washington, D. C., June 28, 1971.
Karth, Ken, Civil Engineer, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments,
Washington, D.C., June 25, 1971.
29)40
Koval, Alex. Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, December 9, 1969.
Levine, Helene. Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, December 18, 1969.
Lovenheim, David, Legislative Assistant to Rep. Frank Horton, R-NY,
Washington, D.C., June 30, 1971.
Leary, Theodore M., Special Assistant to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Washington,
D.C., April 9, 1971.
Lilley Ill, William, of the National Journal, Washington, D.C., October 26
and 29, 1970.
Linsky, Martin, Representative to Massachusetts Great and General Court
from Brookline, October 8, 1969.
Malakoff, Robert E., Staff of the U. S. Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
Housing and Urban.Affairs Subcommittee, Washington, D.C., June 24,
1971.
McDermott, William. Massachusetts Home Builders Association. December 9,
1969.
Raitanen, K.K., Principal Planner for Department of Community Affairs,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, November 25, 1969.
Richardson, M. Daniel, Boston Area Director, HUD, July 8, 1971.
Rodgers, Allen. Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Waltham, Mass., May
1, 1971.
Rosenberg, Philip, Acting Program Manager, HUD, Boston Area Office, November,
9, 1970.
Scott, James. Washington Suburban Institute. Alexandria, Virginia, June 29,
1971.
Seeley, Margaret, Lobbyist of the National Association of Counties, Washington,
D.C., June 23, 24, 1971.
Shaeval,William, Assistant to Massachusetts State Senator John Moakley,
January 22, 1970.
Slater, David. American Institute of Planners, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1971.
Sloane, Martin E., Assistant Staff Director,
Washington, D.C., June 28, 1971.
U.S. Civil Rights Commission,
Skiles, James. Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law. Washington,
D.C., June 30, 1971.
Stephens, Robert G. , U.S. Representative, D-Ga, Washington, D.C., June
29, 1971.
Thompson, Fletcher, U.S. Representative, R-Ga, Washington,
1971.
D.C., June 28,
Tonini, Arthur, Urban Planner, HUD, Boston Area Office, July 8, 1971.
Widnall, William B. U.S. Representative, R-NJ, Washington, D.C., June
29, 1971.
Wood, Robert C., Former Under Secretary of HUD, 1965 - 68, May 4, 1971.
Note: Unless otherwise noted, all interviews took place in Boston, Massachusetts.
